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MUNICH—BEFORE AND AFTER.

THE Prime Minister deserves all the tributes that have been paid to him for the splendid initiative which brought the world back to safety and sanity at the eleventh hour in the recent crisis. I do not think many people share the confidence of his critics that they could have done better than he did. At the same time it is a portentous fact that we should have been brought to the edge of this terrible precipice in seeking a settlement of the Czechoslovakian minority problem. That belongs to the order of events which could not be repeated without total disaster. "Never again" must be the word for us all.

Let us try meanwhile to keep some sense of proportion in looking back on what has happened. There is a temptation to bandy epithets which are either inappropriate or greatly exaggerated. Whether Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to the convenience of France and Britain or, as a large part of Europe believes, saved by their intervention from the fate of Austria, will only be known for certain when the secrets of more hearts are revealed. But in any case, words like "surrender" and "betrayal" cannot fairly be applied to the British part in those transactions. We were of course, as signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, concerned to see that any alteration in its terms was carried out in an orderly way, and we shared with other nations the obligations of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. But we had not, like France and Russia, given Czechoslovakia any specific pledge to guard her interests; we were not like those two in a special relation with the Little Entente, of which Czechoslovakia was a member. Our interests were rather European than local—to see that the local dispute did not develop into a European war in which by virtue of our pledge to support France we should inevitably be involved.

It was in these circumstances that Lord Runciman went out at the request of the British Government to play the part of *amicus curiae*, if that were still possible. It was late in the day. Czechoslovakia had failed to solve the problem of the

Sudeten Germans in the years since the peace ; grossly as their grievances had been exaggerated, she had left enough of them to afford a handle to her German enemy, who had the overwhelming advantage over her friends of proximity and an immense apparatus of force within striking distance. It is impossible to read Lord Runciman's report without coming to the conclusion that the chance of any moderate settlement under which the Sudeten Germans would have lived as loyal citizens within the boundaries of Czechoslovakia had passed before he had time to study the problem. A correspondent who visited Czechoslovakia in August wrote to me on his return that the Sudeten Germans genuinely believed that they were going to be massacred by the Czechs. I replied that the fear was fantastic, and that it must have been put into their heads by German propagandists. To which my correspondent rejoined that this might be true, but that the alarm was genuine and must be regarded as the essential fact in the situation with which Lord Runciman had to deal.

It is here precisely that we get the crux of an unsolved minority problem. It may be settled by compromise early in the day, but if that fails and it becomes material for agitation and propaganda, it rapidly passes beyond the point at which a stubborn dissentient bloc can be induced to live in amity with a majority of different race and religion. That was our experience in Ireland, it is our experience to-day in Palestine, and after much tribulation we have been driven to the conclusion that there is no remedy, when this point is reached, but that of partition in some form. Lord Runciman no doubt had his own Irish experience in mind when he reported that some cession of territory was necessary and had better be carried out promptly.

Those who object may fairly be asked to say what alternative they think there was in the circumstances as he found them. Was it possible that Britain, France, and Russia, operating from a distance, should make themselves responsible for clamping this reluctant minority on to the Czech State and defending that State against the opposition of Germany ? Could that have been permanent, and would it have been wise, even if we had had the force available to keep the watch that would have been necessary to prevent another Austrian *coup* from the German side ? Was there any compromise which would not have been a continuing source of mischief ?

Disagreeable as may be the necessity for Czechoslovakia, it seems to me highly probable that if an impartial international Commission had been called upon to deal with the situation in the form in which it was presented to Lord Runciman, its conclusion would have been substantially the same as his. What was amiss was not so much the settlement proposed, which may very well be judged hereafter to have made the best of a bad job, as the manner in which it was reached—pressure and counter-pressure to an accompaniment of roaring speeches and marching troops. The present German régime has always been preternaturally obtuse to the impression it makes on foreign countries, but if it is concerned to inquire why at the end of this affair practically the whole world was convinced that, if there had been a war Germany would have been to blame, it has only to refresh its memory about the proceedings at Nuremberg and the speeches of Herr Hitler and Field-Marshal Goering during the feverish days of the Party Congress.

I do not think we need trouble ourselves too much about the appearances in this affair. The judgment of history will be on the substance, not on the appearance, and to those who come after, the appearance of having sought a solution by threats may well, in the light of the facts, be as discrediting as the appearance of having yielded to threats. But it was extremely desirable that Herr Hitler's passionate assertion that the question concerned him and him alone should not pass unchallenged, and here, it seems to me, there was real gain in the final Munich terms as compared with the Godesberg terms. It was at last admitted that other Powers were concerned as well as Germany. An International Commission was charged with seeing that the transfer was carried out in an orderly way. Various mitigations were introduced into the original German demands, but, most important of all, the settlement bears the signatures of Four Powers instead of being imposed by one. The late Lord Grey would have been well content if he could have obtained a similar recognition of the rights of other Powers after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908.

II

So much for the local question. If nothing more can be said for it than that in the end the best was made of a bad job, I

believe that history will judge that those who saved the world from being plunged into war about it were public benefactors. But it remains to ask, why was it such a bad job, and why are there so many bad jobs lying dangerously about to trouble the peace? The "postscript" signed jointly by himself and Herr Hitler which the Prime Minister brought back from Munich gives promise of a new start, and the answer to this question is of great importance as a preliminary to that.

I should say briefly that the question of Czechoslovakia has brought to its climax the whole order of events which may be summarised as the failure of the League of Nations. This was not the failure to enforce sanctions but the failure to lay the foundations on which alone sanctions could have been enforced without risk of great and dangerous wars. For this two conditions were essential. (1) Disarmament which would have redressed the heavy adverse balance against the defeated nations, and (2) Treaty Revision to the extent of removing their principal grievances under the post-war Treaties. With the United States standing out, the problem of establishing collective security was from the beginning much more difficult than was contemplated in 1919, but if these two conditions had been fulfilled, a sufficiently powerful European League might still have been set up. Without their fulfilment and the consequent failure to bring Germany into the League, the original idea was changed out of recognition. The "collective security" of the original model was security for all against war and security for each against aggression, the means to be employed being the supposed peaceful one of economic sanctions imposed on an offender by an (*ex hypothesi*) overwhelming majority, which an aggressor would have been powerless to resist. In the actual circumstances the League commanded only a majority, and by no means always an overwhelming one, and the measure it proposed was not security at all as that word is generally understood, but the punishment or restraint of a powerful aggressor at the cost or risk of a great war.

It seems to me important that the right emphasis should be laid on these facts, for otherwise the failure of the imperfect League may lead us to despair of the possibility of realising the perfect League. There is no need to despair. The League as originally planned is still the right ideal for peacemakers in all countries, and with patience what is essential in it may

still be realised. But the important point for the moment is to face the fact that the conditions essential to the success of the League, as constituted in 1919, were never realised, and, if we can, to discover why.

The short answer to this question is, I believe, that the two principal members of the League, Britain and France, held radically different views about its objects and functions. We regarded it benevolently, if rather vaguely, as the road to appeasement and international order ; the French regarded it as the guarantor of the *status quo* established by the post-war Treaties. Disarmament was essential to the British idea ; the maintenance of all armaments against Germany to the French. Between the two, successive disarmament Conferences broke down on one pretext or another ; treaty revision slipped out of sight, and the opportunity of conciliating Germany, while she was still a democratic Power, was lost. There was a moment, the moment of Locarno, when the French seemed to be converted to the British point of view, but the refusal to disarm persisted and once more the opportunity went by.

The circumstances can be explained without recrimination. French fears were natural, and to the French mind British hopes seemed Utopian. France had again and again been invaded from across the Rhine, and Frenchmen could not afford to take the risk of a German change of heart. In spite of all disclaimers they were convinced that Germany was rearming, and until they had positive proof that she had abandoned the thought of a *revanche* they would not join in any general disarmament. In 1919 they had withdrawn their claim to the Rhine frontier in deference to our wishes and accepted in return the pledge of a tripartite guarantee which had immediately been repudiated by the United States. The least, they protested, that they could do in the circumstances was to remain armed. How right we were, is even to-day the conclusion drawn by immense numbers of Frenchmen ; and how wrong you British were to delude yourselves with the dream of a reconciled Germany.

Our answer was that, apart from anything that we might wish or hope, the idea of keeping Germany subdued and disarmed was in itself a dream which could not be realised for any length of time. It was Bismarck's policy to France after 1870, the policy which came to its catastrophe in 1914. But these differences of opinion were fatal to any coherent

or consistent policy. We were not prepared to make war on Germany to prevent her from rearming or reoccupying the Rhineland—which would have been the logical corollary of French policy—and after their experience in the Ruhr, the French were unable or unwilling to act alone. In the upshot we alone continued to disarm, irrespective of what others might do, with results that Mr. Baldwin revealed to an astonished public in 1936. After that came the rush into rearmament, accompanied by alarming doubts whether we should be ready in time. So far we had neither succeeded in appeasing Germany, nor armed sufficiently to be safe against her rearmament.

This confusion between the ideal and the real came to its climax in the attempt to apply sanctions to Italy. The British Government considered it supremely important to vindicate the League, but immense numbers in France thought it folly to commit the French army and navy to rescuing Abyssinia, while Herr Hitler, now known to be formidably armed, stood waiting for his opportunity on the Eastern front. A firm common front was extremely unlikely in these circumstances, and the Hoare-Laval settlement was the patch-up which the Quai d'Orsay considered essential to extricate them from what they thought to be an extremely dangerous situation. Once more France and Britain slipped into the hole between the old diplomacy and the new League policy. The Hoare-Laval settlement, a typical effort in the old diplomacy, was rejected as a betrayal of the League, and the League failed to save anything out of the wreck of Abyssinia. Long before the question of Czechoslovakia was reached the League was out of action. The signatories of the Treaty of Versailles were now left with the burden of defending against a rearmed and hostile Germany territorial arrangements, many of them admitted to be harsh and unfair, imposed on her when she was helpless and disarmed.

III

Can we now get out of this unhappy situation and lay the foundation of peaceful adjustment in the future? The paper—let us hope, this time, not a scrap of paper—to which Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain have put their signature—takes us to the heart of the matter. It raises, in its simplest terms,

the question which, throughout my lifetime, has overshadowed all others—can Europe live at peace with Germany? It was the question of 1870, the question of 1914, and is now the question of 1938. It presents itself first of all as a question between France and Germany, but their hereditary quarrel has for generations been the vortex into which all their neighbours have been sucked, and it must be ended if Europe is to have peace.

If this is impossible then—let us face the fact—there is no hope of permanent peace. Disclaim it as she may, France will, indeed must, still seek the encirclement of Germany; Germany will still seek to break loose from encirclement, and as she grows stronger will draw others to her side. All other questions—Spain, China, the minority problems of Central and South-east Europe, the Colonial question, will be considered in their relation to this central issue. The League of Nations, if it survives, will more and more become an anti-German bloc, and probably be asked to leave Geneva lest Swiss neutrality should be compromised. The prospect of keeping Germany within bounds will then largely depend on Russia, whose policy and intentions, with all the mystery attaching to them, will more than ever be the subject of anxiety to the Western Powers. We shall be back in the old power-politics with the danger greatly increased by the new armaments.

An uneasy peace may be kept on these terms but it will be enormously costly in armaments, and largely fatal to economic progress. Not only will the contribution which a peaceful Germany might make to the happiness and prosperity of the world be lost, but her economic expansion and increase of population will be regarded as a menace by her neighbours. To satisfy her demands for Colonies would be to put weapons into her hands.

Since that is the inevitable sequel on the hypothesis of a hostile Germany, it seems mere common sense to try the hypothesis of a friendly one and exhaust its possibilities. Here I can imagine a cynic breaking in and asking whether I am so innocent as to trust Germany in the teeth of the evidence supplied by Herr Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and her behaviour in recent times. I would trust nothing except a settlement which she has an interest in observing, or at least not seeking to change by force. Here, I think, there is a new factor which

should help. The alternative to peace is no longer the business-like kind of war contemplated by Bismarck and the soldiers of his generation—it is the fearful and indiscriminate destruction from which all the nations shrank aghast in the few days in which they had to look it in the face. In Germany, no less than in France, Britain and Italy, the peoples are at this moment on the side of peace, as never before in living memory. Whatever their dreams and ambitions, statesmen cannot afford to ignore this new fact.

But if we are to go forward with any prospect of success, we and the French must this time keep step. We must not give Germany a pretext for saying that we are pursuing a double policy, professing friendship but continuing hostility behind the scenes, “reinsuring”—in Bismarck’s phrase,—our open obligations with secret treaties. If we are to sweep away suspicions and animosities, we need at last to make a reality of the openness and candour which we had hoped would be a leading feature of the new order created by the Covenant of the League. Next, we must go to meet the difficult problems instead of waiting, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, until they have gone past the point at which they can be settled without wrath and threats. The ingrained diplomatic habit of looking to the morrow and letting the next day look after itself will not serve in these times. We must go at least half-way to meet our modern devils.

It is conceivable that if France and Britain had acted together in the last twenty years, they could have prevented the rearming of Germany and kept her within the boundaries of the post-war treaties for another short period. But this would have been only to postpone the problem, while aggravating its conditions. Europe has somehow to digest the fact that Germany with her immense population and resources is beyond doubt the greatest Power in Europe and can in no way be prevented from playing a predominant part over the great central region. Is that impossible? Let us remember that other nations have for generations had to digest the fact, undoubtedly disagreeable to them, that Great Britain is by far the strongest world-power. Neither we nor Germany can expect to live in peace or be free from trouble if our neighbours have cause to think that we are abusing our position. Strong as we are, the coalitions against us would, in that case, be stronger.

IV

I can only touch the fringe of the questions which now open up. I do not think it wise to complain that a new beginning must be made by the Four Powers, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Practical statesmanship has to reckon with suspicions and prejudices which make it impossible at the moment to bring Russia in or to use the machinery of the League of Nations. But to bring Russia in and get back to a new League—or rather, let us say, the League as originally planned—must be one of the principal thoughts of the Western Powers. The co-operation of Russia will be essential, for standing out or going her own way she will make disarmament on any large scale extremely difficult, and fear of a combination between her and France will still be one of the chief motives of German policy.

In the meantime the pacifism, which urged unilateral disarmament—disarmament in faith that others would follow where we led—has, I am afraid, received its death-blow. Great countries with crowded centres of population cannot negotiate with others on even terms if they are all the time conscious of their vulnerability from the air. This is an open invitation to the diplomatic blackmail which has followed in recent years from the development of air-power. To be assured that the outbreak of war will not immediately expose us to massacre and confusion is the minimum necessary. The cost and the collective absurdity of being compelled to order the life of peace in this way should in all countries help to the education which will presently abolish war or cause it to fall into desuetude.

To offer sympathy to Czechoslovakia may seem at the moment like the shedding of crocodile's tears. It is in a sense true that the peace has been secured at her cost, and if for that reason alone she deserves all possible public and private assistance. But we are not at the end of Treaty revision; we have in front of us the Colonial question, which concerns not us alone, but all the Colonial and Mandatory Powers, and if every proposal to return territory to Germany is to be denounced as an intolerable sacrifice by those who are in possession, there can be no peaceful settlement. To invoke all the sentiments which have gathered about ancient States and nations for the benefit of twenty-year-old treaty

creations, and to denounce their reconsideration as though it were a violation of time-honoured loyalties and unities will greatly increase the difficulty of this problem. The excesses of national sovereignty make trouble enough in the old States; we must keep them within bounds in dealing with the new.

Through all these questions runs another question: Can the different "ideologies" be induced to work together for peace? If we were to take seriously their propagandist literature the answer would have to be no. The Bolshevik dream of international revolution, the Nazi idea of the Greater Reich, the Italian of restoring the Roman Empire, all threaten international trouble. But if a peaceful atmosphere can be restored, these crusading battle-cries are likely to sink into the distance. The probable causes of war between nations are not ideological; there is no necessary connection between their foreign policies and the different forms of their governments; nothing could be less probable than that they would succeed in converting one another by violence. A large field is open to common efforts for world peace while each goes its own way in its internal affairs. But no offence must be taken if, while seeking this common ground with the Fascist Powers, the free and democratic Powers continue energetically to defend their own doctrines against attack or infiltration from without. It is on the battleground of debate and argument, and not on the physical stricken field that this war will eventually be lost or won, and here we must all be free to defend what we think to be the right.

J. A. SPENDER.

GERMANY AFTER MUNICH.

ON the Monday after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden I was dining in Berlin with some leading German journalists and Foreign Office officials. It was quite a convivial party. While the Wilhelmstrasse did not wholly share the optimism and immense sense of relief of the German people after Berchtesgaden, and had some knowledge of the difficulties which were to come to the surface at Godesberg, we were all comparatively hopeful. The toast of Anglo-German understanding was proposed and we were all about to drink it, when one of the party said there was another toast he wanted to drink first—to the well-being of the new Czechoslovakia.

I do not think it would be fair to dismiss this as cant or hypocrisy. The previous conversation had turned on the question what the policy of the new Czechoslovakia was likely to be. Strange though it may seem, the Germans had quite genuine misgivings on the point. They feared that even after the lopping of Sudeten territory the Czechs might, fortified by the proposed guarantee, attempt to reconstitute the old barrier against German predominance and continue to pursue an anti-German policy. And they were quite determined that this should not be done. But provided that the Czechs were ready to make terms with them they were prepared, they said, to offer good terms. In particular, the new Czechoslovakia could obtain, they maintained, a thoroughly favourable commercial treaty, and the proposer of the toast in question insisted that the people who would profit most by the whole transaction would be the Czech Agrarians, in fact the Czech and Slovak farmers generally.

Here, I think, lies the key to Hitler's intransigence at Godesberg, as well as to much that has happened since. The Nazis were determined to press matters to a point where any attempt to hold the Bohemian bastion or to maintain French Eastern policy would be patently ridiculous, and with that objective Hitler was undoubtedly prepared to face a world war which, it was calculated, would peter out as soon as the Western Powers saw they could not do anything effective. Here, too, is the explanation of the bitter attacks on M. Beneš, a man whose whole career was bound up with the policy of resistance to Germany and reliance on the Western Powers

and Russia, and of the change of tone in the German Press now that he is gone.

From the German point of view the real achievement of Munich is not the annexation of territory or the liberation of the Sudeten Germans, good propaganda points though these may be. In both the February and July numbers of this REVIEW I maintained that apart from Austria the primary object of German foreign policy to-day was not territorial revision. I do not believe, for example, that Henlein's Carlsbad points or the negotiations with Lord Runciman were pure eyewash, as many people have naturally assumed. If at almost any time President Beneš or the Czech leaders had made it clear that they were ready to denounce the French and Russian alliances and enter the orbit of German policy, they might well have been able to avoid cessions of territory altogether. For two years at least the German Foreign Office has been putting this forward, together with some sort of autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, as the German terms for an understanding with Czechoslovakia. If the terms were raised at the last minute the reason was probably not so much to secure the aggrandisement of the Reich as to make doubly sure of the smashing of the Paris-Prague-Moscow line.

Perhaps I may quote here a passage from my book, *The German Revolution*, written some five years ago :

It may indeed reasonably be argued that the chief difficulty of the situation lies in the fact that the natural demand of the Germanic races for equality, territorial adjustment, and security for minorities is inevitably tantamount to a demand for the hegemony of the Central and Eastern Europe. At present France and her Slav allies are predominant. Their demand for the chimera of absolute security involves the maintenance of this predominance. The situation is somewhat complicated by the emergence of Italy as a new competitor in the South-East. But in any case the real issue at stake is the leadership of Europe east of the Rhine and the future of French Eastern policy.

Rightly or wrongly, practically every German is convinced that the object of French foreign policy since Richelieu has consistently been to keep the German people divided and hemmed in or "encircled." The context shows that Hitler in *Mein Kampf* bases his declaration that a final settlement (*Auseinandersetzung*) with France is essential upon this conviction. Provided, however, that France finally ceases to

oppose Germany in Central and Eastern Europe there is no warrant either in *Mein Kampf*, or as far as I know in other authoritative Nazi literature, for the assumption that the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine or the offer of future peace with France is not genuine.

The fact should be clearly faced that any attempt to reconstitute a barrier to replace Czechoslovakia, say in Yugoslavia, or Roumania, or Hungary, will bring uncompromising German hostility. This was put to me in very precise terms by a leading German diplomatist. Germany, he said, wished to establish a Monroe Doctrine in Central and Eastern Europe. She would regard any alliances or other arrangements between outside Powers and States in this area, which might conceivably be directed against Germany, as a definitely unfriendly act. This German Monroe Doctrine is a phrase of which we are likely to hear more.

But the German aims in point of fact go a good deal further than anything the United States has yet claimed in regard to South America. The Monroe Doctrine has never been held to cover commercial policy. The economic relations between the Argentine and Great Britain are probably a good deal closer than between the Argentine and the United States. Under cover of the "good neighbour policy" of President Roosevelt, Mexico is frankly expropriating American business interests with impunity. But the recent suggestions for a drive to extend British trade with the Danubian countries and the purchases of Roumanian wheat aroused a storm of protest in Germany, and any Balkan movement to emulate the policy of President Cardenas would certainly be labelled as Bolshevism and treated accordingly.

The German objective is clear, logical and comprehensible. Partly by choice and partly under the pressure of circumstances since the world crisis, Nazi Germany has built up a system of more or less planned and wholly controlled economy. That system has enabled her to solve the problem of unemployment—there is a serious shortage of labour to-day—to rearm on a wholly unprecedented scale, and to launch a vast programme of public works. As is well known, the nigger in the woodpile is not so much finance as foreign trade. The problem has been to secure by the export of German goods the raw materials necessary to keep the colossal German economic machine going at full blast.

The famous Four-Year Plan, now virtually completed, cannot, nor was it ever intended to make Germany wholly self-sufficient. All it can do is to some extent to relieve the strain. A considerable volume of foreign trade will remain essential for Germany whatever efforts she may make at home.

There are two reasons, however, why the Nazis find it difficult and undesirable to rely on normal world trade. In the first place the system of controlled economy, which the more radical and socialistic elements now paramount in the Party are quite determined to retain, is comparatively unsuited to such normal trade, and lays Germany open to continual complaints of "dumping." And secondly, world trade is subject to wide fluctuations wholly outside German control, while the Nazis pride themselves on having worked out a system which will prevent for all time the employment and living of Germans being dependent (as so catastrophically in 1931) on such incalculable factors as Wall Street booms and slumps. Now if it is possible for Germany to secure the bulk of her raw materials and imported foodstuffs from countries under her political and economic hegemony, whose trade she can organise on lines similar to her own, she can snap her fingers at the crises of Western capitalism, and incidentally at blockades as well.

Broadly speaking, that is what Germany is doing in Central and Eastern Europe to-day. I have not the space to go into the details of her methods, which have in any case been widely discussed in recent months. In essence they consist in taking advantage of the difficulty experienced by the countries in question in disposing of their products on the world markets to compel them to sell to Germany in exchange for German manufactures. The Germans claim that there is nothing illegitimate in this, that in fact it is merely logical and natural. However that may be, there is no doubt that Danubia is likely to become almost entirely dependent on the German economic system. Germany is in fact doing what a very eminent historian suggested she might do in a lecture to which I listened a year or two ago. He compared Danubia after Versailles to the famous croquet party in *Alice Through the Looking Glass*, with hedgehogs for balls and flamingoes for mallets. By the time those attempting to organise Danubian trade had got their mallets stiff and ready, the

balls had unrolled themselves and wandered away. So now Germany is coming along and seeing to it by her customary methods that flamingoes and hedgehogs do as they are told.

The Treaty of Versailles failed to organise Central and Eastern Europe on lines suited to modern commercial and industrial trends, which have been consistently towards larger units. It left as it were an economic vacuum, just as, a hundred years before, the Congress of Vienna left political vacuums in Germany and Italy. That vacuum is now being filled, as the previous vacuums were filled, by what may perhaps be described as the atmospheric pressure of world evolution.

Here, however, there is a clear contradiction between political and economic tendencies, which did not exist in the nineteenth century. For the main political trend in the world to-day is plainly racial or ethnographic nationalism, and the post-war troubles of Danubia were due to the victory of the political principle over the economic. Now through the instrumentality of Germany the economic principle seems destined to triumph over the political.

But does that mean that Nazi Germany proposes to crush the powerful and growing nationalisms of the Slavonic and other races east of the Rhine? Is she going to proclaim self-determination for Germans with one voice and to deny it to other peoples with another? It may be so, though to do this would be to deny the very principles upon which the racial Nazi State is based. Rather does it seem likely that she is aiming at a synthesis of the conflicting principles and proposes to use that very force of racial nationalism as an instrument of her aims.

There is warrant for this in the writings of the two original protagonists of the *Mitteleuropa* idea. Neither Friedrich Naumann, its real inventor, nor Moeller van den Brück, whose dreams extended further east, envisaged securing the homogeneity of a vast Reich by conquest. The Germans should be not the conquerors but the leaders of the young peoples of the East and South, and *Mitteleuropa* should be based on consent. "German Nationalism," wrote Moeller van den Brück, "understands the nations out of their inner purposes. It understands them out of their conflicting ideals and attributes to each its own mission."

It may seem a far cry from these words of a thinker and

idealist to the strident tones of National Socialism. But none the less there is a good deal of evidence that to-day leadership rather than conquest is the aim. While one can scarcely take at its face value the *Frankfurter Zeitung* when it claims that Germany is "striving for no political hegemony in the South-East," the velvet glove is as much in evidence as the iron hand. Nations which, like Hungary and Poland, have readily fallen into the German orbit get a good deal out of it, and the other day I had the unusual experience of hearing a leading German arguing heatedly in favour of a great and ancient people like the Poles (as opposed to the upstart Czechs) having a corridor to the sea.

I could not help wondering, however, how long such views would outlast a change in Polish policy. The Nazis have realised, in fact, that the grievances of Versailles are an excellent method of keeping the beneficiaries in line. The outstanding example is, of course, Italy. It is not always understood that Hitler clearly laid down in *Mein Kampf* the need for renouncing South Tyrol as the price of Italy's friendship. He was not responsible for its loss, he wrote. But the co-operation of Italy was a vital necessity for the welfare of eighty million Germans, and who would dare to blame him for abandoning two hundred thousand odd South Tyrolers for this great aim? But though Hitler did not expressly say so, if Italy ever turns against Germany the armies of liberation would soon be on the Brenner. The same applies, of course, as the Führer quite plainly implied at Nuremberg, to Alsace-Lorraine, and the idea was most clearly and explicitly put to me by a leading German official in reply to a question whether a plebiscite in Memel would not be advisable. Memel, he said, was the port of Lithuania and could not prosper without Lithuania. Above all, as long as Memel and its German minority were within Lithuania there was a very cogent reason for Lithuania to co-operate with Germany, and Germany could incidentally quite well see that the minority was well treated.

Skilfully handled, in fact, the German minorities scattered throughout Central and Eastern Europe are an excellent instrument of German policy. They can always cause trouble when needed, and in ordinary times they are efficient auxiliary channels of propaganda. The type of propaganda envisaged can be seen from the examples of Hungary and Roumania,

where a type of National Socialism suited to local conditions and the race in question is being evolved in the Hungarian National Socialist movement and the Roumanian Iron Guard. Both these movements are primarily directed against "Bolshevism," and would in case of need serve the additional purpose of keeping Russia out of the Balkans—always a primary aim of German policy. Incidentally, it is not without interest that the whole technique was invented by the Comintern.

There is no doubt that the ablest among the German leaders feel that it is scarcely necessary for them to do more than sit still for Central and Eastern Europe to fall into their lap on the lines indicated. And since Munich it seems to me quite certain that their calculations will prove correct.

I do not wish to suggest that I am in any way criticising Mr. Chamberlain or the policy of Munich. On the contrary, as those who have followed my articles in this REVIEW and elsewhere will know, I feel that in the circumstances no other policy was conceivable. But what we have to do now is to face facts calmly and without flinching.

Nazi Germany is likely rapidly to become politically and economically paramount in a vast area east of the Rhine, an area which while by no means wholly self-sufficient (as the Bulletin of International Affairs pointed out in a recent well-documented number) is economically comparable with Soviet Russia or the United States or the British Empire, but which unlike the British Empire is geographically concentrated. That area will be efficiently organised on lines which, whatever we may feel or say about them, have been shown to work well, and have enabled Germany completely to outdistance the democracies in rearmament, despite their incomparably greater resources.

It may be, of course, that the methods of National Socialism will provoke resistance and disturbances from the lively and growing nationalisms of the other races concerned. She may bog herself in the East as others have done before her, and find her hands as full as ours are with the British Empire. The more ruthless her behaviour, the more likely this is to be so and the weaker she will be. But we cannot count on this. The most elementary prudence demands that we should act as though she were going to be very largely successful. What, therefore, should we do?

Before endeavouring to answer that question, let us look at Germany's possible future policies. She may, of course, remain satisfied with the Mitteleuropa I have outlined, and since it to some extent coincides with the objectives of *Mein Kampf* this possibility should not be dismissed. Again, she may lead Danubia on a crusade against Soviet Russia, for which there is stronger warrant in *Mein Kampf*—a policy which may result in weakening or strengthening her according to circumstances we cannot possibly foresee. Finally, she may turn on the West. For this there is no real warrant in *Mein Kampf* and little in Nazi literature. It is emphatically, and I am convinced honestly repudiated by all the leading Germans I know. But, heady with success, the Nazis may after all turn to the intoxicating dreams of the Pan-Germans which, as President Masaryk pointed out in his book, *The New Europe*, represented a grandiose "attempt to organise Europe and the human race," but under the sole dominion of the chosen German people.

We do not and cannot know the answer to these questions as yet. But if we want them answered in such a way that we can avoid the appalling tragedy of another war between the British and German peoples, then we must try, sincerely, patiently and steadfastly to be friends with the German people and to understand them. We must frankly face the question of colonies: is Czechoslovakia alone to pay the price of peace? And, however difficult it may be, however deeply we may feel about certain aspects of one of the great upheavals of history we must try to put our feelings in such a way that they will do good instead of evil. The words of Goethe quoted by Joseph Chamberlain about Krüger are just as applicable to a great nation: "If you wish a man to be what you want him to be you must express your belief that he is so."

Whether it is possible to come to an understanding with Germany or not, it is quite certain that the attitude taken up by most of Mr. Chamberlain's opponents is the surest way to make war inevitable. "With growing astonishment," writes an old friend to me from Germany, "we see that reputedly important British politicians are attempting to represent Chamberlain's work not as that of a great and idealistic spirit, but as action born of Britain's weakness. You know from our discussions that among the vast majority of the German

people there is a genuine longing for peace and the sincere wish to reach a permanent understanding with England. The applause which Chamberlain received everywhere in Germany is based on the assumption of a reciprocal feeling and a similar attitude, an attitude not based on a feeling of weakness and unpreparedness, but upon the idealistic will to maintain peace and thus European civilisation, and upon the wish better to understand National Socialist Germany" (my italics).

But how can such an attitude develop, he asks, when there is such a violent campaign as that of the Churchills and Duff-Coopers impugning Germany's honesty and throwing in unmeasured words suspicion on Hitler's honesty? He quotes Opposition speakers at length—every word of theirs is carefully studied in Germany and has its effect. It is not, he says, the fact of the British rearmament campaign which troubles Germans, but the reasons given for it. "Our belief and optimism was based on the conviction of the ascendancy and bravery of Chamberlain. If not this, but the knowledge of British weakness, was the real motive of Chamberlain's action, as is stated on your side, then gradually every hope of understanding and ending the arms race will die in us."

Yet what are we to do? We must be strong. But can we not rearm without perpetually pointing to Germany as the enemy? After all, we are not meeting an immediate menace. If the British people are to survive we must be strong not merely in ships and guns and tanks and aeroplanes, a madness which, if Mr. Chamberlain succeeds, may yet be limited, but strong above all in the spirit of our people. Strong with a spirit which does not only arise in times of crisis—as so impressively the other day—but with one which faces sacrifices in quiet times, which builds for the future and tackles the humdrum yet noble task of rearing sons and daughters who believe in freedom, which will transcend sloth on the one hand and profit-making on the other in its work for the common wealth. For these are the things that endure—even through humiliation or defeat.

H. POWYS GREENWOOD.

TWENTY YEARS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THOSE who have known Czechoslovakia at first hand, who have come into contact with the men who built it from the foundations, and with the people who became its body politic, recognise in the recent events a drama of almost Sophoclean force. The Czechs themselves are a race of fine quality, hard working, shrewd, sound, accomplished. They have performed a prodigy of statecraft, destined, however, after only twenty years, to crumble about their ears. It is no fault of theirs. Their very qualities in some degree have, it is true, contributed to their tragedy. But the main fault was in their stars. It is not for the Czechs to hang their heads. Their courage and dignity in defeat is the proof that such a race could not be responsible for what has taken place. They are the victims of circumstances not wholly or even mainly of their making.

Consider the circumstances in their crude simplicity. The old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke up because—as no British, French or Czech historian will deny—its texture was rotten from the very folly of government imposed by virtue of what we call “power politics” over discontented national minorities. The reconstruction was the work of perfectly sincere, non-German, non-Magyar, political forces which derived their opportunity from the victory in war over the German and Magyar forces. One of the motives of the new State-builders was to emancipate the subject races of Austria-Hungary and thus to remove a condition of grievance in Danubian Europe such as (according to the argument) had been a contributory cause of the war itself. But they had another motive. They wanted to cripple Germany, to block the famous *Drang nach dem Südosten*, to deprive “German militarism” of its power. On paper it looked natural enough to take the old Austrian frontier of the Sudetengebirge, the Erzegebirge and the Böhmerwald as the new Czech frontier. It was, after all, the content of the old Austria-Hungary that was being reformed; and besides, the mountains aforesaid constituted a natural as well as an old-established frontier. So much excuse—for it is now seen to need an excuse—there was for Anglo-French diplomacy at Versailles. Would it have been fair to expect people to be wise in the atmosphere of the 1919 peace conference? Did anyone at that time even suspect

that there was any ground for criticism on the particular territorial reshaping of Danubian Europe, as distinct from the economic provisions, and the general spirit, of the treaties? The very notion of "Sudeten Germans" had never then been heard of except as one of many contemporary essays in political enterprise. The words Sudetenland and Sudetendeutschen were coined by one Dr. Freissler who on October 29th, 1918, set up a provisional government claiming to represent the Germans of Austria, Silesia, North Moravia and Eastern Bohemia. It is true that the Magyars were loud in their grievance, and that the Poles, despite their own acquisition of sovereignty over vast alien minorities, resented the inclusion of Teschen in Czechoslovakia. But the Sudeten Germans, though they were no more consulted about their inclusion in Czechoslovakia than were the other non-Czech peoples, were not at that time conscious of any political affinity with the German Reich. Their race-consciousness is a Hitler inspiration. But that fact is beside the point. It is the business of those who make "peace treaties" to make treaties which will ensure the peace, and which are in themselves reasonable. The crude fact cannot be denied that the victorious Allied politicians of 1919, proclaiming the doctrine of the "self-determination of nations" as their motive, abolished the German-Magyar dominance over Czechs and Slovaks, and thereupon constituted a "Czechoslovakia" containing large German and Magyar minorities under "Czechoslovak" dominance. In a literal sense they turned the tables. Now the interesting question is this. If the *principle* of nationality were the operative principle, if "self-determination" were a serious consideration, if the hypothesis of dominance by one nation over another were the true argument, how could they expect to undo an evil by merely turning it upside down, by substituting a Czechoslovak dominance over Germans and Magyars for a German-Magyar dominance over Czechs and Slovaks? Put in that way it certainly looks crude. History has proved the crudity to be a fair symbol of the fact.

But what of Thomas Masaryk and Edward Beneš? They were the men who would have to stand or fall by what was done at Versailles, so far as it affected the Czech people. It has to be confessed that so large-hearted, so well-informed, so clear-minded a philosopher as Thomas Masaryk, whose

philosophy, like all philosophy, was the product of personal suffering, was himself blinded by the passions of that deplorable epoch of human history. He it was who in 1918 invented the name Czechoslovakia ; and he wholly endorsed, indeed was largely responsible for, the decision about the frontiers that were to enclose the new State. He was a man of gigantic strength, broad-minded, tolerant, gifted in the art of government. He no doubt felt confident that he could weld the elements that were to constitute Czechoslovakia into a harmonious whole. Perhaps if he had been twenty years younger, and had therefore spanned the crisis itself, he would have done so, despite the overwhelming odds. It is doubtful. Few things in history are more tragic than the life work of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. From 1916 till the end of 1920 he was associated with Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson's *The New Europe*. He was an impregnable rock. Opposition broke upon him as the waves break upon the eternal barriers. Two things are fixed in one's own mind as one looks back upon the story of what he did. He duly founded the new State, built it from a foundation of what had been chaos, worked a miracle of statecraft.

At the beginning of June 1928, nearly ten years later, during luncheon at Lany Castle, the President's country seat some twenty miles outside Prague, he said things which one can never forget. He was then seventy-eight years old. The country in that short space of time had reached a condition of hard-working stable prosperity, all the more remarkable by contrast with the condition of nervous disorder in every surrounding country. "Of course," he said on that occasion, "you must remember that the Republic is a new State. In England, by contrast you have an old State with old traditions, with machinery that runs. Everything here is new. We have the machinery now, but all the time we have to mend it. We have to create our traditions. That was the task when I came. What it means is that we have to be more careful than an old State. We have to weigh more consequences. When we came here after the war, Bohemia and Moravia, being the richest countries in the whole of Austria, had been impoverished, exploited by the army. There was no bread when I came. The first work was to provide wheat from America, from Rumania, from other sources. Next, the war had upset the whole administration, including the postal service. The

post was in such a state in 1918 and 1919 that we had to be careful in the sending of money-letters. Money was not safe in the post and was often lost. At the railway stations there were no time-tables. If goods were sent by rail—for instance, eatables or clothing—they were in danger, for the people had been bereft of everything they possessed. Our new State began with a minus. Year by year I watched, got figures from my Ministers, and saw by-and-by how the post office, the railways, etc., could be reorganised. So now our machinery runs in good order. That was the work of the new State. In addition, we had to create an army: not a big army, but an army. It has been created. It is in working order. And so on. One of the biggest things we have done has been done in Slovakia and in Ruthenia. There were no schools in those provinces. There are now some 3,000 in Slovakia and nearly 1,000 in Ruthenia. It costs money, and has been a big financial operation. We also had to stabilise our money. We have succeeded, as you know. Our budget balances. We have already paid our debts. We have made Economic Treaties with Germany, with Austria, with other countries. The Little Entente is our idea. We have two German Ministers in our Cabinet. All this has been accomplished in a short time. In the old Austrian days there was a continuous national fight. Now there is some progress, some hope. On the whole it is a good bit of work. I may say I am not satisfied. I am an old man, but I hope before dying I shall be satisfied."

Before dying? Before he died he had to relinquish the Presidency of the country he had created. The second thing that will never be forgotten was something he said when, in 1927, he was re-elected to the Presidency for a further period of seven years. On that occasion he delivered a Presidential Message to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly and Senate, in which the following passage occurred, now almost heart-breaking in the posthumous meaning added to it: "And now, after the world war, close consideration is given to the great changes in society which have come into existence everywhere, and which again are regarded by some as a definite, by others as only a partial decay, while others welcome them as signs of regeneration and resurrection. I myself regard the fall of three great Empires and the foundation of new States as a sign of progress and regeneration. Even in a bedouin's

wretched tent you will find simple philosophers of history and politics, reflecting on the consequences of the Great War to Europe and other parts of the world. 'Your Europeans,' they often say, 'are falling, and Asia and Africa are about to occupy your place.' And so while on my journey, in my capacity as President of a new State, I was constantly led to the question as to what keeps nations healthy, what guarantees the stability and permanence of their States and themselves, what, in fact, constitutes the true welfare of nations, what ensures a constant progress and settled existence for them. Every statesman, every politician and every political party, and in fact everybody to whom the destinies of his own nation, and thus also of other nations, are not indifferent, must discover for himself what is 'the one thing necessary' for nations and States (as Komensky formulated it), what is not needed, what harms them and leads them to destruction. During the agitated period of the 'Thirty Years' War, Komensky continually reverted to the problem of the decay of States and nations. He left us a small treatise on the happiness of nations, and in the decline of his life—by chance at the same age as myself—he defined the 'one thing necessary' for the life of society and State. He attached the greatest importance to religion and morality for nation and State and mentioned seven kinds of obstacles and confusions detrimental to the welfare of the people: a multitude of rulers, a multitude of laws, many interpreters of statutes who bewilder the public courts, a multitude of external ceremonies which obscure the true basis of affairs, contempt for laws and the infringement of them, which is called taking into account things as they are, the mutual jealousy of rulers, and, finally, open wars and bestial savagery. Translated into the terminology of to-day, this is a justifiable criticism of many aspects of present conditions. . . . Democracy must assert itself not only within, but also without. In foreign politics also argument must suppress violence and deceit. The world, as Palacky was well aware, is becoming centralised. No State, no nation can live without agreement and co-operation with its neighbours and other States. Smaller States, we ourselves in our geographical situation, cannot safely continue without the sympathy of neighbours and other States—our *raison d'être* must be acknowledged and respected by the world. Our policy must be a world policy."

He resigned the Presidency in 1935, but continued to give his advice in the management of the State he had created. The date September 14th, 1937, when he died in Lány Castle, will for ever be remembered. As though symbolically, his passing ushered in the critical phase of German-Czechoslovak relations. Can it be believed that little more than a year ago Herr Henlein's organ *Die Zeit* in its obituary tribute wrote these words: "Masaryk always commanded respect. He could fight without hate. When his life's work was crowned in 1918 he did not hesitate to establish good relations between Czechs and Germans. In his heart there was no hatred of the Germans." What was felt by the German Social Democrats was less remarkable, but the words then written by Herr Jäksch have now been invested with a deeper meaning. "The German elements," he wrote, "that remain faithful to the ideas of humanity have lost a great friend in Masaryk." What indeed may fairly be called the Masaryk phase of Czechoslovakia's short history presents one of history's most striking contrasts with the rapid decline and fall that set in after his passing. He had laid a foundation of German-Czech collaboration in Bohemia and, despite Dr. Tuka, of Magyar-German-Slovak collaboration in Slovakia. Eight years after the foundation of the State, Dr. Spina, a Bohemian-German, and Dr. Mayr Harting, a former Austrian-German, both of them deputies in the Czechoslovak parliament, were given portfolios in the Government itself. Dr. Spina, who before the war had been a professor of the Czech language at Prague University, was an enthusiast for collaboration with the Czechs. Dr. Mayr Harting, less of an enthusiast in that cause, none the less continued himself to collaborate. I saw him in Prague on June 2nd, 1928, when he said to me: "Collaboration is the only way to peace in the State, but it is a hard way and difficult. It is a beginning, but we want more."

The interesting thing, as one looks back on the twenty years' history of Czechoslovakia, as constituted at Versailles, is to assess the causes that led to the total failure of the enterprise of German-Czech collaboration in Bohemia, so promisingly launched under the Masaryk régime twelve years ago. As long ago as 1927 separate administrative districts were set up in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. Dr. Hodža himself was a Slovak. But we know that the decisive district was Bohemia. When in the early autumn of 1938 the German

Reich absorbed the Sudetenland, it followed as a natural result that Poland would absorb the Teschen district and Hungary the southern part of Slovakia. The point is so clear that it hardly needs to be elaborated. It was Berlin that decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. How came it that Berlin had so great a power? The answer, simple as it is, contains in it the epitome of Czechoslovakia's tragedy. A State which out of chaos evolved order in so unpromising a field as Danubian Europe, which made diplomatic or commercial treaties with every country in Europe, which balanced its budget and increased the surplus, which stabilised its currency, paid off its foreign loans and replaced them by loans at a cheaper rate, which was even launched in a surrounding hotbed of nationalist vendettas on the crowning enterprise of harmonising Czechs with Germans in the West and Magyars with Slovaks in the East: why did such a State flounder before the advance of the Germans?

The answer is all too simple. Dr. Edward Beneš was in continuous office, first as Foreign Minister, then as Prime Minister, then as President in succession to Dr. Masaryk. Upon him fell the routine responsibility for consolidating in diplomatic practice the great principles enunciated by Masaryk. On the face of it it looks as if Beneš failed. The entire collapse of the Masaryk structure took place in little more than a year following Masaryk's death. Was it the fault of Dr. Beneš? He was the only practising politician in Europe who held continuous office since the days of Versailles. He was the only actual link with Versailles left in Europe. His knowledge of facts, persons, policies, tendencies in every country in Europe was profound. In his early days he was accused of subservience to France. Those of us who have known him throughout those twenty years knew what his answer always was to the taunt that he was ready to sell his principles for French diplomatic and military support. He admitted it. He hated it. He had a greatly developed taste—and who has not?—for independence. But he was a realist. At the beginning of his life's work, now shattered, he formed the deliberate opinion that to quarrel with France was to jeopardise the whole work of Central European pacification and consolidation on which, under Masaryk, he was embarked. He used to say that in one sense Czechoslovakia was the child of France and Britain. He was taunted, not only

with servility, but with interference in Anglo-French affairs ; and the two charges were mutually destructive. He was the representative of a small Power, and he was realist enough to know that small Powers can prosper only by the leave of the Great Powers : unless, indeed, the League of Nations were to become a success. Hence his unremitting work at Geneva. He was the author of the famous Geneva Protocol of 1924. It was defeated by the opposition of the British Government in 1924. Four years later, when Mr. Kellogg made the substantially same proposal it was enthusiastically adopted. In the one case the proposal came from a great, and in the other from a small, Power.

It is necessary to accept the simple facts in all their crudity. Czechoslovakia was made by Great Power intrigue and was destroyed by Great Power intrigue. In that intrigue a central part was played by Germany. One of the cardinal facts in the history of our time is a strong Germany. If one is to see the wood despite the trees one must concentrate on the bare outlines. It was Napoleon who made possible Bismarck's unification of Germany. The unified Germany was one of the greatest facts in history. The only essential reason why Britain and France fought the last great war was fear of Germany, or jealousy of Germany's ebullient strength. Helped by the entire world they defeated Germany. In victory they did two characteristic things : (1) they took away all Germany's colonies ; (2) they constituted Czechoslovakia. The single motive was to dam German expansion. Czechoslovakia was an instrument of Anglo-French " power-politics " directed against Germany. When the issue was joined in September of this year between a resurgent strong Germany and the Anglo-French combination, Czechoslovakia was bound to get the worst of both worlds. In international, as in all human affairs the small man is at the mercy of the big man. If Britain and France decided to " fight," then Czechoslovakia would be the initial battleground. If Britain and France decided not to fight, then Czechoslovakia had no alternative but to concede the German claims. They were in essence German, not Sudeten German, claims. Herr Henlein has consistently based his own policy upon winning a greater degree of power within the Czechoslovak State. Until he was forced to do so this year by Herr Hitler, he never claimed or wanted incorporation in the Reich. These men who play the

political game are thinking in the first instance of their own part in the game. Incorporation in the Reich means for Herr Henlein his abdication from the position of Sudeten leader and the possibility of a leading rôle in Czechoslovak government in order to become a cypher in the German Reich. But the point is that the fate of Czechoslovakia this autumn was wholly decided by the Great Powers. Even Masaryk could not have saved Czechoslovakia. To what extent was Dr. Beneš to blame? Could he and Dr. Hodža by a quicker offer of autonomy to the Sudetenland have defeated the German Reich in its object of incorporating the Sudetenland? If one reviews the critical events of the present year in their true light as a matter of Great Power rivalry, one begins to wonder if President Beneš and Dr. Hodža, no matter what steps they had taken, and no matter how promptly, could have had the slightest effect in preventing what has taken place. Indeed, there is little satisfaction to be obtained from the actual history of those events, the successive Czechoslovak offers to the Sudeten Germans, the progressive expansion of Sudeten German claims, the open intervention of the Reich, the British attempt to save the threatened clash by means of the Runciman mission (which in the nature of things had no chance of success) and the final Anglo-French device of saving the peace by a virtual surrender to Herr Hitler's demands. One knows that the only reality was the conflict between Germany on the one side and France and Britain on the other.

What however is interesting is the simple story of the famous week, the last week of September, when Mr. Neville Chamberlain's personal resource staved off at the eleventh hour a danger that by then seemed inescapable. It is delicate ground. Did Mr. Chamberlain "surrender"? Of course he did. Why not? On any ground, the greatest menace to every interest involved was the possibility of war. No one wanted it. There were four men, Herr Hitler, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, M. Daladier, and Signor Mussolini, all of them quaking in their shoes, none of them wanting war. It was obvious that this was Herr Hitler's normal method of conducting high diplomacy, his calculation being that the mere threat of war, backed by his superiority in military strength, would be enough to win for him what he wanted. He happened to want something which could not reasonably be denied, and which in principle was already conceded. The real danger was that

Herr Hitler had overplayed his hand and might be hoist with his own petard. The precise story of how the four of them escaped from a war they all dreaded will remain for many a day one of the memorable passages of history. Let the main events of that final choice be here summarised. The concentrated drama of Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremberg on September 12th was followed, after days that seemed years of anxiety, by the still greater drama of the British Prime Minister's flight to Berchtesgaden on September 15th. Behind the scenes the old conflict in British policy was enacted. On September 11th it became known that, though the British Government had taken thorough measures to convince the German Government that a war resulting from German "aggression" would almost certainly involve Britain in it against Germany, yet Britain persisted in refusing a precise and open "commitment." British lives could not be automatically placed at the mercy of whatever Herr Hitler might decide. The British Government insisted on its own right to decide so grave a thing if and when an emergency had arisen and its nature was known. Herr Hitler spoke on September 12th to what was in effect a world audience. On the main issue he was restrained and moderate. He did announce in reference to the Sudeten Germans, that "if those tortured and terrorised comrades cannot obtain their rights and help, then they will get both from us," and that "what the Germans demand is the free exercise of their right of self-determination." No sooner had Herr Hitler finished speaking than the Sudeten Germans staged sundry exhibitions of disorder, continuing throughout the night of September 12th-13th. Prague declared prompt martial law in the districts affected. Herr Henlein on September 13th delivered a six-hour "ultimatum" to Prague demanding the abrogation of martial law, the withdrawal of State and special police, and the confinement of troops to barracks; the vague "penalty" being that if his demands were not conceded he could not be responsible for the consequences. Prague refused the demands.

On September 14th Mr. Chamberlain sent a direct message to Herr Hitler: "I propose to come over at once to see you with a view to trying to find a peaceful solution. I propose to come across by air and am ready to start to-morrow." The Führer at once answered that he would gladly see Mr. Chamberlain. Signor Mussolini at that moment announced that

a plebiscite for the German and other minorities in Czechoslovakia was, in his view, the just and only hope of avoiding war ; and that, far from being weakened, the Czechs, relieved of alien elements, would be strengthened. Mr. Chamberlain, accompanied by Sir Horace Wilson, his personal adviser, and Mr. William Strang, head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, left Heston Airport on September 15th for Berchtesgaden. He talked for two hours and a half with Herr Hitler. In itself that magnificent venture lifted many of the clouds of war. An unforgettable week began on September 18th with a Franco-British agreement "as to the policy to be adopted with a view to promoting a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovak question." The details of the offer were not at that time officially made known. In their main substance they were that the Sudeten districts more than 50 per cent. German should be incorporated in the Reich ; and that, pending the delimitation of the new frontier, Herr Hitler should demobilise his army and refrain from military measures against Czechoslovakia. The French and British Governments further agreed that they would participate in an international guarantee of the sovereign integrity of the new Czech State, resulting from the partition. They did not offer a specific commitment to defend the existing Czechoslovakia against any aggression that might be committed during the period of delimiting the new frontier. During the prolonged hesitation of Prague on September 19th and 20th the British and French Governments addressed urgent appeals for a definite acceptance of their plan, so that Mr. Chamberlain could meet Herr Hitler a second time with Czechoslovak approval behind him. On September 21st the Czechoslovak Government, in a spirit of disillusion, announced that "under the strongest pressure from Great Britain and France" it had decided to accept the plan for ceding the Sudeten districts to Germany. Early on September 22nd Dr. Hodža sent in his Cabinet's resignation to President Beneš. After a day's negotiation a new Government was formed by General Sirovy, who himself took the portfolios both of Prime Minister and Minister for War. He was a Czech legionary in the last war, and now symbolised Czech resistance to German aggression. Dr. Krofta was retained as Foreign Minister. The new Government remained loyal to the Anglo-French plan.

Mr. Chamberlain left Heston for Godesberg on the morning

of September 22nd. Herr Hitler presented a memorandum of Germany's final attitude on the Sudeten issue, claiming that German troops should by October 1st occupy the Sudeten districts within the new frontier proposed by France and Britain. Mr. Chamberlain, on September 24th, sent the Hitler proposals to the Czechoslovak Government. At 10-20 on the evening of September 23rd (that is before the final Hitler-Chamberlain meeting) President Beneš broadcast a proclamation ordering full mobilisation.

It was on September 25th that the third, last, and in the end successful attempt was begun to escape from the urgently threatened war. The Anglo-French proposals had not suggested a date for the transfer to Germany of the ceded territory. Herr Hitler in form "proposed" a date, and in effect intimated his determination to seize the territory on that date. Such, on the surface, was the whole issue that created a world-wide panic. On September 26th Herr Hitler made a speech in the Berlin Sport Palace that was listened to by the whole world. On a sustained tone of vibrant emotion he declared that his patience was at an end; that his ultimatum was unchangeable; that it contained nothing more than President Beneš had promised; that President Beneš now had peace or war in his hands. On September 27th Mr. Chamberlain broadcast a statement that registered the blackest phase of the panic. "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is." Parliament met on September 28th. It was at the very end of Mr. Chamberlain's speech that Herr Hitler's answer was received to a letter sent to Berlin that morning as a final attempt at peace. Herr Hitler agreed to Signor Mussolini's plea and postponed mobilisation for twenty-four hours. He accepted Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion and invited him, together with M. Daladier and Signor Mussolini, to a conference at Munich on the following day. From that moment events moved swiftly to the miracle. In the early hours of September 30th a four-Power agreement was signed in Munich whereby the method and stages of Germany's taking over the Sudetenland were fully detailed. Before Mr. Chamberlain left Munich he met Herr Hitler again, with the historic result that Britain and Germany signed a pledge of peace "never to go to war with one another again."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE.

THE revival of the Entente between France and Great Britain, in the form of a new Anglo-French Agreement, is probably only another milestone on the road to Armageddon. Considered merely as one of the many events during the past two years which have demonstrated more and more the anarchical tendencies and moral deterioration of Europe, it has little significance. It simply emphasises the fact that we are once more back on the old trail which led to the tragic events of 1914. On the other hand, it is within the bounds of possibility that the new Agreement may eventually produce unexpected and far-reaching results. It may contain the seeds of an international policing system which, in course of time, will restore the vanished authority of the League. If it is to be regarded as the first step towards the consolidation of the resources of those nations in Europe who are prepared to resist aggression and uphold the rule of law, then indeed it may become a new landmark on the highway of human progress and achievement. In its present form, however, the Agreement is only the continuation of a pre-war policy inaugurated by Lansdowne and Delcassé in 1904. The new alliance does little more than dot the i's and cross the t's of the original scheme.

The details vouchsafed to us are extremely scanty. There has been no explanatory statement from the Government, and the only information is gleaned from Press reports. From these sources we learn that the new Agreement includes the following: (a) the immediate purchase of armaments and raw materials, together with a certain amount of pooling of financial resources; (b) Great Britain will concentrate her energies on the building of heavy bombers, while France will be responsible for turning out pursuit planes; (c) there are to be more interchanges of British and French officers, so as to spread knowledge of each other's methods, while special facilities are to be afforded to British military pilots at French military aerodromes; (d) co-operation is to be secured by placing the joint air forces under the command of a British officer, whilst the armies are to be placed under a French general. According to the *New York Times*: "The principle of a unified command, which took three and a half years to be accepted in the last world war, will be brought into instant

operation in the next. A French general will command the combined armies of the two countries, a British admiral will direct the allied navies, and a British air force officer will have charge of the combined air forces from the moment an attack on either country is launched."

Up till now these are the only particulars which have leaked out. No White Paper has been issued which would give Parliament and the country authoritative information as to the steps which have been taken to unify and co-ordinate the economic and military resources of France and Great Britain for the common defence and protection of both countries. But enough has been disclosed to demonstrate that, once the political difficulties have been overcome, there is no insuperable obstacle, from a technical standpoint, in pooling the economic and military resources of two sovereign States for a common purpose. This arrangement disposes of one of the stock arguments advanced against the creation of an International Police Force, namely, the impossibility of solving the technical difficulties, which are inherent in any scheme of this kind. Here is a pact, freely entered into by both sides, which represents a drastic pooling of sovereignty. Clearly, if national armies, navies and air forces can be merged and unified in peace time to meet an emergency, there is no valid reason why these arrangements should not be developed into a permanent system, in order to deter the aggressor from the crime of war, and to ensure the solidarity of all those nations who are prepared to pledge themselves in support of Equity and Justice.

I repeat that in principle and in its present form there is nothing to distinguish the Anglo-French Agreement from the old pre-war military alliances. Its appearance at this juncture is due to two causes. First, the abandonment of the League and the system of collective security, without the slightest attempt to develop and organise it, and secondly, the growing menace of German rearmament. Everyone realises that after Manchukuo, Abyssinia, Spain, China, and Austria, Article XVI has, at least temporarily, become a dead letter. The Prime Minister, speaking a few months ago in the House of Commons, said that "we would not tear up a single article of it [the Covenant], not even Article XVI, in the hope that some day it might be reconstituted in such a form that we might rely upon being able to use those powers for the function for

which they were originally intended." It is the same old story: always jam to-morrow, but never jam to-day. The League is to be reconstituted: but when—after the next war or before it? We are back in 1914 with a vengeance. Our rulers, wallowing in their preconceived notions of national sovereignty, and their pre-war mentality, have by their crass stupidity and obstinacy during the past twenty years missed priceless opportunities of establishing law and order in Europe on a firm and durable basis. Now they have brought us to the verge of a still greater catastrophe, when our sons and daughters will probably be compelled to pass through the fiery furnace of another Armageddon.

But perhaps the Anglo-French Agreement may prove to be the starting point in the process of rehabilitation. Obviously standing by itself, without being implemented and developed, it cannot prevent another war any more than its predecessor, the Entente Cordiale, was able to prevent the last. But before the crisis comes and the dogs of war are unleashed, it may lay the foundations of victory. From the outset it will ensure the close co-operation of the chief partners on the side of democracy, freedom and the *status quo* in the threatened conflict for the mastery of Europe. That is the most that can be said for it. But the next war will be very different from the last. It will be mutual destruction on the grand scale and, in the words of Mr. Winston Churchill, it may pulverise what is left of civilisation. Consequently, in a material sense, it is the greatest disaster which can befall us, and must, therefore, be prevented by every possible means.

One of these means, I suggest, is the provision of an appropriate procedure for effecting peaceful changes in the relationships of nations by means of an Equity Tribunal or Commission which will be entrusted with the task of finding a just and impartial settlement, when the resources of negotiation and conciliation have been exhausted. There was a time, not so very long ago, when the relationships between Great Britain and France were strained almost to breaking point. No one can foresee the future, but it is possible that "some day" new sources of friction may arise which, unless they are resolved by peaceful means, may ultimately embroil us with our neighbour across the Channel. Consequently, why should not both nations take advantage of the present opportunity to provide a just and equitable procedure for dealing with all

political disputes, which may defy settlement through the usual channels of diplomacy? Once such a Tribunal has been created in conjunction with the new defensive Agreement, another step will have been taken to establish the rule of law in Europe.

France and Great Britain, the pioneers of this system, could then, with confidence, invite other countries to join them in promoting a new plan in which every European State would be invited to participate. At the outset, Italy and Germany in their present moods, and under their existing totalitarian régimes, would be unlikely to co-operate. But if there was a disposition on the part of the smaller Powers to join in this development; if the impartiality and disinterestedness of the Equity Tribunal commanded the confidence of the majority of European States, then it is conceivable that even Germany and Italy might eventually throw in their lot with the members of the new confederation. After all, totalitarian government is not an everlasting phenomenon, and no one knows what changes there may be when the dictators vanish from the scene.

What are the distinguishing features which would differentiate the new system of law and order from the old worn-out practice of military alliances? First, the creation of an effective arbitral body would be the hall-mark of the new system, because, in its absence, it is impossible to establish unmistakably the identity of the aggressor. It is clear that any nation which ignores this tribunal and takes the law into its own hands by attacking its neighbour, declares itself to be the aggressor by its own act. Secondly, membership of the new confederation will be open to any and every member of the European community who is willing to submit all disputes to such a tribunal, and to contribute its appropriate share to a common defensive force. These are the conclusive tests and conditions which differentiate the new system—the rule of law—from the old régime, the balance of power. It will be aimed not at any one country or group, but only against the aggressor, whoever he may be.

If we are to win the support of the peoples of Germany and Italy, we must convince them of two things. First, that a remodelled League, that is to say, the new system, will give them a fair deal, that it is not an alliance directed against them. Secondly, that the League is a virile organisation

whose strength and solidarity is a power to be reckoned with, which neither they nor anyone else can afford to ignore. Is this rehabilitation possible in existing circumstances? Can we be satisfied merely with the new Anglo-French Agreement in its present form reproducing, more or less, the same conditions as existed in 1914? Is there no escape from the present impasse? I believe there is, and it is to be found in the extension of this Agreement, supplemented by the establishment of an Equity Tribunal, to what are described as the "Small Powers of Europe." The latter consist of twenty-two small States, as distinct from the four Great Powers, France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. All these twenty-two States are members of the League, and all, with the exception of Hungary and Albania, joined in imposing sanctions upon Italy. During the last two years, however, their loyalty to the League has been sorely strained by the behaviour of the Great Powers, especially France and Great Britain. At the moment, therefore, and until a feeling of confidence has been restored in the good faith and sincerity of their more powerful colleagues, the smaller States may hesitate to take the plunge. But even if they all refused, which is unlikely, Europe would be no worse off than it is at present. I think, however, it is a fair assumption that a certain number, it is impossible to say how many, would be prepared to join at the outset, whilst the others would gradually follow as the benefits of the new system became apparent.

It is easy to underrate the combined resources of the twenty-two small Powers and to strike them off the map as if they were of no account. That is because few people take the trouble to investigate the subject. Under the Barème formula, however, we find that these resources are computed for the purpose of assessing their individual contributions towards the annual maintenance of the League. As a result the total contribution of the twenty-two States is assessed at 301 units, whilst the four Great Powers, France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain, are rated at 337. Consequently, the potential resources of the former are roughly equal to those of the four Great Powers. Therefore, if the smaller Powers could be induced, by the example of Great Britain and France, to throw their combined weight into the scales in support of the rule of law, then the future peace of Europe,

if not assured, would, at any rate, rest upon a much broader and more powerful basis than it does at present.

Let us assume that the principle of equality of sacrifice has been agreed to, and that the military contributions to a joint force are to be assessed under the Barème formula. It follows that the total contributions of the Small Powers, plus those of France and Great Britain, will be represented by 489 units. Further, let us assume that the dimensions of the joint defensive force will depend upon the armament programmes of those States who refuse to submit themselves to the rule of law. At the moment, Germany and Italy are not members of the League, and their potential resources are assessed at 139 units. To these must now be added those of Austria, rated at 10 units ; a total of 149 units.

It is clear, therefore, that the extension of the Anglo-French Agreement, so as to include the small States, would give the new combination at the outset a considerable preponderance of resources, if not of actual military strength, in comparison with any aggressive axis or outside alliance which might threaten to disturb the peace of Europe. But, says the critic, I want to know what military strength the small States can contribute now, not what their potential resources may be. It is common knowledge that during the last few years, the small Powers have been drawn into the armament race ; between 1932-7 they increased their expenditure upon military equipment by approximately 43·9 per cent.

Let us take air power as one of the tests of their military resources. After leaving out of account such countries as Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary, where no figures are available, and also, for obvious reasons, omitting Spain, there are fifteen small States which in the aggregate possess at the lowest calculation 4,000, and at the highest some 6,000, military planes. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if all the small States were prepared now to pool their air weapons and to place them exclusively at the disposal of the League, this joint force would consist of approximately 5,000 front-line aeroplanes. The combined air forces of Great Britain and France are estimated at 4,780 front-line planes. Consequently, if the small States could be induced to become partners in the Anglo-French Agreement, Europe would be equipped with an Air Police Force of some 10,000 planes, which could be organised and controlled as a single unit, and

would only be employed to go to the assistance of any of the co-operating countries which might become the victim of aggression. Moreover, the existence of an Equity Tribunal presupposes, if it does not guarantee, that this preponderance of force would only be applied to uphold the rule of law, and to compel the submission of all disputes to the adjudication of an impartial tribunal. It follows that moral force, the superiority of reason over brute force, which is the basis of the new system, will be reinforced by the joint resources of all those nations who are prepared to co-operate in establishing law and order in Europe.

Can anyone doubt the effectiveness of such a plan? Can anyone suggest an alternative which is more likely to banish the spectre of war? All past experience proves that rearmament programmes, the inevitable result of competitive national armaments, sooner or later end in hostilities, and that military alliances are temporary expedients which only postpone the evil day. Therefore, the problem which confronts us is, how to establish not merely a new alliance, but a new system, backed by a superiority of moral and physical force. The solution, I suggest, is the inclusion of all States who are willing to participate, in the Anglo-French Agreement, supplemented by an Equity Tribunal. Not only would this new combination be endowed with the superiority I have described, but it would also command the moral support of the United States, and the beneficent neutrality, if not the armed assistance, of Russia.

In a recent speech Mr. Churchill has emphasised the necessity of securing the support of the small States on the side of law and order. This is what he said: "Britain and France are now united. Together they are an enormous force, which few countries would dare to challenge. I should like to see these two countries go to all the small States that are menaced, and say to them bluntly, 'We are not going to help you if you are not going to help yourselves. What are you going to contribute? Are you prepared to take special service in defence of the Covenant? If you are willing to do so and prove it by actions as well as words, then we will join together in active military association with you.'" I doubt, however, whether the majority of the small States would be willing at this stage to join any military alliance, even though it is purely defensive in character. But it is a different

proposition to invite their participation in a new European system, as a preliminary step to a United States of Europe, in which they will be able, not only to maintain their individuality and national character, but to be also assured of their security.

The Anglo-French Alliance may be only the stepping-stone to a new war. On the other hand, it may become the stepping-stone to a new peace. Almost two centuries have elapsed since Rousseau wrote : " But if those obstacles are such as I have described at the present moment—a moment when all the Powers are entirely free to form separate leagues and offensive alliances—judge what they would become if there were a general league, fully armed and ready at any moment to forestall those who should conceive the design of destroying or resisting it. That in itself is enough to show that such a Federation, so far from ending in mere vain discussions to be set at defiance with impunity, would on the contrary give birth to an effective power." Even in these days of turmoil and strife let the nations of Europe highly resolve that the Anglo-French Agreement shall be the advance guard of a League fully armed, which will become the guardian of equity and justice, no less than the powerful protector of every nation in " this venerable home of philosophy, this brilliant sanctuary of art and science."

DAVIES.

Note.—In these days events move with alarming rapidity. The above article was written some months ago, and since then the Czechoslovak crisis has intervened. What was a practical policy three months ago may appear somewhat visionary to-day when so many of the Small Powers are hastening to make their peace with Hitler.

Great Britain and France have now forfeited the respect and confidence of the Small Powers. But the Czechoslovak *débâcle* only illustrates the soundness of the policy advocated in this article, because it proves that the two great democracies standing alone can never hope to assert the rule of law, or to deter aggression in Europe. Now it may be too late to revive the policy of collective security. Manifestly, however, it alone offers the only chance—slender though it may be—of averting the catastrophe of war.

D.

PROPERTY AND LIBERTY.

ONE of the supreme problems of modern democracy is the problem of limiting and regulating the power wielded by great wealth, and by the organised interests which control it. In America, President Roosevelt has been struggling against this power ; in France, M. Blum fought an unsuccessful battle with it. The problem exists also in Britain, but is not yet being seriously tackled. Various schools of reformers are sharply divided as to the way in which it should be dealt with.

The relations between property and liberty have long been a subject of debate. Time was when the sanctity of property was regarded as an essential element in a system of liberty : when Locke founded the case for representative government upon the necessity of consulting every man (through his representative) before any part of his property could be taken from him by taxation ; or when Burke glorified the great estates of the landowning magnates, and the independent power of giant corporations such as the Bank of England or the East India Company, as the chief bulwarks against monarchical tyranny. We have abandoned that view. But most Conservatives are still prepared to spring to the defence of the great industrial corporations which form a new and dominating factor in our social life, and which are now the backbone of Conservative strength.

Those who recognise the danger of this formidable power are divided. Socialists find the root of every social ill in the institution of private property, or at any rate in the ownership by private persons of "the means of production and exchange." They believe that this leads to the creation of vast aggregations of wealth and power in private hands, and to the exercise of an illicit domination, by the wielders of this power, over the whole life of the community. Their remedy is to transfer the ownership of all "the means of production and exchange" to the State, which will presumably wield it, not in the interest of private persons, but in the interest of the community. Liberals, on the other hand, while recognising the danger of excessive aggregations of wealth and power, believe in private property as an essential element in a system of liberty. In their view, the ownership of some property is a vital condition of personal freedom ; it heightens a

man's self-respect, buttresses his independence, and saves him from being completely at the mercy of his employers, whether public or private. The aim of their policy, in this sphere, must therefore be to bring about the widest possible diffusion of ownership ; they accept Bacon's aphorism that "property is like muck, good only if it be spread." Fearing the vast increase of the power of the State and its rulers over the individual which would result from the concentration of all capital in its hands, they advocate, not "public" but "popular" ownership of the means of production.

It has, however, become necessary to think out afresh the whole question of the relations between property and liberty, in the light of the extraordinary change in the nature of property which has come about during the last century, and especially during the last generation. The cause of this change has been the growth of the joint-stock company with limited liability, and the enormous increase in the scale of industrial production which the joint-stock system has made possible.

Property used to consist almost wholly of definite, tangible *things* : of land, crops and livestock ; of houses, workshops, factories, tools, machines, ships, carts and carriages. The owners of these things controlled, and were responsible for, the way in which they were used. Property still consists, ultimately, of things. But most of the things which are needed by modern industry and transport are so huge and so costly that they cannot be individually owned. They are therefore owned in "joint stock" ; and the property of a sharer in a joint stock is represented by a document which can be bought or sold, and which entitles him to a share of the wealth earned by the use of the joint-stock company's property. Thus the greater part of the property owned by individuals has now become incorporeal or disembodied ; and those who control this disembodied property now control the greater part of the nation's activities.

But by whom is this control actually wielded ? In theory the shareholders of a joint-stock company are still held to be responsible for the use made of their property ; and the shareholders (for example) of the L.M.S. Railway are annually summoned to a meeting, at which they are supposed to elect the Directors, and to criticise, approve or disapprove of their report on the year's working. But this responsibility has ceased to be more than a legal fiction. If all the shareholders

of the L.M.S. Railway were to attend an annual meeting, there is no building in the country that could hold them, not even the Wembley Stadium; and if they did assemble—perhaps on Salisbury Plain—it would be impossible to transact business with a mob of some hundreds of thousands. The consequence is that the Directors, in effect, elect themselves, or fill up vacancies in their number; and that they wield a practically irresponsible control over the Company's work, over its army of workers, and over the vast mass of capital which it employs.

In short, *the ownership of property has been divorced from responsibility*; and this is true not only of vast concerns like the L.M.S., but even of small companies. The divorce is accentuated by the practice, common among investors, of distributing their risks: a man who has £10,000 invested in many concerns, perhaps scattered over the earth, can neither feel nor exercise any responsibility for the use made of his property. It is still further accentuated by the growth of Trust Companies. When a man invests £100 in a Trust Company, he draws his interest from many different concerns, about which he may know nothing, and whose meetings he is not even entitled to attend. The incorporeal character of property, and the divorce of ownership from responsibility, could not be carried farther.

It is futile to deplore, or to denounce, these developments. They are the inevitable consequences of the joint-stock system, which alone has made possible the gigantic achievements of modern industry. It is impossible to reverse the process. We must be content to study and understand it, and to realise its momentous social consequences, instead of merely taking it for granted, as we too commonly do. The change in the character of property, and in the way in which it is controlled, opens up new problems, and dictates a fresh approach to the question of the relations of property and liberty. There are, in particular, two consequences of the change which especially demand our attention.

In the first place, the new form of property lends itself readily to the building up of gigantic aggregations, either by the direct amalgamation of separate concerns, or by the device of "holding companies" which exercise control over a group of concerns by owning a majority of their voting shares (which may form a relatively small proportion of the

total capital), or by other financial devices. The upgrowth of these giants has been a marked feature of our economic development, especially since the war; and it has been greatly encouraged by the exclusion of foreign competition by means of tariffs. These huge concerns often bring about an improvement in efficiency and economy, and it is for this reason that the process which has created them is glorified by the name of "rationalisation." But these advantages are frequently nullified by gross over-capitalisation; and, in any case, a concern may easily become so unwieldy in size that efficient central direction is impossible, and the elaboration of organisation, and the multiplication of red tape may counterbalance the efficiency and economy that are aimed at.

For the most part, the giants are built up, not by practical industrialists but by financiers, and are therefore dominated by financial rather than industrial aims. The main motives of the organisers are usually, first, the hope of making large flotation profits; and, secondly, the desire to build up a gigantic fabric of power. Each of these huge concerns is usually dominated by a single powerful and masterful personality; his colleagues on the Board are apt to follow him with docility, especially as most of them probably hold directorships in a multitude of different concerns.

The controllers of these gigantic organisations instinctively aim at monopoly, or at such an approximation to it as will enable them to dominate their rivals, and to control the market. Even if they cannot succeed in incorporating all the concerns in a particular industry into one gigantic combination (and this has not yet been attained in any British industry, not even in chemicals or soap) they can often achieve the substance of monopoly by organising price-rings or agreements.

Monopoly is in some instances defensible and even necessary, as in the case of the Post Office, or the supply of electricity or water: it would be wasteful to have more than one postal service, and intolerable to have more than one organisation laying pipes in the street. But these are cases of essential public services of a uniform and standardised character. Where these conditions exist, it is best that the monopoly should be under public control. But in all other cases, which are concerned with the supply of the infinitely varied and changing needs of the public, monopoly is vicious

and indefensible. A monopoly, even an imperfect monopoly, has the consumer at its mercy : it is tempted to use its power to crush out legitimate competition ; it strives to establish a stranglehold over the distributors ; and it is often tempted to buy up and suppress useful new devices in order to avoid the cost and trouble of making changes. The controllers of a monopoly, whether private or public, are always tempted to conceal their own inefficiency at the expense of the public, especially when they are protected against foreign competition. On all grounds, it should be a prime object of public policy to be constantly on guard against tendencies to monopoly. Yet no attempt has been made to check or to regulate the very rapid development of monopolistic tendencies in British industry. They have rather, in recent years, been stimulated and encouraged by Government action.

A part of the reason for this may perhaps be found in the second aspect of the transformation that has been taking place : it is creating a new ruling class in Britain, as formidable and as much in need of control as the old feudal class of independent barons. It is not wealth as such that now threatens British liberty. It is the power of those who wield an almost irresponsible control over the accumulated wealth of millions. The new ruling class may be described as the Director-class.

It is recruited in part among men who have shown ability, especially in finance : the chief controllers of these giant concerns are nearly all very able men. But many of their colleagues can scarcely be described as master-minds. Some of them hold their places because they were directors of concerns that have been absorbed ; some because they are the sons of their fathers ; some because they own great wealth ; some because they were supposed to have useful influence, economic or political. In this category must be included many politicians, or ex-politicians : the *Directory of Directors* includes a large proportion of the members of the Houses of Lords and Commons, especially on the Conservative side, and it is sometimes said that the chance of obtaining directorships is one of the attractions of membership of Parliament. Although members of the Cabinet cannot be directors while they hold office, they can generally look forward to being provided for in this way when they retire. The new ruling class thus wields a great indirect influence over

the regular organs of government ; and this reinforces the immense direct power which they wield over the nation's economic policy, and over the lives of the millions whom they employ.

There is thus enthroned at the heart of our nominal democracy a formidable power which is, in the main, irresponsible and uncontrolled ; this offers a real danger to liberty. If democracy is ever to be real, this power must somehow be regulated and controlled. But how ?

The Socialist solution is that the State must take over both ownership and control. This would mean that the imperfect monopolies which now exist in some industries would be replaced by complete monopolies, enforced by law, in all industries. Most of the evils that spring from monopoly, and especially those that arise from over-bigness of scale and the absence of competition, would be present in public monopolies as much as in private ; indeed, they might be worse, since all competition would be forbidden by law. The Socialist plan would mean, secondly, that the great but as yet imperfectly organised power wielded by the small class of Directors would be replaced by an overwhelming plenitude of power wielded by the small number of men who always act in the name of the State, and who would have control of practically all the capital of the country. How crushing and irresistible this power can be is to-day being exemplified in Russia. The notion that Parliament could guard against abuses must be dismissed : Parliament cannot adequately perform its existing duties of criticism and control ; if to these duties were added the supervision of the whole economic system, the machinery of democracy would break down completely. For these reasons the Socialist solution of our problem must be discarded.

But if the State cannot undertake the direct control and conduct of the whole industrial machine, it has an inalienable duty to regulate the working of the machine in such a way as to ensure justice and liberty for all its citizens. The State has itself, by its legislation, and especially by its Company Law, created the conditions from which our problem has arisen : it has, notably, given to the investors in companies (whose ownership, as we have seen, is divorced from responsibility) the great privilege of limited liability, without any corresponding limitation of profits. When need arises—and, surely,

the need has arisen—it can revise and strengthen its system of regulation.

It can, to begin with, lay down stricter provisions regarding the qualifications of Directors, requiring, for example, that a majority of the Directors in any concern shall be men who give most of their time to its service, and limiting by law the number of directorships that any man may hold. It can, again, impose strict obligations upon auditors, regarding the fullness, accuracy and fairness of the balance-sheets or prospectuses which they endorse; and auditors might well be enrolled in a professional organisation, charged with the duty of “disbarring” those guilty of professional misconduct.

It can (and this is more important) draw a clear distinction between small companies, which commonly initiate new enterprises, and, in doing so, often take great risks in the hope of later winning substantial profits; and, on the other hand, large and well-established concerns: the criterion of their being well-established should be the volume of their total capital, including that of their subsidiaries. Companies controlling more than a defined amount of capital might be required to register in a special category as Public Corporations. They might be required to publish much fuller accounts than are exacted from ordinary companies, and it might be provided that complaints of unfair competition made against them could be referred by the Board of Trade to a special tribunal. They might be prohibited from distributing free bonus shares among their shareholders, who have done nothing to earn them; and encouraged to allot new capital set aside out of profits among their workers by brain and hand. The amount of the dividends they might pay might be limited, by a provision that beyond a certain figure profits should be shared with their employees. The effect of these provisions would be to weaken the motives for striving after a monopoly position and for plundering the consumer; and also to diminish fantastic rises in the market value of shares, and the speculation which this occasions.

Finally, something can be, and ought to be, done to check the abuse of price-fixing rings and agreements. In their place, these arrangements have a real value; they prevent ruinous competition, especially on a falling market; but they are obviously open to grave abuses. They should be regularised, and their decisions should be made public. It might be provided

that any price-fixing agreement not publicly reached by an authorised and recognised body should be open to prosecution as a conspiracy in restraint of trade.

This is a very brief and desiccated summary of the way in which the State might use its inalienable power of regulation to restrict within reasonable limits a development that is full of danger to our social order, without forbidding or preventing the expansion in the scale of industrial organisation that is probably necessary. But even if all this were done, we should still be far from having brought on to a sound basis the relations between liberty and property. I have not, in this article, attempted to consider how the new form of property can be utilised to bring about a healthier distribution of wealth among the people. That is a distinct theme, for which another article is required.

RAMSAY MUIR.

RELIGION AND REASON.

THE age-long controversy concerning the relations of Reason and Religion is at present being raised again from different quarters, both within and outside the Christian Church, and in new forms, both religious and psychological. In his Gifford Lectures on *Symbolism and Belief*, Dr. Edwyn Bevan recalls attention to Dean Mansel's once famous contention that religious beliefs are *regulative* for conduct, but that the Divine Reality beyond them is inaccessible to human thought. Mansel advanced this extreme position because he had become entangled in the abstract philosophy of the Absolute and Infinite. Dr. Bevan gives qualified support to Dean Mansel's position, somewhat modifying it by explaining that what the Dean really meant was that "If we *could* know the life of God we should see in it something which human love really resembled, so that to call it love would be the best way of saying what it is in human language" (p. 332). The Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. W. R. Matthews, in reviewing Canon Quick's new book, *Doctrines of the Creeds*, remarks that

At the present time there are two types of systematic theology, which are in conflict with one another and are based upon widely divergent principles. The Roman Catholic dogmatic theologians, and some Anglo-Catholics, begin with the Scholastic philosophy and its distinction between faith and reason; the prevailing School of Protestant theology abjures all alliance with philosophy and, at least in Karl Barth's presentation, deserves our author's title "Protestant Irrationalism."

In praising Canon Quick for seeking a truly Anglican *via media* between, or if possible a synthesis of, the two extremes, Dr. Matthews adds that Canon Quick "does not accept the sharp distinction between reason and revelation which scholasticism would suggest, nor does he admit that we have no knowledge of God except through Jesus Christ, as some Protestants would hold" (*Spectator*, July 22nd, 1938). While seriously questioning the statement that those who abjure all alliance with philosophy are the "prevailing" school of Protestant thought, it appears to the present writer that the general situation thus presented demands fresh and careful consideration.

I. Though the philosophical assumptions of materialism and agnosticism remain unchanged, yet some notable

modifications are to be observed. The old materialism simply dismissed religion as irrational from beginning to end. It criticised religious beliefs one by one as improbable, contradictory, or absurd. At present there is a tendency to seek to account for religion ; to explain its origins and factors in order to explain it away. The services of psychology are involved to trace the way in which subjective consciousness is projected upon the objective and unconscious universe. The old agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, in its attempt to mediate between Religion and Reason, fell into a hopeless contradiction, for it *affirmed the existence* of the Unknown and Unknowable. The less metaphysical, and therefore less positive, agnosticism of the present day appears to be content to assert that the Whence, Why, and Whither of the Universe are not known, rather than to contend that they must needs be unknowable. It suffices for it to dispute or to deny the existence of conscious personality as the explanation of the cosmos. Perhaps, if it be true that these modifications are real, they may be treated as marking an advance of reason in rationalist thought. Religion is a fact that cannot rationally be ignored.

2. The new breach, on the religious side, between Religion and Reason, owes its rise, in the main, to Professor Rudolf Otto, and its development to Professor Karl Barth. The sense of "The Numinous," if it be held to *overbear* human consciousness by the apprehension of the "*tremendum Mysterium*," is, of necessity, non-rational, if not irrational. It is assumed, without sufficient ground, that no element of reason is involved in this primary apprehension. If this were really the case, the eventual rise of a reasoned, if not rational, religion out of the sense of the Numinous would be inexplicable. Other factors may indeed have been subsequently introduced from without, yet how is it that these factors have been absorbed by a sense that is absolutely discontinuous with them ?

It has remained for Professor Karl Barth to glory in the absence of reason from true religion, and to treat reason as incompatible with evangelical belief. The Righteousness of God is, for him, revealed to the conscience of men in total separation, not only from human thought, but even from human morality (*The Word of God and the Word of Man*, Eng. translation, pp. 18-23). Barth italicises the statement

that "at the moment when religion becomes conscious of religion, when it becomes a psychological and historically conceivable manifestation in the world, it falls away from its inner character, from its truth to idols. Its truth is its other-worldliness, its refusal of the idea of sacredness, its non-historicity" (p. 68). It, therefore, must come by "a crisis that denies all human thought" (p. 80). It is the revelation "of a new order absolutely beyond human thought." The Will of God "is not a corrected continuation of our own. It approaches ours as a Wholly Other" (p. 24). The contradictions contained in these statements are obvious. How, for example, can the grace or righteousness of God be recognised as "*truth*" and as "*a new order*" without the activity of reason in the accepting faith? The very recognition that it is discontinuous with all other human thought and experience is a judgment of reason. The whole of Barth's characteristic position is simply the exaltation of a mood into a method. This mere exaltation of the mood overwhelms the perception of its incoherence and contradictions.

3. The position, thus taken up, is wholly incompatible with typical and continuous Christian thought; with the truly Catholic conception of the Christian faith as accepted by all branches of the Church. The early Christian thinkers, whether they were apologists or systematic theologians, were conspicuously rational in their exposition and establishment of the Christian Faith. This was above all the case with the Alexandrian Fathers. For them all, God, the Eternal Son as the Logos, the Incarnation, and the incarnate Christ, formed a coherent and inseparable Whole, which threw as much light upon the nature of the universe as it did upon the Nature of God Himself. They proceeded to the spiritual and rational interpretation of the universe and its history upon the assumption, fortified by their philosophy, that the universe is organically related to Christ, and, therefore, is interpretable in terms of the Truth and Values revealed in Him.

The Scholastic period exhibits a change, which received its classic formulation in the great work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Faith and reason became clearly distinguished from one another, and their respective provinces marked out as Revealed and Natural Religion. Yet faith and reason, following their characteristic ways, were united in arriving at the truths of Natural Religion. Even in the case of Revealed

Religion, while its truths were conveyed by revelation, and were above the sphere and competence of reason, yet, when revealed, these truths became so far amenable to human reason that it was competent to articulate them and to deduce their consequences. So truly was this the case that this ancillary service of Reason was treated not merely as legitimate, but as essential. Thus Religion and Reason were not merely held to be in alliance; they were, indeed, "deeply interfused." The explanation of the need of Revelation lay above all in this, that God being the Supreme Personality, the truth concerning Him must needs be conveyed by Himself; and this, above all, because His purpose for mankind and His redemptive grace in accomplishing it were conveyed through His transcendent Activity and Deed. Yet after they had been so communicated, they could be recognised, not only by faith but by reason, as being in keeping with the glory of His spiritual perfection, and in particular with His love.

In view of all this it becomes intelligible why the Roman Church showed a distrust of John Henry Newman, with his ambiguous and changeable attitude towards reason. This distrust was intensified by his emphasis on certain factors of religious faith, which he treated as subjective, and therefore as lacking in the universality of the appeal that reason, by its very nature, is impelled to make.

4. It is only necessary, at present, to call brief attention to the fact that the recent advances in the psychology of religion have emphasised important factors in religious faith that are, at least primarily, distinct from reason, being concerned with the will, the affections, and the aspirations which are active in religious belief. To call these factors non-rational, however, because they can be distinguished from reason, is to prejudice the case, as will shortly be seen, by separating factors which, while distinctive, are united in the total act and attitude of Personality. The contributions of psychology, in calling attention to the volitional and affective elements of religion, have been reinforced from the side of philosophy by Kant's criticism of what he called the Pure Reason, and by his transference of all that establishes the certitude of faith to the realm of the Practical Reason, with its predominant ethical concern.

In view of the situation thus briefly described, it is important to examine the subject afresh, and the following

suggestions are offered in the hope that they may be of some service in this endeavour.

(1) It is essential to start with a clear conception of what is meant by the terms Religion and Reason. Religion stands for something more than and different from the acceptance of a body of doctrines and practices. It is above all an attitude, and an attitude to a Being, or beings, deemed to be beyond and higher than, to use symbolic language, the religious individual or community. Religious faith is, therefore, the act and venture of the whole personality, involving the co-operation of mind, heart, and will. Religious belief postulates the real existence of its object, and assumes that this object is in actual relations with, and at least in partial control of, the believer. It also presumes that its object is adequate to satisfy the demands and needs of the worshipper, whether these be trivial and material, or whether they have become so profound, with the development of personality and the enlarged range of experience, as to be truly spiritual. Now reality, relationship, adequacy, each and all require a judgment of the reason, however imperfect and almost instinctive it may be. Even if Schleiermacher's definition of religion as "the sense of dependence" be accepted, yet it is inconceivable that this sense should exist without some glimmer of a concept of the object upon Whom, or which, dependence is felt. An element of reason is, therefore, involved in the attitude taken up, even if this be only "the sense of the Numinous," since it is the act of the personality as a whole, is occasioned by the whole of its conditions and circumstances, and involves the affirmations of reality and relationship. To expel reason from religion is, therefore, to maim the personality that believes.

On the other hand, reason is a differentiated, a specialised, activity of the personality, in which an attempt is made to become purely intellectual and disinterested. If reason is to be "pure," its activity must be so entirely disentangled from emotions, desires, and intentions that it becomes concentrated upon the apprehension, pursuit and definition of what is objectively *there*. When thus set free and isolated, reason seeks to articulate Reality as a coherent Whole; its coherence, however, involving its consonance with the reasoning mind of the inquirer. Otherwise Reality, if existent, would be altogether unintelligible. To use symbolic words again, it may

be said that religion is primarily concerned with the Above and the Inward in association, while reason fixes its attention upon the Around. Hence it would appear that religion is prior to reason, at the outset, that its factors are more complex, that its aims are more far-reaching and its satisfaction more intimate. Yet reason enters into religion, as an essential ingredient, and faith is not absent from reason, if only faith in its own competence and in the universe as being amenable to the effort to interpret it.

(2) In so far as reason itself is concerned, the human inquirer has, to begin with, to make a choice between two alternatives. Human consciousness is twofold. There is the inner world of personal life and there is the outside world perceived through the senses. Roughly speaking, there is the spiritual and there is the material. Which is to be made the starting-point? In terms of which should the problem be approached, if the Truth of Reality is to be discovered and explained? Since the rise of the physical sciences in modern times, a widespread tendency has arisen to choose the external universe, assumed to be material, as the starting-point, and as containing within its facts, forces, and laws the clue to the interpretation of Reality, if indeed it can be interpreted by man. Those who make this choice arrogate to themselves exclusively the title of Rationalists. This preference can easily be explained. The pioneers of the physical sciences concentrated their attention upon the material universe, and built up an instrument of inductive philosophy—comprising observation, experiment and inference—with wholehearted concentration and astonishing success. In making the twofold endeavour to discover the secrets of nature and to build up a systematic instrument of inductive research they found themselves confronted, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by a rival system that came down from antiquity, authoritative in its claims, highly articulated in its content, derived by deduction from abstract metaphysical premises, and vitiated by its inherited neglect alike of nature and of the methods of practical research. The dogmatism of this system not only countenanced but supported a great mass of primitive superstitions, which were clearly at variance with nature, and often actively mischievous. This system enjoyed the approval of current religion, and indeed was held to be an integral part of it. In these circumstances it was hardly

remarkable that the new science claimed the exclusive possession of reason and assumed that faith and religion must needs be, not only irrational, but the deadly foes of reason ; not only in its endeavours, but in its very essence. Yet to choose the other alternative, and to hold that since personality is the culminating factor of evolution, since the employment of personal faculties is the only way to discover the secrets of the universe, and since all scientific progress shows the universe to be so amenable to their employment as to reward them, therefore the secret of world-explanation—its Whence, Why and Whither—is to be discovered within and through personal, spiritual consciousness is, to say the least of it, as rational a choice as that of naturalism. It is the contention of Theists that it is more rational ; indeed, that it is so rational as to be able to embrace, within its ample scope, the whole apparatus and results of natural science. What is given to faith supplies the impulse and inspiration of reason. Theism has a Wholeness all its own. Knowledge is the fruit of Faith, Reason is a handmaid of Religion. This is the claim of faith, and it is substantiated by all the aids that can be supplied by reason.

(3) Important consequences follow from this choice, made not blindly, but by the aid of reason.

To begin with, the contents of religious experience are entitled to higher regard and more careful appreciation by reason. The intimations, aspirations, hopes and fears which spring from religion, and are sifted by rational faith, cannot reasonably be dismissed on the mere ground that they are human and religious. If personality counts in the rational interpretation of Reality, still more if it be the most valid means of interpretation, then to dismiss spiritual experience as merely subjective is irrational. Why should the categories of the understanding alone have cosmic significance, to the exclusion of the contents of spiritual experience and the dictates of moral consciousness ? Above all, why should Love be overlooked, seeing that it is the outstanding fact of human life, and that it rises to ever greater heights of spiritual purity and transforming achievements ? It is not merely religion, but reason, that presses this inquiry and seeks to substantiate this claim.

In the next place, when the significance of Personality has been recognised, reason itself comes forward with religion to

give more reverent heed to the claim that the Divine Personality, God, the source and ground of all finite personalities, is real and living, has spoken and acted in human history for ends worthy of His Godhead, and in ways that are congruous alike with His transcendence and His immanence in the spirits of men. The self-imposed limitation of agnosticism corresponds with religion in its characteristic utterance, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" (Job xi, 7). Religion joins with reason in this confession. They are united in acknowledging that God, in the fullness of His eternal and infinite perfection, is beyond the adequate apprehension of man. Yet if He be personal, "the Father of our spirits," what can be more reasonable than to expect that He "has not left Himself without a witness," that He has given more than a merely regulative revelation of Himself, and that this Self-revelation has been consummated in the life, work and teaching of the supreme personality of human history, Jesus Christ? This acknowledgment assumes such kinship between God and man as to make this revelation possible and probable. This assumption is as much the conclusion of reason as of religion, once the rational choice of Personality as the key to the nature of Reality has been made.

(4) Perhaps the most crucial question for reason is that of the Personality and purposiveness of God. Belief in both is indispensable to the Christian Religion. It is impossible within the limits of this article to discuss the subject. Only two remarks can be made in order to affirm that at these vital points for religion, reason is as active as elsewhere. Both reason and religion are at one in recognising that personality, as it exists, or indeed is only coming to exist, in finite creatures, must needs give an utterly inadequate idea of what the Personality of God must be. Yet for religious reason it is unthinkable that the world of spiritual life as found in human society is explicable without a spiritual ground, that reason springs out of the non-rational, and that the whole drama of conscious life is being played out, and, indeed, furnished with its setting and instruments, in and by means of a universe that is careless and unaware of what is taking place. So, also, in regard to the purposiveness of God. The universe as it exists to-day is the unfinished result of an ordered evolution, which has advanced by stages, is active at every stage, and

throughout which there is intimate interaction and reciprocity of every part, whether animate or inanimate, whether conscious or unconscious. This evolution has culminated in Man, and man has come into his manhood through his purposiveness. The triumphs of civilisation have been due to the ever-increasing activity of a purposiveness, which has created and organised the Sciences and Arts, and has applied them to the individual and collective activities through which its ends may be attained. Ordered evolution has issued in the ever-growing power, range and persistence of human purposiveness. Religion invokes reason to join in insisting that the cause must be adequate to and consonant with the result—in short, that it must be a Sufficient Reason, linking cosmic evolution and human purposiveness in a consistent movement towards the fulfilment of its aims.

(5) Irrationalism in religion, whether Barthian or other, is incompatible with the nature of faith, with practically the whole course of Christian thought and with the intellectual procedure by which alone can religion itself in the end be satisfied. The Faith of religion is the act and attitude of the whole personality, and as such carries with it every activity and affection of the believer. Were reason left behind the personal act would be incomplete, and a subsequent inner disruption would take place. This is still more evidently the case when such faith is not merely a momentary act but a steadfast attitude. That, similarly, account must be taken of the volitional and emotional elements of faith goes without saying. Yet, while these may be distinguished in thought, neither intellect, emotion, nor will is isolated in the activity of the entire personality. They are interpenetrative. If reason could be so detached from the so-called non-rational factors and ingredients of religion as to survey them from outside, the very fact that these reach out beyond themselves towards Another would supply to reason strong evidence that such Another is actually existent. For just as the eye can only be explained in relation to the light, so, it may well be argued, can the life of the spirit only be explained as due to the reality of the object of which it is in quest, which develops it by satisfying and stimulating it, as is the case with the senses and their objects.

(6) Finally, to contend that reason is inherent in true religion is in accordance with the uniform teaching both of

the Old Testament and the New. Both the Prophets of the Old and the Apostles of the New Testament support their appeal to the conscience and heart of their hearers by invoking the confirmation of wisdom and knowledge. The Truth they proclaim and the salvation they offer, while revealed from above, as they insist, are shown to be coherent with the universal ways of God with mankind and with His world. Hence St. Paul, in giving an account of his Gospel to the Areopagus, sets it in relation both to the order of nature and to the philosophy of men. They are set forth by him as constituting a coherent whole. The findings of human thought are summoned in support of the Divine revelation of the Gospel as being accordant with it. Any other position involves, not only discontinuity of process, but an ultimate Dualism, which ends in Manichæism. Thus religion and reason go hand in hand, alike in the venture of faith, in the reverent apprehension of its object, and in so casting aside the superstitions of crude anthropomorphism, as to contemplate God as the Divine Other, Who because He is not "the Altogether Other" is the "rewarder of them that seek after Him."

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

CZECH-POLISH UNDERSTANDING.

THE TESCHEN QUESTION.

ONE of the most unhappy cases of tension in post-war Europe has been that between two neighbour Slav states, Poland and Czechoslovakia. For this reason, the prospects of removing this tension, by the returning of the Polish parts of the Duchy of Teschen to their motherland, are welcomed warmly by all friends of peace.

A number of reasons contributed to these strained relations, each of them worthy of special study : the difference in the attitude of the two peoples during the nineteenth century, on the one hand to Tsarist Russia, on the other to the Hapsburg régime in Vienna ; the manifest unfriendliness of the Prague government in 1919 and 1920 toward the new Poland, during her life-and-death struggle with the Bolsheviki ; the unwillingness of Poland to join the Little Entente, which she regarded as a Danubian Basin affair. But more than all these taken together, the seizing by Czech troops of the town and district of Teschen on January 23rd, 1919, after an agreement had been reached by the two parties on the spot on November 5th, 1918. Without pressure or interference from outside, a line had been accepted that would have done the minimum of injustice to the inhabitants ; giving in effect the county of Frydek to the Czechs, and the other three counties to Poland. The result of the Czech invasion was the coming of an Inter-Allied Commission, and a year and a half of unrest on the spot, and of anxiety for the Peacemakers in Paris. The dramatic outburst of Mr. Lloyd George, " Where's Teschen ? Who ever heard of Teschen ? " brought the issue to the attention of the newspapers ; but few people knew anything about the matter, and as a result few cared.

But the thing could not end there. Those of us who have known the facts never doubted for a moment that an adjustment would some day be necessary. Now, after eighteen years, under pressure of an ultimatum sent by Poland as the culmination to long negotiations, the Prague Government yielded on September 30th to the demand for an occupation at once by Polish troops of the admittedly Polish parts of the Duchy, beginning with the part of the town of Teschen, lying west of the Olza river. This start was made on October 2nd, amid the unbounded rejoicing of the inhabitants, and further

steps came in due course. In a short speech the Polish Foreign Minister referred to "our adversary of yesterday," and foreshadowed a new era in the relations of the two neighbour states and peoples. This turn of events is a relief to all, if only in view of the surging tide of German expansion, threatening all Slav peoples.

In appearance this whole incident, to the average and so uninformed man in Western Europe, has been unfortunate. It has looked as though, at a time of special danger for a smaller state, another neighbour—also bigger—has come along to rob the victim when he was down. Such is the appearance, but the reality is something quite different. What has now happened in the Teschen area was bound to come some day or other; and we can only regret that things have come to such a pass in European affairs—not through the fault of the smaller Powers, that conference and negotiations are of little value. The brief survey of the salient facts in the Teschen dispute should help to explain what has happened in these days.

The agreement made on November 5th, 1918, was denounced by the Czech Government a month later, and a campaign set on foot for the gaining of the "historical frontiers" for the new republic. This would have meant the giving up by the Poles of the whole Duchy as far as Bielsko (Bielitz). As noted already, only one of the four counties, namely the Western one around Frydek, has ever had a Czech population. The Poles naturally refused to budge, and on January 23rd the Czechs began a formal attack on the Polish lines. Having no kind of equality of forces, the Poles had to withdraw and to leave over half of the area in dispute in Czech hands. They did, however, make a stand after three days of fighting, on the Upper Vistula around the town of Skoczow.

An Inter-allied Commission took charge, and a long period of unrest and discussion followed. The Poles were at a disadvantage throughout, owing to the far graver peril of the Bolshevik invasion, which engaged the attention both of the people and the Government. Small wonder then, that under French pressure and with the promise of "compensation" in Prussian Silesia, they agreed to withdraw their demand for a plebiscite and accepted a settlement at the hands of the Council of Ambassadors on July 28th, 1920. This settlement cut the town of Teschen in two on the line of the Olza River,

giving the German part to Poland and the Polish part to the Czechs. The latter also got the rich hard-coal mines of Karwina and the big foundry at Tryniets. Finally, they remained masters of the trunk railway of this part of Europe, running southward from Bogumin (Oderberg) through purely Polish territory to the Jablonkow Pass, and on to Slovakia. The new line left on the Czech side a Polish population of at least 120,000 souls.

Looking for a moment at the main grounds on which the Czechs based their operations, we find three :

- i. The claim for historical frontiers—Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia,
- ii. The need for the natural resources of coal and iron to be found in this area, to balance the economic structure of the new republic, and
- iii. The need for the trunk railway just mentioned, connecting Prague with Slovakia.

Only the third of these claims could really bear examination. There was at the time no other good railway connection with Slovakia, and the latter was gravely threatened by an invasion from Hungary. Even so, however, there is no doubt that the Poles would have allowed the use of the railway as a temporary measure, for the protection of Slovakia. Further, the time soon came when the other lines through Moravia were in working order. Finally, if the local needs demand consideration, then the parallel line running south from Ostrava to Frydek and Bíla, through purely Czech territory, could be put through the pass of the Western Carpathians without great cost, to join the trunk line in Slovakia at Čadca. (It is on record that Paderewski offered to pay for the building of this short line in order to save a national frontier for his people.)

The "need" for coal and iron, or any other raw materials, could be used as a pretext for both reasonable and unreasonable frontier claims in any part of the world. Certainly the economic position of Czechoslovakia was stronger for having these resources. However, to get with them a solid population belonging to a neighbour state, and so bound to be discontented, was to weaken and not strengthen the body politic. Even if the treatment of the Polish minority in this area had been in the last twenty years in keeping with the

very liberal Czechoslovak Constitution—and it has been very far indeed from this ideal, the sense of injustice would remain in the hearts of peasants, miners and foundrymen. With this kind of thing every wise Government in the world will reckon.

The claim to “historical frontiers,” more readily conceded to the Czechs where they were held in common with the German Reich, because they also represented a strategic frontier for defence, falls to the ground entirely in the Teschen area. All the way around Bohemia and the length of the Grandfather mountains, the frontier follows the watershed. Here it leaves the watershed entirely. The whole Duchy of Teschen lies outside of the Moravian Gate. It belongs geographically to the plain of the Upper Oder river. The fact is, of course, that not a single national claim to historic frontiers as such was admitted in Paris after the war—neither those of Poland, Lithuania nor Hungary. This makes the concession to the Czechs the more unusual, for the special reason just mentioned.

Writing in *The New Europe* of September 30th, 1920, by the courtesy of the editor, Professor Seton-Watson, to protest against the frontier drawn in this fashion, I said as follows :

The *exposé* made by Dr. Benesh to his Government reveals many interesting facts, surmised already by those of us who have been in close touch with the whole Teschen dispute. He admits that the American line, as he calls it, was very near being decided on over a year ago ; and that it would have been far less advantageous to the Czechs than the one now attained. I am ready to believe it. The Americans, who investigated the matter on its merits as a boundary dispute between two peoples, found that an ethnical frontier was not at all hard to draw. It exists : one of language, defined some ten years ago by both a Pole, Nitsch, and by a Czech, Niederle ; one of nationality, which goes with the language ; and one of religion—most remarkable of all. It lies almost identically on the boundary of the two counties of Frydek and Teschen (Cieszyn) ; and to anyone who has lived any time in the country, it is obviously the only just division. . . . The Polish population now assigned to the Czechs is Protestant and has always gravitated toward Teschen ; whereas half a mile away further west there is scarcely a Pole—all are Catholics and they gravitate toward Frydek.

This “American line” is the one now occupied by the Poles, who have shown commendable moderation in not going

further. It is notable that their press kept calling for the "return" of the whole Duchy; which would have meant the county of Frydek as well, and have given the Ostravitsa river as a new boundary. Such action would have meant including the same kind of Czech minority in Poland, as was the Polish group hitherto included in Czechoslovakia. It would have been both unnecessary and undesirable; and could only have led to trouble in the future. Official action has been wiser than the shouting of the masses.

To me personally, who had spent the whole war period as a civilian prisoner in their midst, the blow dealt to the Polish Protestants in this region—a group of close on 100,000 peasant people, with an unbroken Church tradition since Reformation days, was the worst feature of the whole transaction. They were cut right in two, and their spiritual and social life almost ruined by the disruption. Nine parishes were separated from their mother country; a very serious thing in a part of Europe that is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. The large parish of Teschen, partly urban and partly rural (which is served by one of the "Churches of Grace" begged early in the eighteenth century from the Emperor as a special favour by the King of Sweden), was cut in two. Nine thousand of its members were left on the Czech side, a small part of them Germans, but mostly Polish peasants. From visits made every few years to the homes of these people, I know what they have suffered from the new order; and the rejoicing among them at their reunion will be of a very special kind. For one thing, the contribution this solid body of Protestants can make to the cause of their Church in the whole of Poland will be greatly enhanced.

It should be added that the history of this Protestant community in pre-war days was not a happy one. Related directly to the Supreme Council for Evangelical Churches in Vienna, they were always faced with the reproach used for political purposes by the Germans throughout Central Europe: "If you are Protestant, you must be German!" Ensnared by this, and by the promise of the loaves and fishes that political and economic controls can always offer, one section of these people formed a "German friendly" group, led by the since notorious Joseph Koźdon. Calling themselves "Silesianists," they curried favour with the existing order, and earned the name of "renegades" from all men and women of principle.

During the post-war unrest, they threw their influence against Poland, counting on a safer future in the much larger German minority of Czechoslovakia than as a part of the far smaller and extremely scattered German minority in Poland. Koźdon rose in time to be Mayor of the part of Teschen given to the Czechs : a curious business, since he had hated the Czechs of old for their sound hostility to the Austrian régime. It was on this account that, as the English papers reported, the Governor of Polish Silesia, Dr. Grażynski, refused to accept from his hands on the Sunday of occupation, the keys of the city. " We respect honest Czechs and Germans," he said in effect ; " but not political trimmers like you ! " This incident is notable ; seeing that the presence of people of this kind in most mixed population areas of Central Europe, has made all settlements harder to achieve.

With the removing of this, the chief bone of contention, between Czechoslovakia and Poland, there is no reason left for strained relations between them. The fortunate thing is that, in spite of this tension, cultural, economic and personal contacts and collaboration have made real progress. To enter on this is, however, outside our present theme. There remains only one point to be touched on, the bearing of what has happened on the balance of power in Central Europe. It is a good deal more significant than the outsider might suppose.

The reason is the fact of the trunk railway already referred to. The fifty miles or so of this line, now in the possession of the Poles, are a sector of the famous Berlin-Belgrad-Bagdad railway of war-time fame ; a means of communication of capital importance for whatever may come in south-east Europe. Viewed coldly the situation is this : the Czechs could not hold it against the Germans, if they attempted to take it ; while the Poles must ! For this fifty miles of line to get into German hands means the threatening of all Polish industry in Silesia, and the turning of the Polish flank in the struggle for position in this part of the continent. If the Germans want only the " liberation " of their minority, then all is well. If, on the other hand, they are out to control the Danubian lands, then the possession of this railway has a bearing on the whole process.

WILLIAM J. ROSE.

THE NAZIS AND THE VATICAN.

THAT the final settlement of accounts with Christianity was but a question of time was evident to all those who fully realised the character of the Totalitarian State. They saw clearly that Concordats and agreements might create an external truce but could never bring a real solution of the problem. Thus no special prophetic gift was needed to predict that the true opposition to modern State absolutism would come from the religious camp—remarkable though the fact may seem at a time when so many believed Christianity to have lost its democratic features. This has been substantiated by the happenings of the past five years. Christianity in Germany, no matter whether Catholic or Protestant, has produced so many witnesses of faith unafraid of prison or death that our era can compare with the first centuries of the Christian Church. In July 1938 the official organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Romano*, published a document entitled *The Religious Situation in Germany* which by its simple enumeration of facts is one of the most pathetic records of history. It is arranged in seven chapters, entitled respectively: "Anti-religious Propaganda," "Against the Cross," "Restrictions upon Divine Service," "Hindrance of Religious Teaching," "Educational Propaganda," "Against Catholic Associations," "Against Charitable Institutions and the Administration of the Sacrament of Matrimony."

Chapter I recalls the methods by which the ideas of Alfred Rosenberg, the apostle of Neo-Paganism, have been spread among the people in every possible way: by educational courses, public meetings, periodicals and the entire daily press; how suspicion was systematically cast upon the clergy's patriotism, and demonstrations against priests and princes of the Church were arranged, whereas church processions were prohibited and those taking part in them punished. Public opinion in general was whipped up against the clergy, above all by means of sensational law-suits for money-smuggling and "immorality." As early as in December 1935 I had learned from a friend who wore the swastika from purely outward motives that the Ministry of Propaganda was preparing trials for "immorality." I already knew that whole libraries of falsified evidence and falsified photographs were piled up for use in due course as a death-blow to

the Church. It was possible for me at this juncture to inform the Vatican by the agency of Cardinal Hinsley of these facts ; I also published what I knew in the American daily press. In March 1936 the American Jesuit review *America* published an interview with me in which numerous further details of the coming trials were disclosed. The first of these law-suits took place on May 27th, 1936. The document of the *Osservatore Romano* calls special attention to the propaganda made for "public renunciation of faith," above all amongst educationists and other State and Party officials. Within the Archdiocese of Freiburg in Breisgau the number of "public apostasies" rose from 2,798 in 1936 to 3,374 in 1937. These cases of apostasy are frequently due to intimidation and threats.

The second chapter describes the war waged against the Cross in the name of Rosenberg's ideology. Many examples are given of the removal, destruction, mutilation, and profanation of crucifixes. The third chapter treats of the restrictions imposed upon religious freedom in general. Churches are closed on the pretext of Party demonstrations ; employees of the State and Party are prevented from taking part in Divine Service and in the Corpus Christi procession ; pilgrimages are declared to upset the traffic ; children of State and Party officials are forbidden to minister at Holy Mass. Notwithstanding the guarantees of Article 34 of the Concordat, the Catholic People's Association (*Katholischer Volksverein*), which in Baden alone numbered 450 branches with 30,000 members, was dissolved in 1934 ; its property was confiscated ; the Catholic professional associations are persecuted, the Catholic sports associations disbanded. Even Catholic charity is subjected to the terror. Its institutions are not allowed to co-operate with the general ones ; children's homes and orphanages are evacuated by force and Catholic associations are not even allowed to give shelter to the unemployed, to nurse old people or attend to prisoners and lunatics.

Chapter IV is dedicated to the obstacles put in the way of the free teaching of the Word of God ; though freedom of preaching is stipulated by Articles 4 and 32 of the Concordat, it is in practice narrowly limited by police measures. Numerous clergymen are being arrested on account of their preaching ; the announcements of sermons in the Cathedral of

Münster have been removed by order of the police. The reproduction of Papal encyclicals was frequently made impossible, even for the organ of the diocese. A special decree was issued to prohibit the distribution of religious pamphlets. In Baden twenty-two Catholic newspapers have disappeared and the Censor has suppressed a number of Catholic books. (The Catholic population of Baden amounts to hardly 7 per cent. of the total number of German Catholics.) As regards Catholic teaching in the schools the guarantees of the Concordat are practically non-existent. In the Archdiocese of Freiburg alone, thirty-two Catholic professors have been dismissed; the work *Wahrheiten des Katechismus* ("Truths of the Catechism") has been confiscated; since July 24th, 1927, the *Handbook of the Bible*, for many years a standard work, has been banned; biblical teaching is prohibited in all the schools. State officials can no longer send their children to Catholic schools. What makes the document particularly important is the fact that it is written by the Archbishop of Freiburg himself, who in the first years of the régime was among the few who believed it possible to get on with compliance and compromise. What he now has to say about the situation in Baden can be applied to the whole of Germany, and the *Osservatore* has recognised this.

The more unpopular this régime grows, the more hopeless its political situation becomes, the more unrelentingly will it seek to indemnify itself at the expense of Christianity. The recent persecutions of German and Austrian Jews which surpass all the preceding ones in savagery can be regarded as a barometer, for during the past five years Jew-baiting has always been the forerunner of blows directed against the Christian Churches. We have reason to assume that the régime will exercise pressure with a view to creating a schism within the Catholic Church in Germany and Austria. In Berlin and in the circles around Herr Bürckel the hope is nourished that even princes of the Church can be persuaded into apostasy and made agreeable to the formation of a "National Church" supervised by National Socialism. Rumours of this kind were heard even before Cardinal Innitzer, after the Austrian coup, had signed his declaration of loyalty to the new masters of the country with a "Heil Hitler" written in his own hand. Though the Cardinal had till that day sharply rejected National Socialism in public as

well as privately (I can myself recall numerous conversations with him on this subject), he has in the meantime gone so far as to try to introduce the Nazi racial laws into the matrimonial order of the Church. Needless to say this attitude is condemned by the Vatican and by the militant German bishops.

But that is far from being the whole story. As early as the summer of 1933 the Nazis tried to gain influence over the Chapter of the Cathedral in the Archdiocese of Salzburg, and it was said that they wanted to turn Salzburg into "the German Rome." To-day they might perhaps succeed where they then failed unless the Church keeps a sharp look-out; the consequences for those Catholics who have remained faithful, as well as for Christendom as a whole, would be immeasurable. All the means of pressure and terror of the State would be put at the disposal of such a "National Church" and brought into effect against conscientious bishops, priests and laymen. It is seen what immense dangers await the Church from all sides in the Totalitarian State—that state which denies the freedom and dignity of the individual. But to realise this does not exhaust the problem: it is, moreover, indispensable to take a clear stand regarding the Democracies, to play an active and not merely a defensive part in international as well as in national life. By its very nature the Church belongs to the camp of the Democracies, because their form of Government is the one most closely related to her qualities of freedom and social ethics. In his Encyclicals, *Non abbiamo bisogno*, *Quadragesimo Anno* and *Mit brennender Sorge*, the reigning Pope has declared Fascism and National Socialism in their political as well as social and moral aspects to be incompatible with the teachings of the Church. Moreover, the Encyclical *Arcanum* issued by Leo XIII and the Encyclical *Casti Connubii* of Pius XI make the laws of sterilisation, which play such a decisive part in National Socialism, unacceptable to every Catholic.

In spite of all this and of the campaign of destruction of the totalitarian state against Christianity, a deplorable division of public opinion exists to-day—a division which perhaps does more harm than all the persecutions. We need in this connection hardly refer to the Spanish "Civil" War, that revolt organised by the Fascist Powers against a legal Government—the classic example of a rebellion of the kind which the teaching of the Church has at all times condemned.

It is, however, not even necessary to go very far back in history for the verdict : it will suffice to look up the Encyclicals *Immortale Dei* and *Au Milieu* by Pope Leo XIII, the *Gravissimo* of Pius X, and the present Pope's *Divini Illius*. Notwithstanding these facts, and although Spain, were she to become the prey of the totalitarian states (to say nothing of the Islamic Moors) would mean a grave danger to England and France, Catholic papers in England and America try to present facts in such a light that it must seem almost a heresy for a Catholic to side with the Constitutional, Republican Government. Yet Austria ought to be a terrible example! Her powers of resistance would have remained intact if Austrian democracy after 1933 had received the support of the clergy. Instead of this a pseudo-Christian state was supported, about which the eminent Catholic statesman and scholar, Don Sturzo, says in his book *Church and State* : " The Austria of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg pretends to be a Catholic state based on the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* ; in reality it is a dictatorial state under Catholic and Fascist domination. Her Government represents but a minority whose power resides in martial law and whose social measures, called into being by Papal Encyclicals, are no realities. . . . The masses of the workers have not forgotten the cruel suppression of February 1934."

We have seen whither this policy has led the country and into what attitude—pro-Hitler, pro all that his name stands for—it has finally been converted. There are still people, of course, who dream of a " South German solution," a " Catholic " state consisting of Austria and South Germany under one of the Habsburgs, provided Germany is defeated in a war, or National Socialism is overthrown. Such ideas are said to be popular, amongst others, in foreign financial circles. They are bound to be popular with all those who are incapable of learning the lesson of history. From the point of view of true Catholicism such a thing cannot be envisaged, least of all by German Catholics, who must refuse to see their Church misused as a bulwark of reaction and for the disruption of their Fatherland. For them there is but one alternative if they realise their Christian, European, and German-democratic duties : in home policy Christian freedom and social justice within the frame of a peaceful Greater Germany ; co-operation with all positive forces, whether Catholic or not ; in

foreign politics, a policy of friendship without competitive ambitions, and of international justice—be the individual problem called Abyssinia, Spain, or anything else.

The burning question of "Church and State" can only be solved when totalitarian claims to power have ceased to infringe the right of every human being to his own God and his own conscience; when all the members of the Church recognise that political freedom and social progress are essential elements of the teaching of Christ. It is often contended that the Church only turns against the totalitarian state in so far as her privileges are being prejudiced. If this were true then the term "Catholic" would indeed have lost its intrinsic meaning, for the cause of the persecuted, whether Catholic, Jew, Protestant, Freethinker, or heathen, German or non-German, European or non-European, must be the personal concern of every Catholic. This means that even were the unimaginable to occur and the totalitarian state, for strategic reasons, to leave the Catholic population in peace, still no Catholic could compromise with it so long as a single person, no matter what his way of thinking, is kept under terror or other nations are being threatened.

According to the doctrines of the Church and the modern conception of the nature of the State, Church and State are two perfect and independent communities; but the existence of either is only possible if they respect man—for whose sake they were created. The present crisis has one good point; namely in increasing recognition of the oneness of human destiny. Since in Germany all the loyal followers of the Cross have had to suffer persecution, Catholics and Protestants have ranged themselves on a single front. Cardinal Faulhaber, Bishop Count Gahlen and the others have come to be the same heroic examples for the Protestants as Pastor Niemöller is for the Catholics. Once a similar recognition has been achieved in all the nations now suppressed, as well as in those which still enjoy their liberty, and also throughout the Catholic and the various Protestant Churches, we shall not be far from a solution of the problem "Church and State." In that day it will possibly be called "Church and Humanity," and the ordeal through which we are passing to-day will appear to those who come after us as the last which mankind has had to suffer.

PRINCE HUBERTUS LOEWENSTEIN.

GENEVA RECONSIDERED.

FOR two full years the believers in the League of Nations have been looking their greatest disappointment in the face : and in that time many have begun not only to see clearly, but almost to accept as fundamental, facts which before 1936 were hidden from their eyes. These facts have been recently dealt with in two American books, as frank as they are fair, dealing with international policy as a whole : they are, *Looking Behind the Censorships*, by Mr. Eugene F. Young, and *World Policies of the Great Powers*, by Dr. Frank H. Simonds and Professor Brooks Emeny. These books, being in agreement with regard to Italy and to Abyssinia, throw a new light upon Geneva. They point out that in spite of Italy's defiance of the League and in spite of the way she waged the war, she had a case, and that if the League failed, this was not merely because of the brutal and Machiavellian resources of Mussolini but because of certain defects in the working, and in the very structure of the League itself.

In the first place, it aimed at too much. War is a tragic and onerous burden weighing on the shoulders of peoples, and they cannot be expected, least of all in democratic countries, to engage in it except in defence of what they have been convinced are vital necessities. It was a mistake to expect Paraguay to go to war to defend the frontiers of Transylvania against the Hungarians, or to expect Siam to keep the Bulgarians from the tobacco lands of Macedonia. The interest was too remote for the principle of peace to outweigh the scales against the state of peace. It was for this reason that from the beginning the United States refused to ratify Wilson's engagement, and they were right. There was no Court working out valid principles of law, and when there neither is agreement in the law, nor means of enforcing it, what looks like a Court becomes a debating society. Furthermore, it may act not on principles of right as against wrong, but from motives of self-interest. When, for example, the question of an Austro-German customs union was brought before the League, the judges declared the union illegal by a vote of eight to seven. The eight states which declared it illegal were all linked in interest with Germany, the other seven were not.

But this was not the only difficulty. The position established when the League began was what might be called the

Victory of Versailles. It left Russia and the United States entirely self-supporting within their vast territories, one of eight million the other of three million square miles, as against, say, the hundred and eighty-one thousand of Germany. Even vaster than Russia's territories were the twelve million square miles of the British Empire. These huge extensions of territory were supported by the resources of wealth, of coal, of iron, of food and power, of cotton and wool, of machinery, rubber and chemicals, of iron ore, petroleum and metals. Of all these the United States had the full supply for her needs within her own territories, with the exception of wool and rubber. Russia's imports were confined—but for small amounts of machinery, minerals and wool—to rubber, nickel, tungsten, antimony, tin and lead. Great Britain, in addition to her vast supplies of power, coal, iron, machinery, chemicals and nitrates, was well able to supply her other deficiencies either from the Empire or her foreign investments : while Italy had to import iron, copper, cotton, rubber and minerals. At first she was also in desperate straits for her wheat supply—and at the same time her population was increasing. In the years before the war this increase in population had meant that emigrants sent home remittances, and so had balanced her economic system ; but in the years following the victory, she found her quota of emigrants to America reduced from 250,000 to 35,000, and they were almost excluded both from South American States and British colonies. This forced on the country a rigid and controlled economy. With this, she was almost though not quite able to maintain her birth rate, and her population continued to increase at the rate of 400,000 a year. But neither in the League of Nations, nor elsewhere, was any provision made for her increasing power : on the contrary, the rising numbers of her people were resented. Ignoring the fact that her birth rate was already tending to decrease, her neighbours on the West told themselves that it ought to decrease far more. They also ignored the fact that this would mean for the Italian people a revolution of both their emotional lives, and their moral principles. For both were inseparably associated with the vital impulse of their patriotism. The question involved was too wide and too fundamental to enter public debate anywhere, not to mention Geneva. Yet it involved the health not only of Italy, but also of the League of Nations.

In Germany the issue centred not so much on the actual life of the people as on the rights of the nation, and the very existence of her economic system. To demand reparations from a starving nation was itself an anomaly : to keep the largest and most progressive nation in Europe out of the League for a term of years was another : to use the machinery of the League to apply very questionable decisions, all to the detriment of Germany in territorial cases in Eupen-Malmédy, in Upper Silesia, and in the Hultschin area, were still others. They were aggravated by the circumstance that Germany in 1919 had forfeited areas essential to the economic system of the last fifty-eight years. But all these pointed to the fact that, in spite of all the idealisms of Geneva, it was, in its actual working out, an organism to perpetuate the victory of Versailles. It was true that at Wilson's instance it contained a clause to permit possible revisions ; but when it came to the point, the clause was seen to be controlled by two great Powers, France and Great Britain : and even so, those two Powers were frequently in disagreement. It became almost impossible to obtain a revision of the League : lacking the sense of general human justice in the vindication of powerful people long oppressed, lacking also the power to apply judgments with the force of law, it became merely a peculiar plan of the concert of Europe. The situation could not be summed up more clearly than it was by Count Grandi when he wrote in 1934 :

We are faced at Geneva with the following reality : that the Powers—large and small—carry their difficulties and their conflicts to the League of Nations. These conflicts do not shrink at Geneva : they expand. The Great Powers, in conflict with one another, seek for allies among the lesser Powers and form hostile groups which complicate and aggravate the situation ; the small States court the support of the Great Powers, who in order to maintain their diplomatic combinations at once take sides. Thus all disputes brought to Geneva finish sooner or later, either directly or indirectly, as conflicts between the Great Powers. During my stay in Geneva, I never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by agreement between the Great Powers. They alone are responsible for the situations that arise. A few States that remain outside of fixed diplomatic combinations and are therefore able to maintain an independent attitude have from time to time exercised a conciliatory influence at Geneva. But this only happens in the case of secondary disputes, and moreover

these lesser Powers, not having at their disposal the forces that might become necessary to back their action, are themselves compelled to have recourse to the Great Powers. The whole of the Geneva procedure is, in fact, a system of *detours*, all of which lead to one or other of these two issues: agreement or disagreement between Great Britain, Italy, France and Germany—the latter now formally absent, but not yet entirely detached from the League.*

Such then was the real state of affairs at Geneva, when the Italians, in their need of expansion, finally arrived by combination with other Powers at being allowed a pretty free hand in Abyssinia. Their case was strengthened by two facts, not then generally known in England: first, that Abyssinia, after twelve years in the League, was still a slave State; secondly, that it had evaded every clause of its trading agreement with Italy. Italy was guaranteed the privileges of the most favoured nation; but in point of fact she was the least favoured. The words of Messrs. Macartney and Cremona, in their authoritative book on Italy's foreign policy, are strong: "It was intolerable for Italy to be treated by blacks as a third-rate nation."

The deplorable results of all this are too familiar. If the Abyssinians made mistakes, they have paid for them heavily indeed. And for a long time Italy forfeited the friendship of the world in order to gain territories which it appears only foreign capital can fully develop. But even this was not so serious as the situation which developed when Hitler, remembering the policy of Bismarck in the early 'eighties, opened his arms to Italy, and in return for diplomatic support, first armed the Rhineland so as to be free for aggression in the East, then to prevent a plebiscite invaded Austria, now reduces Czechoslovakia to subservience, and sends a shiver of apprehension through the Balkans, as though the muddy waters of the Danube had overflowed their low banks on to the wide plains of Hungary and Roumania, of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with waters poisoned at their source.

The country most threatened by this bumptious Frankenstein is obviously its too trusting companion, Italy. Italy? No. The Italian people were anything but trustful or enthusiastic over national socialism. The axis does not mean a union of German with Italian hearts: it was the fire into which

* *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XII, p. 558.

Mussolini jumped from the frying-pan of his vendetta with Eden. But he has far too good a memory to forget that the words of *Deutschland über Alles* claim the Etschthal as German soil. It was, furthermore, as the southern port of German trade that Trieste rose with Genoa, Barcelona and Marseilles. It was as the vassal of German Emperors that Italy remained, through the centuries of her most magnificent achievement, divided politically into what Dante called harlotry, and instead of bringing her rich freight to port was driven like a ship rudderless in the storm.

In such circumstances, Italy naturally seeks rapid release from the Spanish embroilment. That there was a real danger of Russia controlling Spain has been proved, and that such a Spain could have cut off Italy at any moment from her sea-borne trade is also true, but the Spanish war has lasted far longer than Mussolini desires. The money he has spent on it has brought no return : and he needs for Abyssinia every *lira* he can get. Yet he cannot obtain a loan till he, and with him the far more dangerous Germans, are out of a Spain that matters to British trade routes only a little less than it matters to Italian ones.

Yet if we look at this curious state of affairs : that Italy almost came to war with an England who was her friend from the beginning ; that Germany keeps Europe—from our Western Island to the Black Sea—apprehensive every hour, we see that it is not merely the differences between our parliamentary system, and the combination of industry with government in one complex and inter-relating organism. There is a greater difference than that. It is that Geneva was linked up with a treaty which put ethnic urges before economic realities. It might be said that the Congress of Vienna had not understood the momentum of nationality : the Treaty of Versailles showed its consciousness more behindhand in thinking in terms of nationality, rather than those of economic life. They so undermined the peace they proclaimed ; very powerful nations were very poor, and could not be asked to acquiesce in a system, which, far from giving them a better distribution, took from them even the little they had. Mussolini may have given a knock-out blow to Geneva, but sooner or later Geneva must have been shown up as supporting a system which guaranteed the richer nations an addition to their riches, while the poorer nations could not make their claims heard.

That does not mean that Geneva should never have existed ; still less does it mean that Geneva promises nothing for the future. It means that if its force is to be as great as its best ideals were noble, peace must be seen in its true meaning. For peace is not the mere absence of war, though that is much. Peace is the life of peoples fulfilled in rich harmonies of inter-relation. It is not silence, but the concord of many instruments in an orchestra. It is the fullness of life which results from general freedom and justice.

To obtain peace, therefore, we may have to pay a higher price than so far we have had in view. We may have first to see that the League of Nations and its collective security were a benefit more agreeable to us than to hungrier nations. "Like the Americans," say Dr. Simonds and Dr. Emeny, "the British were willing to obey the law ; also, like the Americans, they were content with their own territorial possessions. *Having by past aggression attained present satiety*, they were now able, with complete sincerity, to renounce all purpose to disturb the *status quo*." The expression puts it gently ; but it is a call to moral responsibilities we seldom envisage. Englishmen, and sometimes Americans, are quick to detect and slow to forgive a moral failing in a foreign ruler. Their indignation is founded on the highest principles : it is supported by incontrovertible evidence. The only thing they leave out of account is the possibility that, in their wealth and ease, they had to take thought for a situation which tempted the foreign ruler to provide something more for his hungry people. Dr. Simonds and Professor Brooks Emeny put this very forcibly :

The economic policies of the well-fed nations have brought slow starvation and a cloud of impending disaster to those nations less fortunately situated. Thus, in a period of nominal peace, Italy has been subjected in reality to the experiences hitherto the lot only of cities blockaded and besieged in war. In a very real sense, therefore, the Ethiopian and Spanish enterprises represented not so much the departure of an invading host as the sortie of a beleaguered garrison. . . . Mussolini the conqueror is in reality Mussolini the captive.

If this applies to Italy, it applies also to Germany. The two countries, although so often lumped together, are in reality vastly different. They are different in history, different in temperament, not least are they different in government.

Urbane, astute, and slightly cynical, the Italian people were as a whole undisciplined and anything but military. (Whether recent years have changed them is open to debate. Marshal Badoglio gave his troops in Abyssinia the highest praise. Franco praised them for their advance on Santander ; but it is understood that he would not be heartbroken to see them leave Spain.) Mussolini has retained the monarchy, the Church, the capitalists, the Universities, the aristocracy, and until very recently the Jews. The genius and tradition of Italy which he cultivates proclaims with famous eloquence the ideals of freedom.

In Germany—in Vienna—it is, alas, a very different story. But disquieting as it is, can London—or New York—or Geneva—repudiate every responsibility? Our American authors sum up the case in these words :

After the war, the high tariff movement led by France and the United States, well-fed nations, greatly restricted Germany's sale of the products of her labour, thereby reducing her to part-time work. Germany asked for work relief in the form of lowered tariffs, but American and British loans provided direct relief instead, so that Germany did not go hungry. Then when the first chill blast of the Great Depression stopped foreign loans and froze foreign credits, and the new series of trade barriers, led by the American Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930, combined to reduce Germany's work and relief at the same time, the German people forsook the blessings of democracy for Nazi dictatorship.

These words are not in a pro-fascist book : they are written by American writers in a book supported by documents, charts and figures as thorough as any that have yet been made available to the public.

Many Britishers, some Americans, will lay the blame on France. But even in favour of France there is something they should remember. It is that France was in real danger of revenge. We know now that even Stresemann was looking for his opportunities : we know now that long before Hitler came to throw off the mask, Germany had been secretly rearming. What France asked was security. She might, it is true, have realised that England could never afford to see her crushed : but she asked for a sign. Both England and America refused it. And so while the French asked for security, the Germans asked for parity, and the British for disarmament, to find they could only agree each to threaten the other, till twenty

years after the armistice we come back to a situation nerve-racking in its tensiety and menace. As the ghoul has come nearer and stares us in the face, Geneva has done nothing. Yet its Article VIII insisted that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments.

Mr. Young's book, with a shrewdness that no one can ignore, analyses from his coign of vantage as Cable Editor of the *New York Times* the interests and intrigues, many of them personal, which accompanied this plan of the sated Powers to maintain the *status quo*. But he sees certain principles of British policy: security of communications, the use of the balance of power against any continental rival, the fostering of buffer States against this rival, and, finally, co-operation with America to stabilise and police the world. These objects, he asserts, were hidden as propaganda for peace and disarmament, which sometimes made much of Geneva, and sometimes not.

As he develops, generally with great acumen, the analysis of the diplomatic games of the Powers, he never once finds a trace of any great constructive statesmanship, any sense of the good of Europe as a whole: any analysis of Britain's position in relation to her European neighbours on one side, and on the other to her own Empire, which claims both political independence and yet defence at the cost of the taxpayers and men of Great Britain. There is no inkling of the real historic significance of the Great War: that in it Europe abdicated her supremacy. Divided against herself, she could no longer stand on the proud eminence which made her both the leader and the beneficiary of the whole world. His record is one of policies which, although intelligible, are so much connected with varying interests, and even personal interests, that at times they look very like intrigues. There has been some idealism, no doubt, but on the whole each country has been fighting for itself alone. The sense of the unity of the world has not developed: on the other hand, the sense of the unity of Europe has almost disappeared. The leadership of the world has been forfeited: direction has been lost. Asia has stepped into conflict which Europe is unable to restrain, because she is divided against herself. England is warned to abandon her responsibilities and think only of herself; but the unity of the Empire is dependent on Great Britain's relation to Europe. If a Great Power were to threaten the

centre of the Empire, no dominion, no colony could help feeling the result. The independence and security of each would be at the mercy of the Power which was supreme in Europe. Each, therefore, needs to support Great Britain in a constructive policy, which will enable her to give reality to the ideals and principles of the League.

We see now that what really happened at Geneva was that a system of Power politics was being pursued all the time. Economic combinations and personal combinations, not without support of armaments, produced such cynicism that at the end Germany and Italy followed the example of France in armament, and of Great Britain in thinking first of national profit. But this system has not only brought us to the verge of war : it has led to increasing economic strain. The only remedy for these is a policy which foregoes immediate profit or selfish security for the sake of that general welfare which will maintain Europe in her position of leadership. The Great Powers need to come together : and the only means of doing so is for the British Empire to face the responsibilities of its wealth and come forward with generous and far-reaching proposals to put Europe as a whole, and especially the Great Powers, in a juster relation to the economic system of the world, and especially to the developing territories of which so many are still within our sphere of influence. We need to forego quick profits for a policy nobler and wiser.

Recent events have shown up, like gallows on the skyline, some of the most dangerous elements in the contrivances of Geneva : on October 5th in the House of Commons, Sir John Simon pointed out that, by Article XIX, existing frontiers, no matter how false to ethnic principles, and economic needs, could not be changed unless all the governments in the League were *unanimous* in demanding the change. Why such an absurdity ? If we want an answer to that, let us turn to the eloquent and tragic episodes of disillusionment in the newly published memoirs of one of the most distinguished contributors to THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW : to *In My Time*, by Mr. Sisley Huddleston. Its honesty, justice and acumen make it one of the most salutary documents of our time.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

THE ORIGINS OF FASCISM.

VINCENZO GIOBERTI.

IT is April in that year of revolutions 1848, and the streets of Genoa are beflagged to welcome home an exile. Fifteen years before, Vincenzo Gioberti left his country a republican; he returns as one of the firmest supporters of the monarchy. All Italy is astir. Charles Albert has put himself at the head of the movement for a united Italy, and he needs such men as Gioberti. A few months will see the exile installed as Prime Minister, a philosopher turned statesman, a priest planning war; yet a few months more, and he will quit his country again, till out of the wreck of the *Risorgimento* in its earlier phase new men arise to carry on his work.

Who is this man with the spare frame and the thoughtful eyes of one who has long looked upon the ultimate mysteries of human life? Vincenzo Gioberti was born at Turin on April 5th, 1801, and was educated by a devout mother for the priesthood. In his student days he came under the two influences which were then most powerful in the intellectual circles of Northern Italy—a but half-understood German Idealism and Republicanism. A brilliant student, his ordination was followed by rapid promotion, so that he soon found himself Court chaplain. But in the King's service he retained his republican opinions, and associated himself with Mazzini and Young Italy. His first political *credo* was published in the periodical which served this new movement; it was an appeal for the renewal of Christianity and the achievement of national unity as the two urgent tasks of the hour, tasks, moreover, which were not to be thought of as in any sense opposed. "Let us make religion social," he cries, "make its voice to the peoples one of unity, independence, liberty, equality, humanity and love; its voice to tyrants one of anathema and condemnation, a threat of terror and divine vengeance by the hand of the people; let its voice to the individual citizen be a summons to patriotism, hatred of tyranny, public spirit, the passion to live in freedom, and admiration of and desire for death in the service of one's country."

Gioberti had already resigned his post at court, and for such daring opinions he was banished in 1833 to seek a place of refuge in Paris. Once there, he began to shake off the influence

of Mazzini, now himself an exile also. He was repelled by the doctrinaire fanaticism which could foment sporadic revolts which were foredoomed to failure, and so fling away the very lives which Italy would one day most need.

In 1838 he published from Brussels his first philosophical work, the *Teorica del Sovrannaturale*, in which a view first appears of fundamental importance for all his thought; he derives the origin of language in particular and of civilisation in general from divine revelation. From this it is but a step to the conception of Catholicism, the one revealed religion in his eyes, as the sole bond of unity for the European peoples and for Italy among them.

Five years, however, were to pass before Gioberti's thought had fully matured. It did so in a book which is still at work among us. The *Primato morale e civile degli Italiani* is the fountain-head of that cult of Italy as "the supernatural nation"—the expression is Gioberti's—which is active in Fascism to-day. In it Gioberti stands revealed as the high priest of a Catholic nationalism, offering up to the mother of civilisation all that romantic devotion which was characteristic of the early *Risorgimento*. From the divided, exploited Italy of the present, the book appeals to the heroic Italy of the Cæsars and the Popes; surely one so great cannot perish, surely she is destined once again to be mistress of the world! The ancient world, so runs the argument, was the work of two peoples, the Greeks and the Jews. Rome has fallen heir to both of these, she is the unity of religion and civilisation. The two streams converged on Rome, to flow on henceforth in one mighty river, whose waters are for the healing of the nations. Europe is more properly Christendom, the union of Christian peoples under the Vicar of Christ in Rome. "The interests of religion and the hopes of world-civilisation alike are rooted in Italian nationality. Italy is the elect people, the typical people, the creative people, the Israel of the modern era."

The book is divided into two parts, showing how Italy is superior in action and thought respectively. Geographically, Italy is marked out for leadership. Does she not lie in the centre of that sea around which the ancient civilisation grew up? Do not all roads lead still to Rome? Racially, too, Italy is superior to her rivals. In the veins of her people to-day the blood, not merely of many nations, but of the best and most vigorous of their sons, flows commingled. Some were drafted

from the Rhine to serve under the Roman eagle, some swarmed over the Alpine passes in quest of plunder and new homes ; all alike have gone to make the Italian of to-day. One cannot resist the temptation to quote here the very different inference which Houston Stewart Chamberlain draws from the same facts. The population of Italy " goes back to the countless thousands of liberated slaves from Africa and Asia, to the jumble of various Italic peoples, to the military colonies settled among them from all countries in the world, in short, to the Chaos of Peoples which the Empire so ingeniously manufactured."

But most important of all in Gioberti's eyes is the historical rôle of Italy as the mother of European civilisation. Roman roads were highways of law and order, and our modern languages are but so many degenerate forms of the old Roman speech. It was Catholic Rome which softened the manners of the barbarians, and at the Renaissance the descendants of those barbarians crossed the Alps to learn what Italy had to teach. It was an Italian who discovered the New World, as it was Italians who discovered that other world within the personality of the individual. The land of Dante, Michelangelo, and Galileo " deserves to be saluted as the universal fatherland and as the nation charged with the redemption of the whole human family."

Great as Italy is in herself, she is greater still because, in the Catholic Church, she has been appointed guardian of a heavenly treasure. It was the revolt against the Vicar of Christ at the Reformation which rent Europe in twain and brought about an inner decay of human society. To be sure, for that result Church and State are alike to blame ; the one clung to temporal power even after the peoples had attained to that full nationhood for which it was her task to train them, and the other shook off a legitimate authority with the yoke which had come to prove galling. But the nineteenth century, ardent as its nationalism is, yet longs for a restoration of the lost world-unity ; where then will it turn if not to the Roman and Catholic tradition ?

It is not difficult to see what this would mean for Europe. But what does it imply for Italy ? Gioberti answers : A federation of Italian States, with the Pope as its head. The head of the Church Catholic is to become the champion of Italian unity, the Pope is to return to politics as a national

leader! For such a step the people are ready. So at least Gioberti thinks. Hence all that remains is to win the princes for such a policy. Above all, Piedmont must enlist on its side. "As the Pope is Italy's word, Piedmont is her sword." Let Charles Albert march behind the cross of St. Peter!—such was the political fantasy of the erstwhile republican in his Brussels exile.

Before we pass on to the attempt to translate these theories into action, we complete the analysis of the *Primato* with a passage even more prophetic than any we have yet cited. Looking into the future, Gioberti sees Italy "united, strong, powerful, at peace and harmony within herself, winning the respect and admiration of the peoples." To such an Italy empire will fall as well as peace.

I picture to myself the joy and elation of the sea, when an Italian fleet sails again the waters of the Mediterranean, and those moving plains, so long under alien rule, will return at last under the empire of the strong and generous race which once possessed them and gave to them its own name. I see in the future a regenerated Italy draw to herself the eyes of Europe and the whole world; I see the other nations, astonished at first but afterwards receptive and reverent, receive of their own accord from her the principles of truth, the form of the good, the example and the norm of noble actions and lofty sentiments.

Surely there is an echo of these words in Mussolini's proud utterance in 1921: "It is destiny that Rome again take her place as the city which will be the directress of the civilisation of all Western Europe. Let us commit the flame of this passion to the coming generations; let us make out of Italy one of the nations without which it is impossible to conceive the future history of humanity."

As long as Gregory XVI was on the throne of St. Peter, who could think that the Church would identify herself with a democratic and national policy? But the accession of Pius IX raised the hopes of many, and Gioberti wrote enthusiastically to a friend: "Heaven has given us more than we hoped for. . . . Pius is our Cæsar and our Emperor." Alas! Pius was no bold crusader for liberal principles; even had he been such, he was surrounded by cautious and reactionary Cardinals. Gioberti saw that no easy solution of the Italian problem was now possible; there must be massive toil to rebuild the nation from within. The *Risorgimento* would succeed only as it

became a spiritual revolution—that was the thought which followed on the “great refusal” of Pius. Italy needs a generation of writers who will look upon themselves as prophets called to a holy mission in the service of their country, accepting Mazzini’s slogan of “God and the People” while discarding his revolutionary fanaticism. It was in this light that he regarded his own work; as Catholic and as Italian, he must serve the fusion of religious and national ideals.

The period from the publication of *Il Primato* to the rising of 1848 has been called that of “Gioberti’s Italian hegemony.” Few, no doubt, shared his hope of leadership emanating from the Vatican; but who did not respond to his appeal for love and devotion to that Italy which is mother of art and science, the God-willed redeemer of a divided world? The shame of Italy could not long endure, now that a man had risen with such a faith in her destiny. “The Italians,” says Massari, “had at last found a cry which they could raise as one man to express their hopes, their desires, and their faith. That cry was *Viva Gioberti!*” Hence, when the exile returned in 1848, it was with the welcome of King and people alike. He was offered a place in the Cabinet, but declined; it seemed to him to think in terms of Piedmont and her interests, while he wanted Piedmont to suffer and sacrifice for the Italy that was to be. The fortunes of war went against the little kingdom; an armistice was concluded with Austria; the Government resigned, and Gioberti was called upon to form a Cabinet. In his declaration of February 1849 the priest-premier declared himself against the particularism which has been the bane of his country to the present day. “The divorce of provincial and State interests from those of the common fatherland is in our eyes unnatural and fatal. The primary characteristic of our administration will be that of being national.”

The new Prime Minister of Piedmont was soon on his way to Rome. Three audiences, however, served to convince him that the only leadership under which Italy could ever be united was that of the House of Savoy. He was compelled, therefore, to face the political and military situation afresh. Was the armistice with Austria to be followed up by negotiations for a treaty, or to be broken by the resumption of hostilities? The King was for the more cautious policy and the Minister for the bolder. A rising of the Florentines compelled

a decision. Gioberti was for war; the King hesitated, and when confronted with his resignation, accepted it. His brief political career was at an end. He went into voluntary exile, while Charles Albert accepted too late the policy which he had at first declined. In the disasters which followed at Novara and Rome, there were not wanting those who said that the *fons et origo* of all was that Piedmont had proved unworthy of her ablest son.

Into the few years left to the exile and the modifications of his thought which took place in them, we need not enter here. For the Gioberti who stirs the heart of Fascist Italy is the Gioberti of *Il Primato* and the baffled heroisms of 1848. Suffice it to say that even in exile his thoughts were only of his country, and that in pamphlet after pamphlet he urged the cause of the very monarchy which had rejected him. Doubtful though he was of Cavour in some respects, he saw clearly that only in him and in Victor Emmanuel could a will to national unity be found strong enough to cope with the problem as the first failure of 1848 had left it. He despaired of the Pope and put his trust now in Piedmont; yet not in her arms alone. "Ideas and arms may for the time be balanced one against the other, but not for long; arms do not overcome ideas, but ideas arms." So he was true to the end to his faith as a Catholic, as to his loyalty as an Italian. It was on October 25th, 1852, shortly after a visit from Cavour, that he passed away in poverty in a hired lodging in a Paris street. Piedmont went on to victory, but he was not there to see it.

What would have become of the *Risorgimento* had Pius responded to Gioberti's appeal? Interesting as the question is, it is too remote from the possibilities to call for discussion here. Catholicism did not make common cause with Italian nationalism, but stood aloof from it. When, therefore, in our own day nationalism flamed up again, it retaliated by taking over some of the functions of religion. Superficially, no doubt, Fascism and Catholicism are on the best of terms, the one providing the moral and religious background for the political purposes of the other. Gentile sees in Catholicism the only possible expression of the Italian genius in religion, and in the discipline of the Church—at least, as far as the masses are concerned—an essential component of the régime. But

how far is such a *modus vivendi* in accordance with the realities?

Has not Catholicism shut its eyes to the fact that, in the last resort, Fascism is Catholicism modified by the substitution—surely an all-important one!—of the State for God? The slogan “Everything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State,” makes illegitimately for a political organisation that totalitarian claim which is legitimate when the Church makes it for God. Unity, Authority, Duty—the triad is an excellent one in itself. But in whose name is it required, God’s or the State’s? That Fascism is a secularised Catholicism is plain for all to see. Indeed, such a relation is inevitable, for have not both a common ancestor in Imperial Rome? The political system of the Cæsars rises again, after so many centuries, against the spiritual dominion of the Popes.

If the Duce is a political counterpart of the Pope, the College of Cardinals reappears in the Fascist Grand Council. Nor is Mussolini wanting in the attribute of infallibility. For the Fascist Militia also has its Ten Commandments, and the last of these runs: “Mussolini is always right.” The Party, a select body into which only those enter who have assimilated a political theory and from which none is excluded on grounds of class—is not this the political equivalent of a priesthood protected by celibacy from hardening into a hereditary caste? The oath of the Young Fascist: “I swear to execute without discussion the orders of the Duce, and to serve with all my strength, and if necessary with my blood, the cause of the Fascist Revolution,” calls to mind the vow of obedience and unquestioning fidelity required of entrants to the Society of Jesus. One would think that all possibility of doubt on this score had been removed by the Duce’s own clear statement: “The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value.”

Palmieri, in his *Philosophy of Fascism*, an apologia for American readers, does not hesitate to admit what has taken place. The disintegration of the modern world, the breakdown of moral authorities, and the clamant self-assertion of materialistic individualism have reached a point at which they must perforce be bridled. That would, of course, be a task ordinarily for religion; but religion to-day is itself too

gravely imperilled by this mood to be able to check it. But we cannot let chaos loose, the moral government of society must somehow be carried on. Since the idea of God can no longer avail for this, we must set up the State and ask for it what we once asked for God :

Gone is forever [*sic*] the time when it was possible to find a way to the heart of man through his devotion to higher things than his personal affairs ; gone is the time when it was possible to appeal to the mystic side of his nature through a religious commandment ; gone, finally, is the time when it was possible to illuminate the reasoning powers of his mind with the light of ideals whose existence and whose reason of being cannot be proved through the powers of reason.

All that remains is an appeal to force, to compulsion ; intellectual as well as physical, an appeal to what lies outside of man, to what he fears and with what he must of necessity abide. Such a forceful appeal is made at present by Fascism which, compelling the elder or educating the younger, is slowly but surely bringing the Italian people to the comprehension of the worth, the beauty, and the significance of the National Ideal.

E. L. ALLEN.

A FAMOUS SCHOOL BOOK.

IN 1871, in the German town of Kassel, a society was founded to preserve the memory and perpetuate the ideas of Johann Amos Comenius, and this Moravian educationist and bishop became the recipient of an honour which, as Bacon said of another kind of distinction, "happeneth rarely." Well and truly did he deserve it, though in one particular respect credit belongs to another. A number of writers have made or repeated the statement that Comenius was the first to introduce illustrations into the text-books that were prepared for the use of the young ; but this appears to be incorrect, for the Italian scholar, Tommaso Campanella, and probably one or two others, had already done something of this kind. The distinction of popularising the new idea, however, belongs rather to Comenius than to Campanella, for it was the Moravian's little book *Orbis Sensualium Pictus* that set an example that has been so widely followed. From it are directly descended the thousands of illustrated text-books that fill the shelves and load the desks of our schools and display their infinite variety whenever and wherever teachers and education authorities meet in conference.

Born probably at Nivnitz in Moravia, in 1592, Comenius embraced the religious faith that had been taught by John Huss and became a pastor in the church founded by the reformer, but his main interests were in education rather than in theology. He gained practical experience of teaching when he conducted a school in his native land and he widened his knowledge by reading, travel and correspondence. The Thirty Years' War cost him dear. His wife and children were murdered, his home was plundered, and in 1632 he himself was driven into exile. He found a refuge in Poland, where for some years he was in charge of a school, and in 1641 we hear of him in England where he had friends and where he was actively engaged in furthering a project for the foundation of a college of universal knowledge (*Pansophia*) that was to be built in Chelsea ; a drawing of the proposed edifice can be seen in the British Museum. Comenius also spent some time in Sweden ; here he was more fortunate than Descartes, for in the year (1650) that the Frenchman died in Stockholm the Moravian left the country, where he had survived the rigours of seven or eight winters, to enjoy a further twenty-one years

of life. His long and fruitful career ended at Amsterdam in 1671.

Here, however, we are only concerned with one event in a full life, this being the preparation and publication of the illustrated text-book for the young that has just been mentioned. This *Orbis Pictus* enjoyed a remarkable popularity, not only in Germany, its birthland, but throughout almost the whole of Europe and the United States. An American authority, Ellwood P. Cubberley, in his *History of Education* (1920), puts the period of its influence at a hundred and fifteen years, during which time it was "without a competitor in Europe." It then served in a secondary or auxiliary capacity for a further eighty-five years, making an active life of two hundred years in all. As remarkable as its length of life was the number of countries into which the *Orbis Pictus* was introduced. It was in truth an international text-book. We have seen that it crossed the Atlantic and one authority says, somewhat rashly perhaps, that it was translated into all the languages of Europe. It was certainly translated into a good many, and our libraries hold copies that were prepared for the use of English, French, German, Italian, Russian, Polish, Dutch and Czech students.

A recent writer, Gladys Scott Thomson, in her *Life in a Noble Household, 1641-1700*, throws an interesting sidelight on the use of the little volume in England in the seventeenth century. In 1658 William Russell, fifth earl of Bedford, who was later to receive a dukedom for his services in the glorious revolution of 1688, was employing as tutor to his younger children, five or six in number, a Cambridge graduate, the Rev. John Thornton. Thornton was evidently familiar with the ideas of Comenius and had introduced his pupils to the master's earlier and unillustrated text-books, so it is not surprising that, as soon as an English edition of the *Orbis* was available, he ordered several copies for the use of his young charges. So much use was made by them of these books, or so badly were they treated, that the tutor found it necessary to order replacement copies more than once.

We may imagine the boys and girls, for Thornton had three girls under his care, of this illustrious family poring over their slender volumes, slowly learning the Latin words for the corresponding English ones, and from time to time aiding the memory by glances at the illustrations where the various

objects named were pictured. At a later date it is possible that the book was used in a more august schoolroom, for the copy of the first English edition now in the British Museum came from the library of George III. In any case what was happening to future lords and ladies in the Bedford household at Woburn or in London, and possibly in the succeeding century to princes and princesses in the royal household at Windsor or elsewhere, was certainly happening to many humbler folk, and we are told that this book, explained by mothers in the home and by ushers in the school, "gave to many a boy and girl his or her first general notion of the outside world."

The decision to prepare a book of this kind came to Comenius some time between 1631 and 1657, that is, during his years of exile. In 1631 he had published his *Janua Linguarum Reserta* (*The Gate of Languages Unlocked*), a book containing some eight thousand Latin words arranged in simple sentences with vernacular equivalents in parallel columns; the idea was probably suggested by a work issued in 1616 by a member of the Irish College at Salamanca. The sentences gave information on a variety of subjects. The *Orbis* was a shorter and simpler form of the *Janua* with the added attraction of illustrations. The material was arranged in 150 chapters, each dealing with a particular subject and, as in the *Janua*, the information was given in Latin and German in parallel columns. Each subject was provided with an illustration directly related to the text; this was prepared for the pupil by numbering every object thereon, each number corresponding to one inserted in the text where the object in question was mentioned. The first edition was printed at Nuremberg in 1657 by Michael Elsner and a second was called for in 1658. The illustrations were from wooden blocks cut by Michael Endtor. The name and work of Comenius were by then widely known and the book was a best seller from the first.

German boys and girls did not long enjoy a monopoly of the book and, as we have seen, the young Russells were in possession of an English edition as early as 1658. This was prepared by a London schoolmaster named Charles Hoole, who left the Latin sentences as they were in the original, but translated them into English instead of into German. The illustrations were the same in both books, so evidently Hoole

obtained wood blocks from the Nuremberg printer. It would be interesting to know what he paid for them, but it is hardly likely that anything in the nature of royalties reached the pocket of Comenius. With the eye of a good bookmaker Hoole, or someone associated with him, arranged that each subject, with one or two exceptions, should begin at the top of a page and should occupy exactly two pages, illustration on the left and letterpress facing it on the right, but this example was not followed in some of the later editions. The book made 309 pages, in addition to which there was some prefatory matter and an index.

On the title page of Hoole's first edition the *Orbis*, or *Visible World*, the name it bore in England, is described as "a picture and nomenclature of all the chief things that are in the world and of man's employments therein." It was "a work newly written by the author in Latin and High Dutch (being one of the last essays and the most suitable to children's capacities of any that he hath hitherto made) and translated into English by C. Hoole, teacher of a private grammar school in Lothbury, London." Comenius had provided a motto taken from Aristotle that justified his title: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu*. Two prefaces were provided: the original one of Comenius duly translated, and one by Hoole, who addressed his remarks to "all judicious and industrious schoolmasters." The date of this preface is January 25th, 1658, and the book was printed for J. Kirton, at the King's Arms, St. Paul's Churchyard, London.

Hoole was not indifferent to the possibilities of advertisement. Quite in the modern style he printed at the beginning of the book a short eulogy from the pen of an "eminent schoolmaster in London," Hezekiah Woodward, who says: "And if we had books wherein are the pictures of all creatures, birds, beasts, fish, fowles, they would stand us in great stead. For pictures are the most intelligible books that children can look upon. They come closest to nature; nay, saith Scaliger, art exceeds her." Then comes a personal advertisement telling the public that Mr. Hoole will take pupils into his house at New Buildings in the Tokenhouse Garden in Lothbury, London. He says that in the work of instruction "he will be diligent himself and will maintain an able usher in his house to attend to their teaching, and his wife and her servants ready to see to their wholesome diet and cleanly ordering upon

a rate reasonable to so great a charge and pains as are thereunto required."

The plan of arranging the information in Latin and vernacular sentences in parallel columns adopted by Comenius, first in the *Janua* and then in the *Orbis*, was not seriously altered by those who translated and edited the smaller book, but from time to time some of the illustrations were replaced by others, and a certain amount of new matter was added. After 1729, at least in England, the book lost a good deal of its popularity, but some forty years later a certain William Jones, having heard "a learned gentleman" say that the *Orbis Pictus* "had fallen totally into disuse, though no other comparable to it had been substituted in its place," set about the work of preparing a new edition, the twelfth, which, bearing Hoole's name, appeared in 1777. Many of the illustrations in this edition are different from those in the first and some new chapters have been added, notably one on botany and another on the deluge. The editor also tells us that he has made mention of Harvey's recent discovery of the circulation of the blood. But even so, owing to the use of smaller type and the saving of space by beginning a new chapter on the same page as the old one ended, this book is slighter than its predecessor of 1658; its 153 chapters make only 179 pages, exclusive of the prefatory and index matter.

Of the numerous editions in languages foreign to England, one published at Nuremberg in 1746 was in two volumes; the first was practically the original work, but the second was entirely new, containing 150 chapters on subjects omitted by Comenius. In 1808 an edition issued at St. Petersburg contained only eighty chapters and its illustrations differed almost entirely from those in the original. The languages used were Latin, German and Russian. Primarily the *Orbis* taught Latin, but it could be, and was, easily adapted to teach any other language as well and in one or two of the editions four are employed. The pupil could acquire, at one and the same time, a considerable amount of useful information and an acquaintance, let us say, with Latin, German and Italian, or Latin, French and Dutch. The British Museum possesses a stout volume in which Latin, French, German and Italian are employed, but the bulk of the information given has diminished from sentences to words. Editions of the *Orbis* were prepared for those who wished to study Greek.

In England the work of Hoole and his successors was continued towards the end of the eighteenth century by a certain James Greenwood, who, however, treated Comenius with less respect than his editorial predecessors. In his own words, he prepared an illustrated text-book "based on the method of Comenius but criticising it." This was "adorned," to quote again from the Preface, with twenty-six pictures, a much smaller number than heretofore, but this economy did not prevent it from reaching a twenty-third edition in 1797 and so carrying the ideas of Comenius into the nineteenth century.

To return to Hoole's first edition, which is really an English translation of the first Nuremberg one. It opens with a dialogue between master and boy :

M. Come boy, learn to be wise.

B. What doth this mean, to be wise ?

M. To understand rightly, to do rightly, and to speak out rightly all that are necessary.

B. Who will teach these things to me ?

M. I, by God's help.

B. How ?

M. I will guide thee through all. I will show thee all. I will name thee all.

B. Sir, here I am, lead me in the name of God.

M. Before all things thou oughtest to learn the plain sounds of which man's speech consisteth, which living creatures know how to make and thy tongue knoweth how to imitate and thy hand can picture out. Afterwards we will go into the world and we will view all things.

Evidently something went wrong when the book was being printed, for the illustration to this "Invitation," as it is called, is one that has no bearing on the subject, while a few pages further on is one showing master and boy in conversation in the open air. The two have evidently been transposed in error. The correct illustration is repeated at the end of the volume where the master gives his valedictory address. "There, thou hast seen in short all things that can be showed and hast learned the chief words of the English and Latin tongues. Go now and read other good books intelligently and thou shalt become learned, wise and godly. Remember these things ; fear God and call upon Him that He may bestow upon thee the spirit of wisdom. Farewell." In the twelfth edition the illustration to "The Invitation" shows the master

seated before a filled bookcase with the boy standing in front of him. The dialogue is followed by a "lively and vocal alphabet," the adjectives being justified by giving against each letter a representation of an animal or bird that makes its sound. The crow croweth gives the sound of *a*; the lamb's bleat gives *b*, and the grasshopper's chirp gives *c*. The sound of *q* is attributed to the cuckoo and of *x* to the frog.

The lessons proper, 150 in number, begin and end with religion. That on God is at the beginning and the last two are on God's Providence and the Last Judgment. They are arranged to some extent in groups according to subject. One group consists of chapters on the products of the earth, both vegetable and mineral, and another of chapters on living creatures, which are divided into the following classes: tame fowl, singing birds that haunt the trees and woods, ravenous birds, waterfowl, flying vermin, four-footed beasts and those about the house, herd cattle, labouring beasts, wild cattle, wild beasts, serpents and creeping things, crawling vermin, creatures that live as well by water as by land, river and pond fish, sea and shell fish (Hoole's spellings have been modernised). The illustrations are often unexpected and sometimes incongruous, at least to the modern mind. For example, the one on singing birds shows an owl in a cage, two other birds in adjacent cages and several others perched on a tree. Other chapters or lessons describe and illustrate the shops of the barber and the bookseller, and the crafts of the weaver, potter, carpenter, blacksmith, printer, bookbinder, tailor, shoemaker and cordwainer. The work of obtaining food is under such headings as fishing, fowling and hunting, and of preparing it as butchery, cooking, and baking. Vintage and brewing describe the making of wine and beer and there is a lesson on bees and honey. The dressing of gardens is a pleasing reminder that time was found for one of the most humanising of occupations.

The sciences taught include geometry and astronomy, which take the form of chapters on the heavens, planets and eclipses. The schoolmaster is seen at work in the school and the study is described and illustrated. The virtues inculcated include diligence, temperance, fortitude, humanity, liberality and prudence, and there are chapters on religion and on its manifestations as Christianity, Judaism, Mahomedanism and Gentilism, the last-named describing briefly the mythologies of Greece and Rome. The lessons on the city and the

inward parts of a city suggest a beginning of the modern study of civics. The chapter on the earth describes its physical features as high mountains, deep valleys, hills rising, hollow caves, plain fields, and shady woods. The one on Europe names its twenty-eight countries, all called kingdoms, and marks each of them on a map. Switzerland, although by then an independent State, does not appear. The lesson on man shows Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden with the serpent twined round the tree of life; other adult beings, presumably their children, are walking about. Other chapters in this group deal with what we should now call physiology, and there is one on the seven ages of man.

The social historian might do worse than consult this book for information about the daily lives of the people of the seventeenth century. He would learn that the potherbs and vegetables then in use included the lettuce, colewort, onion, garlick, parsnip, turnip, radish, horse radish, parsley, cucumber and pompion, an old spelling of pumpkin. He would get some ideas about travel by land and water, on foot and by coach; about the musical instruments of the day; about weights and measures and about sports and pastimes. Recreations include the stage play, tennis and dice. Under the heading of sleights we are told about tumbling and rope-dancing as well as juggling. The fencing school is described and the sports of boys include whipping a top, walking on stilts, and a ball game resembling cricket or rounders. The house as pictured by Comenius is a pleasant place, inhabited clearly by a man of substance. Its furnishings include a bath, stoves in the bed rooms, clocks, called dialls, and mirrors. Its rooms include not only the kitchen, the buttery and the bedchambers, but also the gallery and the dining-room.

Two chapters at least are on subjects that would not find a place in the modern schoolbook. One describes deformed and monstrous persons and the other the tormenting of malefactors. The torments mentioned and illustrated bear witness to the extraordinary inhumanity that existed side by side with a considerable amount of culture, a contrast very vividly pictured for a somewhat earlier age by Lytton Strachey in *Elizabeth and Essex*. Not only are the whip, the pillory and the galleys mentioned as normal forms of punishment, but breaking on the wheel, burning at the stake and cutting out the tongue are enumerated.

Mere enumeration soon becomes tedious, and perhaps a better idea of the book will be obtained by a slightly fuller reference to two chapters taken almost at random from the first edition. The one headed *Fire* has on its illustration thirteen numbered items, each referring to an article similarly numbered that is mentioned in the text. On a table we can see a flint, a steel, a tinder-box, a lighted match and a candle, these being numbered one to five. Six, seven and nine are the parts of the fire that is burning on the hearth, stick, flame and smoke, while through the window we can see a larger and more uncontrolled fire called a blaze; this bears the number eight. Ten is the chimney and the remaining three, firebrand, coal and ashes, take us back to the fire on the hearth.

The other chapter selected is on a feast, which is thus described in Hoole's translation.

“When a feast is made ready the table is covered with a carpet (*tapetibus*) and a tablecloth by the waiters who besides lay the trenchers, spoons, knives with little forks, table napkins, bread with a salt-cellar. Messes are brought in platters, a pie on a plate. The guests being brought in by the host wash their hands out of a laver or ewer, over a hand basin or bowl, and wipe them with a hand towel; then they sit at the table on chairs. The carver breaketh up the good cheer and divideth it. Sauces are set amongst roast meat in saucers. The butler filleth strong wine out of a cruse or wine pot or flagon into cups or glasses which stand on a cupboard and he reacheth them to the master of the feast who drinketh to his guests.”

As in other chapters the articles mentioned are numbered to direct the attention of the pupil to their present representation in the illustration.

Such, in bare outline, are a few of the pictures of the little book from which, for nearly two hundred years, boys and girls all over Europe and in the American colonies obtained such knowledge as they had of the world around them and of languages other than their own, the lesson being reinforced by the presence of informative illustrations. To-day it looks old-fashioned, and so it is, both in appearance and in content. The matter suggests the unhurrying and unscientific age from which it came; an age to which some would like to return, for it knew nothing of the modern examination system.

A. W. HOLLAND.

NÎMES.

NÎMES is, to all appearances, a modern city. One stands in the Place, waiting for a pause in the traffic of rapid cars, vans and motors. One glances down the elegant tree-lined boulevards, reminiscent of Haussmann. And one exclaims : " Roman Nemausus ? Incredible ! " True that, not far away is the exquisite little Græco-Roman jewel, the Maison Carrée. True, here and there one catches glimpses of the fine arena between the densely patterned foliage of the plane-trees. And true indeed that now and then in the streets one comes upon some ancient Roman gateway. Yet to-day, in the midst of the continual bustle of busy people and petrol-propelled vehicles, one feels that either the antiquities are out of the picture, or that latter-day Nîmes fails to reach a standard of stateliness in keeping with their hoary dignity. The snorting of taxi-hooters, the screech and pulsating of motor-bicycles, the clamour of vociferous humanity and the gay music of the smart café's orchestra at the corner of the Esplanade ; tend to disturb the earnestness of the sight-seer and to introduce a more cheerful modern note into the formal strain of past times.

The Esplanade is Nîmes' finest square. In spite of first impressions, one finds the city is far from being altogether given up to frolic. A wise strain of the practical and commercial steadies its balance. Its industries of grape-pressing and silk-weaving are far-famed. It is the birthplace of Jean Nicot, to whom France owes as much as we in Britain owe to Sir Walter Raleigh. For Nicot in 1564 introduced to his country the plant which owes its botanical name to him. Another of Nîmes' illustrious sons and one who has benefited mankind, or at any rate literary mankind, is Alphonse Daudet, who was born here in 1840. Throughout Provence, nay more, wherever French literature reaches, his is a name with which to conjure. Who that has revelled in the *Lettres de mon Moulin* and chuckled over " Tartarin's " doings, both in the Alps and in Tarascon, who that has followed the fortunes of " Jack " and enjoyed " Numa Roumestan," and above all, who that has discovered between the lines of *Le Petit Chose* much of the youthful Daudet himself, is not grateful to his birthplace for the gift of this great writer ? His statue by Falguière in the Place de la Couronne bears witness to his

city's appreciation. Force of adverse conditions compelled him to leave Nîmes at the early age of fifteen and to seek his living elsewhere. When he reached Paris in his seventeenth year, however, his pen began to trace for him the road to fame. In later life after he had gained success, he was frequently to be found at his mill in the valley of the Rhône, where his friendship with Frédéric Mistral, a great and kindred spirit, was a recurring pleasure. Daudet's nature, genial, artistic, delicate and generous, was one of the best that France—land of many fine natures—can show, and his love of his country was only second perhaps to his love of his countrymen and countrywomen, her sons and daughters. Through all his works runs a pæan of praise to his native corner—Provence. Another well-known name, whose bearer first saw light at Nîmes, is that of Guizot, the great statesman and historian.

But to return to the city itself. In the vast arena are held at stated times the bull-fights, or *mises-à-mort*, that Provence has borrowed from Spain. These *mises-à-mort*, as practised in France, are an anæmic version of the original Spanish sport, about which widely divergent opinions are held. There is no doubt, however, that in Nîmes the sport attracts a multitude of spectators and adds greatly to the financial gains of the city. As to the arena, it is one of many such impressive memorials with which the Romans embellished the lands where, if only temporarily, they ruled as masters. It is somewhat smaller than the one at Arles, but it is in far better preservation, although its past history shows as many changes as befell the Arles arena. At times it has also become a fortress, at others it has developed into a small town within a town. During this stage, two of its arcades were converted into a church, of which portions have been retained to tell their own tale. The view over Nîmes and the surrounding country is delightful when one has climbed to the topmost gallery and on to the paved way roofing it.

We read that probably the arena was built chiefly for gladiatorial contests. Careful scrutiny, we are told, has, in fact, revealed that the wall of the podium, separating the actual arena from the spectators' seats, is too low to have safely allowed of fights in which wild beasts took part. Many critics compare the amphitheatre with the giant of its kind—the Coliseum in Rome. It is a comparison hard to draw when one

remembers that Rome's amazing arena held 90,000 persons, while that of Nîmes was only constructed to seat 22,000. The stupendous bulk of the Coliseum overpowers one. The spell that its ruined immensity casts is a spell of bewilderment, of intimidation, striking one with awe. Whereas the arena of Verona, of which the seating capacity was only for 20,000 spectators, that of Arles with its 30,000 seats and that of Nîmes at once attract one. The exterior of the Nîmes amphitheatre has preserved to this day its admirable cornice, and the holes are still to be seen into which the masts supporting the awning or "vela" were fixed. Many traces of sculpture were discovered lying amongst the rubble within the elliptic ring. The outside of the pile, as well, shows relics of similar decorative art. Some fragments of stone, bearing interesting inscriptions, are kept in the museum, which is housed in Nîmes' most fascinating old building, the little *Maison Carrée*.

A short distance from the amphitheatre along streets shaded with plane-trees and flanked with handsome shops, one comes upon this exquisite temple. The first sight of it gives one a thrill of deep pleasure, so charming are its proportions, so graceful its lines and so altogether satisfying its symmetrical daintiness. Its features are, of course, known to nearly everyone, just as a great painting by Carpaccio, Botticelli, Raphael, Rembrandt or Gainsborough is known to us, or in the same way that we are familiar with Michael Angelo's stone marvels. But previous familiarity with its lineaments in no way lessens the joy felt on beholding it for the first time in reality. It was constructed by Greek genius under Roman sway. One reads that none of its vertical or horizontal lines are really vertical or horizontal, but show subtle curves of their own, which convey an impression of greater height and more slender outlines than it actually possesses. Yet the sight of the perfect whole banishes the importance of these facts. The beauty, in truth, is so complete that, to the lay eye, analysis becomes superfluous and one is left merely marvelling and gratefully accepting.

Sir Theodore Cook tells us that the Greeks knew it was those deliberate inaccuracies which give life and beauty. This is, he adds—"an essential principle which, known to Greece and known to the builders of the *Maison Carrée*, is one of the chief reasons why this little temple is the greatest treasure of classical architecture north of the Alps." Another and earlier

critic, Arthur Young, who visited Nîmes while travelling through France during the Revolution, wrote—"it would be impossible to single out any special part for excellence of beauty, for it is altogether perfect in symmetry and grace." And yet another modern writer declares it to be—"the finest classical temple extant." The design of the Madeleine in Paris has been copied from the Maison Carrée, but just misses the artistic grace and harmonious contours to be found in its smaller prototype. Looking at the heavier bulk of the Madeleine, one is tempted to quote Browning—"Oh, the little more and how much it is!"

The Maison Carrée was built in the first years of the Christian era and inscriptions that have since been discovered prove that it was dedicated to Caius and Lucius, the two sons of Agrippa. These lads died early without having performed any great deeds to carry down their fame to posterity. But because their names are connected with the Maison Carrée, they will never be forgotten. Many are the uses—and in some cases, I am afraid, also the abuses—to which the little temple has been put during its long and remarkable career. It has been a Pagan temple and a granary. It just escaped becoming a private vault to the Uzès family, its sale for that purpose to the Duchesse having at the last moment been refused. The utilitarian trend of life, however, converted it into stables. Finally, last scene of all that ended its strange eventful history, it was held by the Augustine friars, who used it as a church or chapel. After the Revolution it attained peace under the Government of the Restoration, and now it abides as a museum in which a unique collection of antique relics is stored.

This brief mention of it would be incomplete if attention were not drawn to one or two of the sculptured busts to be found within its walls. The gentle, pensive head of Julia Domna looks out at us so serenely, that it seems hard to believe she was the mother of the cruel Caracalla, whose bust is also housed there. Near by is a third head, that of Caracalla's cousin, Julia Mamaea. But the most outstanding of all the sculptures in the Lapidary Museum is the Venus of Nîmes, a charming figure, inferior certainly to the Venus of Arles, but nevertheless built on fine, if somewhat generous lines. There is swing and life in the folds of the long drapery which she grasps with her left hand. It is the only one,

by-the-by, which the cruel passage of the centuries has spared to her. Many interesting inscriptions of the Roman epoch are kept in the Musée Lapidaire. They were discovered near and removed from the Pont du Gard, a few miles away. A word must also be said in appreciation of the excellently wrought mosaic pavements to be found in the temple. The workmanship in its delicate precision is admirable and can hold its own with that of many of Italy's ancient pavements.

A graceful flight of steps leads down from the Maison Carrée to the street below. We read that this was originally the place of the old Roman Forum and traces of its foundations may still be seen. Now the square is set round with modern houses, but as the architect has had the good taste to place them at a respectful distance from the precious relic they surround, the sense of spaciousness is not disturbed. Further to the left of the town stands the cathedral of St. Castor. Though the interior has been much restored, luckily no disturbing signs of renovation are to be seen from without. It is said to have been built on the site of an ancient Roman temple, as indeed was often the case with many of the antique churches of France and Italy. Its exterior is decorated with an interesting frieze of the twelfth century, carved very simply and in excellent preservation. The subjects are chosen from the Old Testament and are easily recognisable. Unlike the Maison Carrée, the cathedral, unfortunately, lacks the space due to it. Modern shops and houses have encroached somewhat unceremoniously on its position and this detracts from its dignity. So that the only satisfactory view that can be gained of it is from the small Place facing the west porch.

In Nîmes there are besides two other churches worthy of notice, Saint Baudile and Saint Perpetué. The twin spires of the former stand up in the landscape when viewed from afar, like the masts of a ship. These churches, however, cannot be placed in the same rank of interest as the cathedral of Saint Castor. Not very far from Saint Baudile we may find Nîmes' most venerable remnant of Roman mural architecture, the Porte d'Auguste, built by Augustus in 16 B.C. It has four arches, two large central ones and two side ones, over which there are small niches. At one time the gateway formed part of the ramparts of the town. Later it was buried under a big fortress and it was not until centuries afterwards that it was again revealed. Like the stones of Les Baux, of which the

wonderful remains are known to all who have sought and visited the historical traces in Provence, how many stirring tales of warfare, gallantry and siege could these old arches tell! They must have seen the passage of armed hosts. Those ancient walls must surely have echoed to the song of roving troubadours and witnessed gay cavalcades of bold knights and the captivating ladies they courted. Far later, and nearer to our own times, a down-trodden populace, from which the revolution was bred, must have passed, riotous with despair, beneath those curving vaults.

Among the outstanding works that Rome has bequeathed to us at Nîmes, the Fountain of Nemausus is one which offers an insistent appeal. It takes us captive at once on account of the grace of its lines and its delightful setting, both natural and artificial. The dusky wooded slopes of Mont Cavalier form a happy green background to the beautiful gardens where the spring is to be found and which one reaches through a fine, wrought-iron gate. The Fountain and its surroundings seem in many ways related to those near Tivoli. Their broad terraces and wide flights of steps winding up the shady inclined paths of the mount are admirably planned. Involuntarily they call to mind the canvases of Poussin and renew for us the gay times of eighteenth-century France. The pellucid green of those waters! The white of those charming putti and of those graceful urns and marble balustrades! They seem so rightly present in every mental picture of elegant, careless, pre-revolutionary France. Standing there, surrounded by all that white and green, unconsciously one peoples those sunny terraces and foliaged walks with the *belles dames et gentils galants de France*, whose fatal downfall was so imminent.

Though the gardens of Nîmes certainly cover a far smaller area and do not possess the grand park Versailles owns, there is yet here and there a hint pleasantly recalling M. Lenôtre's noble planning that still delights us in the Park of Versailles. The square central basin of the Fountain, now embellished with graceful groups of cherubs and garlanded urns, occupies the original site of the Nymphæum, or the old Roman bath where, in those past times, the fine ladies made merry. Below, now half covered by the glaucous waters of the spring, still stand some of the white pillars of the ancient colonnade. No doubt passage-ways led from there to the disrobing-rooms

and other apartments. Gazing into those clear emerald depths, watching the wavy reflections of the marble columns, one played with the fancy that, now and then, laughing voices were to be heard. Almost one saw the sparkle of splashed water, and even, here and there, one caught the gleam of shapely limbs beneath the glassy surface. *Eheu fugaces . . . !*

At the far end of the probable passage which must have connected it with the Nymphæum, is to be found the ruined Temple of Diana. It was formerly sacred to that goddess and to an earlier divinity of Gallic origin, Nemausus, the water-god. The spring which afterwards fed the baths and fountain was originally dedicated to this divinity. Inscriptions bearing upon Diana's Temple and the Fountain of Nemausus are still extant and carefully preserved in Nîmes. The Temple of Diana, though only a ruin, still shows a beautiful portico with pillars and a colonnade. Inside, it houses one tall column. This and others similar are believed to have supported the *vela*, under which the Roman ladies bathed. Antiquarians are much interested in the vaulted roof of the temple, that is, they declare, one of the first examples of barrel-vaulting, afterwards so widely adopted in ecclesiastical architecture.

Leaving the wonderful relics of Diana's Temple, one may climb the sloping path of Mont Cavalier. Odorous flowering shrubs and the dense foliage of ilex trees shade the way and at the outset one passes the circular basin of the real spring of Nemausus. Ten minutes' walk takes one to the Tour Magne, which, we are told, is the oldest building in Nîmes. It is a hollow octagon about a hundred feet high and was erected as a tribute in honour of Augustus. It commands a wide outlook over the surrounding country. At its foot, beyond the gardens, stretch miles of marshy land between Nîmes and Aigues-Mortes. It is 360 feet above sea-level, and probably therefore when first constructed in 27 B.C., it was built for the purpose of a watch-tower. From its dominating height the approach of sea-faring enemies could be detected. Later when the town was besieged, the monument was used as a point of defence. Its summit is reached by a narrow circular staircase winding up the hollow tower. The interior is gloomy and awesome. On one side the staircase lacks any handrail or balustrade, so that one peers down into dim nothingness. To those subject to giddiness the climb, though anything but an arduous one, is not to be recommended. When the top is

gained, however, the far-reaching view over bland and smiling country basking in the warm hush of the spring day is reward enough.

There is a strange scarcity of tales or legends connected with the tower. Almost the only one available is banal, but is here given for what it is worth. The astrologer, Nostradamus, a name that often figures in the sixteenth century annals of Provence, declared that the discovery of a golden cock would make a rich man of some lucky farmer. This talk, by the way, of hidden treasure in the form of golden birds and beasts is often to be met with in the folk-lore of mediæval Provence. A farmer named Trucat is said to have heard of the prophecy and, like all superstitious people, he felt that he was destined to be the fortunate finder. He was also firmly convinced that the treasure-trove would reveal itself within the Tour Magne. After surmounting the obstacles placed in his path by a careful and grudging sovereign, Henri IV, who insisted that a share of any find should be claimed by the crown, Trucat was allowed to commence operations and began excavating in the interior of the monument. Needless to say, his efforts proved quite unavailing. Like Mark Twain's snakes in Iceland, the golden cock of the Tour Magne has still to be discovered.

In connection with the Tower, Sir Theodore Cook says that it gave rise to a most elaborate pun dealing with the romantic adventures of a Provençal courtier named Gal. The pun, which follows, was probably composed by Marc Monnier :

“ Gal, amant de la reine, alla, tour magnanime,
Galamment de l'Arène à la Tour Magne à Nîmes.”

“ This is supposed to refer to the athletic lover's feat of carrying his sweetheart on his back from the amphitheatre to the tower.”

While at Nîmes, a visit to the local picture-gallery may well be included. The antique mosaics in the great hall attract one at once. They are splendid specimens of early Roman work, far less coarsely executed than many to be seen elsewhere. They were discovered near the market-place in Nîmes over fifty years ago. The gallery can boast many good pictures, both French and foreign, though certainly those of France surpass the rest. There are several paintings by Poussin; of these his two landscapes are greatly to be

preferred to his biblical canvas. Sigalon has a delightful portrait of Madame Diaz, besides some other pictures. There is as well a large canvas by Besnard, of which the colour and the brush-work are arresting. Among the foreign artists' exhibits, the Nîmes gallery is lucky to be able to include good work by Titian, Rubens, Vandyck, Nicholas Berghem and Wouwerman. A portrait by Carl Vanloo of an elderly woman, who was, we are told, the artist's mother, is delightful. There is another portrait, too, of an old lady, full of dignity and refinement—this one by a woman artist whose maiden-name was Gérard. She died in 1905 at the age of 100. In the gallery is also housed a valuable collection of engravings, so that the Nîmes picture gallery adds one more attraction to its city's charms.

MARY F. RAPHAEL.

"TIME AND THE HOUR" IN LITERATURE.

Come what come may,
Time and the hour runs through the roughest day.

Macbeth.

WHEN the world was young, day had only the two natural divisions : the time when the sun was going up to the zenith, and when he was declining from it. Odysseus, recounting his raid on the Cicones after he sailed from Troy (*Odyssey IX*), tells how "as long as the sacred day waxed, and the sun climbed," the raiders held their own, "but when he turned back to the time of the loosing of oxen," the fight went against them. And when "night sped down from heaven," "immortal night," in Homer's world, men had no fear of it.

Lucretius makes the same point, rightly or wrongly (*De Rerum Natura*, V, 973), that men in early times did not fear the night. If he is correct, it is an interesting speculation as to just when, in the development of man's moral consciousness, this fear crept in. For as literature advances (or recedes) from the simple grandeur of the age when "immortal night" was common speech, we find two aspects of night emphasised in poetry. On one side is the peaceful, beneficent time of rest ; Virgil's "*suadentque cadentia sidera somnos*" ("the sinking stars persuade to sleep") and his picture a little further on (*Aeneid IV*, 523), of all nature at rest : "the woods and the savage seas were stilled, when the stars wheel in mid-course, when all the farmland is silent, beasts and brightly coloured birds, both those which far and wide possess the watery pools, and the bushes of the rough open country ; laid asleep beneath the soundless night" ; but Dido in her misery cannot rest, "nor ever melts into sleep nor takes the night into her eyes or heart." Virgil had in mind, no doubt, Apollonius Rhodius' haunting picture of Medea's wakefulness, at the hour when "the mother whose children are dead is asleep, when only the helmsman wakes, watching the sky and the stars in Orion" ; and both passages are echoed in Shelley's *Remorse* :

The cloud shadows of midnight possess their own repose ;
For the weary winds are silent, or the moon is in the deep ;
Some respite to its turbulence unresting ocean knows ;
Whatever moves or toils or grieves hath its appointed sleep.

Virgil can portray night, however, no less vividly in a far different guise: the terror that walks in darkness, when "black night has stolen the colour from the world," in (*Aeneid VI*), the descent of Aeneas to the dead. This is night's other aspect, the uncanny hours when strange powers are abroad, Hamlet's "very witching time of night When churchyards yawn and hell itself breathes forth Contagion to this world." The awe, if not the sense of evil, is already present in the Book of Genesis, when a deep sleep and "a horror of great darkness" falls upon Abraham, in the dusk when God speaks to him beside the rows of divided animals; it is the atmosphere of Faunus' oracle in Virgil (*Aeneid VII*) where the priestess, sleeping her ritual sleep within the shrine on the skins of sacrificed sheep, sees phantoms flitting and hears the Gods at talk, and speaks with the deep places of the world beneath. The Irish legends can parallel it, as can the tales of some modern countrysides where superstition has lingered long; Cuchulain, passing through the magicians' trials to earn a champion's name, watches alone through a night of despondency, and to his watching "nine grey shapes came out of the marsh by the light of a cold moon."

The effect of night and dark powers sweeping forward the action links two of the world's supreme epic dramas, the *Sixth Aeneid* and Dante's *Inferno*, whose kinship is obvious and acknowledged, with Shakespeare's *Macbeth*.

Ere the bat hath flown
His cloistered flight, ere to black Hecate's summons
The shard-borne beetle with his drowsy hums
Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done
A deed of dreadful note . . .
. . . Light thickens, and the crow
Makes wing to the rooky wood.
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse.

(*Act III, sc. ii*)

Almost the same imagery is repeated in Gray's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*, but with what a difference!

Now fades the glimmering landscape on the sight,
And all the air a solemn stillness holds,
Save where the beetle wheels his droning flight,
And drowsy tinklings lull the distant folds.

Macbeth's fevered imagination seizes upon night in its grimmest aspect, leagued with the powers of darkness, as a

necessary setting to the second murder even as it had been to that first which had swept for ever out of reach, for him, night's gentler meaning ("Macbeth shall sleep no more"). Night to him henceforth can only be an ominous blackness, paralleled by that sudden opening of a door into the dark in St. John's account of the Last Supper, when the commonplace departure of one of the diners, affording a glimpse of the black square of the doorway, as he goes, is recollected afterwards in its appalling significance: "He then having received the sop went immediately out; and it was night."

The division of the night into "watches" is of an antiquity going back to Homer's time or earlier. "Let us be going," says Odysseus to Diomedes, cutting short the latter's embarrassing praises of him; "for truly the night is waning, and near is the dawn, and the stars have gone onward, and the night has advanced more than two watches, but the third watch is still left" (*Iliad X*). The "dead" of night, midnight and the hours just after, is the time when Richard in Shakespeare's *Richard III* wakes screaming from the nightmare visitation of his victims' ghosts, and mutters as consciousness of time and place returns, "The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight." Traces survive in literature and folklore of a belief that the last watch of the night, like the last phase of the waning moon, was the most uncanny. Such an idea may help to account for the disciples' panic when Christ came walking over the Lake of Galilee towards their boat, "in the fourth watch of the night," and they took Him for a spirit and shrieked aloud. R. L. Stevenson shows us the small hours in their healthiest and kindest aspect, in a celebrated passage from his *Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes*:

There is one stirring hour unknown to those who dwell in houses, when a wakeful influence goes abroad over the sleeping hemisphere, and all the out-door world are on their feet. It is then that the cock crows, not this time to announce the dawn, but like a cheerful watchman speeding the course of night. Cattle awake on the meadows, sheep break their fast on dewy hillsides, and change to a new lair among the ferns; and houseless men, who have lain down with the fowls, open their dim eyes and behold the beauty of the night.

According to Dante, the cold clear twilight before dawn is the time when dreams are true; "the hour when the swallow begins her sad lays nigh unto the morn . . . when our mind,

more of a wanderer from the flesh and less prisoned by thoughts, is almost prophetic in its visions." Dante dreams (*Purgatorio IX*) of what was even then happening, and when he awoke "the sun was already more than two hours high, and mine eyes were turned to the sea."

Sunrise in poetry has never, perhaps, been painted with more brilliant economy of expression than in two lines of Lucretius (V, 461, 2),

Aurea cum primum gemmantis rore per herbas
matutina rubent radiati lumina solis ;

"when first the golden morning light of the beaming sun burns red through the dew-spangled grass." Anyone who has awakened out of doors or walked through summer fields at sunrise knows well that gold of the first level rays and the tiny red sparkles they strike from the drops of dew. The passage goes on, "the pools and never-failing streams give out a mist, as at times the very earth seems to smoke." Such imagery taken in its context, illustrating the birth of the world according to Lucretius' atomic theory, calls to mind the Biblical story of creation when "there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground."

The colour and the mist inspire the *Odyssey's* recurrent daybreak line : "When the Dawn shone forth, mist-born, the rosy-fingered." The mist flees before the dawn at Dante's first sunrise in Purgatory : "Daybreak was vanquishing the breath of morn, which fled before her, so that from afar I recognised the trembling of the sea" (*Purgatorio I*). The sense of air and space which breathes through those first two cantos, dew-washed morning and mists fleeing over the water before the sun, are eloquent of the deliverance from a long harrowing experience, from the horror of great darkness ("Hell is murky," "*Oscura, profunda era, a nebulosa*"), yet of a deliverance not to serene sunset in the evening of life, as some have imagined for Shakespeare after the period of the great tragedies, but to a new daybreak of strenuous vigour ; the man still young, all his faculties quickened to go forward and upward through range upon range of still more tremendous experience, passing up from the earthly hill of Purgatory to regions where the very roots of Time are laid bare. Rossetti, whose Christian names (Dante Gabriel) must have been a perpetual suggestion to him of such regions and such themes, attains for a moment

by sheer imaginative simplicity, in *The Blessed Damozel*, the heights where Dante continually dwells :

From the fixt lull of heaven, she saw
Time, like a pulse, shake fierce
Through all the worlds ;

but Dante's vision by grace of Beatrice penetrates still further, gazing in the swiftest heaven (*Paradiso XXVII*) to the sphere where " the nature of the universe which stills the centre and moves all the rest around, hence begins as from its starting-point, and in this same vessel Time hath its roots, and in the rest its leaves."

Two great descriptions come to mind of the dawn of day upon those who have travelled through the night. One, austere and forceful as only Greek literature and the Old Testament can be, is in the Second Book of Samuel (ch. ii, v. 32, Revised Version) : " And Joab and his men went all night, and the day brake upon them at Hebron." The other is at the end of Malory's *Morte D'Arthur* : " And as soon as Sir Bedivere had lost the sight of the barge, he wept and wailed, and so took the forest, and so he went all that night, and in the morning he was ware between two holts hoar of a chapel and an hermitage."

Of " mornings after " in literature, perhaps one of the most amusing comes at the end of Plato's *Symposium*. The banquet and its immortal discussion have ended in rollicking uproar, and a number of the guests, including the narrator Aristodemus, spend what remains of the night more or less under the table. Towards daybreak Aristodemus opens a sleepy eye, when the cocks are crowing, and sees Socrates still " in," passing an enormous bowl of wine round with two others while he forces them to admit that the same man may be a writer of both comedy and tragedy. In the end he argues them both to sleep ; whereupon he tucks them up on the couches, and goes off to the Lyceum for a bath.

The long period of sunlight in the early morning, before people are about, is a peculiarity of summer-time in towns in the northern countries. This was the hour when the sight of London so deeply moved Wordsworth, as he stood on Westminster Bridge :

The City now doth like a garment wear
The beauty of the morning . . .

Ne'er saw I, never felt, a calm so deep!
 The river glideth at his own sweet will;
 Dear God! the very houses seem asleep,
 And all that mighty heart is lying still!

At such hours the day has not yet made up its mind what weather it is going to bestow upon the world, and the unwary were evidently lured by its deceptive brightness, in Shakespeare's time as now, into setting out for the day without their "rainwear":

Why didst thou promise such a beauteous day,
 And make me travel forth without my cloak,
 To let base clouds o'ertake me in my way?

(*Sonnet XXXIV.*)

From time immemorial, "perpetual day" (probably in contrast with the satanic aspect of night) has been pictured as one of the joys of a future life. For Christian writers the idea was no doubt stimulated by the seer of Revelation's vision, "There shall be no night there." Such religious poetry as the Dark Ages produced is pathetically shot through with this heaven of eternal sunlight—a theme which has suffered many things at the hands of mediocre hymn-writers since, but which must have been appealing enough in the squalid age of St. Peter Damian and of Bede. "*Nox et tempus desunt ei, diem fert continuum*," writes the former, "Night and Time are found no longer, heaven brings forth perpetual day," and from Bede is the "Wistful beauty" of the line which Helen Waddell translates:

Nor any night
 To snatch the splendour of the gracious light,
 (*Nox ubi nulla rapit splendorem lucis amoenae*)

Mention of actual hours of the day brings home not a few of the great scenes of literature to our own humdrum, clock-ridden lives. Even Shakespeare's climax of ethereal beauty woven under the spell of night, love kindling into flame between Juliet at her window and Romeo in the moonlit garden, is linked to daily life by the fixing of "the hour of nine" for their communication next day. There must after all be a to-morrow, must be a morning following such a night; nine, of all the hours of daylight, having perhaps for most of us the least romantic associations. And that precise and feverish watching of the clock connected with all appointments

and "dates" when one is in love, is evident in Juliet's first words when we next see her: "The clock struck nine when I did send the nurse." So Cyrano de Bergerac in Rostand's play keeps restlessly crying "*Quelle heure, Rague-neau ?*", as he sits writing his letter in the "Rôtisserie des Poètes" while the minutes tick by off the last hour before his meeting with Roxane; writing to her in a letter the things he knows he will not dare to say.

The earliest account of Christ's crucifixion (St. Mark's) gives the exact time: nine o'clock in the morning ("the third hour," Jewish reckoning being from sunrise, 6 a.m.). Three accounts give the time of the terrible darkening of the sky which followed, from twelve o'clock to three, and at three His last cry and His death. St. John, writing his gospel perhaps fifty years after the events, recalls the exact time on the day he and Andrew first met Christ and went to spend the evening with Him: it was four o'clock in the afternoon (ch. i, v. 39). Twice again in this gospel a precise hour is put on record across that gap of half a century; "about the sixth hour" (mid-day) when Christ sat down on the well-side in Samaria and the woman came to draw water (ch. iv) and one o'clock in the afternoon when the nobleman's son, according to the servants' report, recovered from his fever, and the father remembered that that was the exact time when Christ said he was well. In the Acts of the Apostles, ch. xix, where St. Paul is recorded as "reasoning daily" in the school or lecture-room of Tyrannus at Ephesus, there is an old traditional reading which says that he had the use of the room from "eleven o'clock till four."

The afternoon, on the whole, receives little definite notice in poetry. Tennyson sums it up in the *Lotus Eaters* as a time of lethargy: "In the afternoon they came unto a land In which it seemed always afternoon." Shakespeare mentions an afternoon hour in the groom's remark, *2nd Henry IV*, Act V, sc. 2, "it will be two o'clock ere they come from the coronation"; one of those realistic comments put into the mouth of characters who toil at the "trivial round," which sketch behind so-called historic events that background of ordinary commonplace happenings measured by the clock, which make up after all the bulk of life.

Though the daye be never so long,
At last the bells ringeth to evensong.

The *Odyssey's* recurring line for nightfall, "The sun sank and all the ways were darkened," and the Psalmist's "Man goeth forth to his work and to his labour, until the evening," both from the poetry of Mediterranean lands where twilight is short, are exemplified to this day in the villages where the country folk go home from the olive groves and vineyards at sunset, to exist over candles and wretched little lamps in their comfortless houses till daybreak. Dante has a sharply realistic phrase for evening, drawn very likely from the experience of many a nightfall on the road in his journeys of exile: "when the fly gives place to the gnat." The French express twilight in a delightful idiom, "*entre le chien et le loup*," "between the dog and the wolf," which takes one straight back into lands of fairy-tale infested by wild beasts.

As midnight comes round again, one recalls Gibbon's description of "the hour of his final deliverance," how he wrote the last words of the monumental history which had been conceived twenty-three years before. "It was on the day, or rather night, of the 27th of June, 1787, between the hours of eleven and twelve, that I wrote the last lines of the last page in a summer-house in my garden. After laying down my pen I took several turns in a berceau, or covered walk of acacias, which commands a prospect of the country, the lake, and the mountains. . . . A sober melancholy was spread over my mind by the idea that I had taken an everlasting leave of an old and agreeable companion, and that, whatsoever might be the future date of my history, the life of the historian must be short and precarious."

"Turn off the water-clock." It brings the page of print to life, that little direction which has come down the centuries at the end of some of Demosthenes' legal speeches, conjuring up the court scene in Athens where a kind of water-clock marked the time-limit for the speeches of advocates. An even more light-hearted method of dealing with Time is that of the sundial near Venice, which Hazlitt saw and quotes in his *Sketches and Essays*. Round it ran the inscription: "*Horas non numero nisi serenas*," "I count only the hours which are sunny."

H. M. WILSON.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.*

Professor Harold J. Laski's latest volume is an important commentary upon the principal aspects of parliamentary government in this country. It is certainly a work which ought to be read and digested by all serious students of the Constitution. It is true, of course, that the author is not a detached observer and that he writes as an ardent socialist, and no doubt some of his factual hypotheses may appear to many readers either distorted or untrue. But much of his argument has a non-party character and even that presented from a socialist angle frequently has an interest and validity which goes further to the very roots of representative self-government.

This work is at once a commentary on the working of the Constitution under existing conditions with the Labour Party in opposition and a foreboding for the future when a socialist government seeks to overthrow the capitalist system. Professor Laski argues that ever since the struggles of the seventeenth century our parliamentary system has operated upon the assumption of the private ownership of the means

* *Parliamentary Government in England*. By Harold J. Laski. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

of production and that this basis of society has never been questioned by any party in power until after the Great War. Absence of any fundamental economic and social cleavage has permitted the existence of party tolerance and compromise which is essential to the success of parliamentary government. So far the "function" of the party system "has been the settlement of what may be termed quantitative differences; now it is called to settle differences that are qualitative in character." Between conservative and socialist economic thought "there is, in fact, a doctrinal abyss now unbridgable in terms of the old continuity of policy." From the very nature of the issue the capitalist cannot remain idle in face of a Labour majority. Either of two events will follow. Under pressure of conservative elements in the Constitution, such as the Crown, the House of Lords and the Civil Service and threatened by economic sabotage a Labour Government may suspend, as Professor Laski fears, at first temporarily and then indefinitely its programme of socialisation. But if it insists, anti-socialists will resist to the utmost, using every constitutional manœuvre and resorting ultimately to conflict. It is needless here to comment on the contingency of civil war since it infers unpredictable constitutional consequences. But there is involved the question of the Crown's so-called "reserve powers" in critical circumstances. In particular, has the King still the constitutional right to compel a dissolution against the advice of his Ministers, or alternatively to dismiss them? Professor Laski has very little difficulty in showing that political neutrality is the foundation of the British Crown and that such initiative must ultimately subject it to party attack and possibly to ruin. "A 'Patriot King,' whatever the character of his opinions, is incompatible with parliamentary democracy in its British form." Moreover it is significant, as the author points out, that Edward VIII preferred to abdicate rather than oppose actively his Ministers' advice. So long, however, as authorities such as Professor Berriedale Keith insist upon the Crown's personal powers and there exists the possibility of personal influence upon the King, particularly from the Right, there must remain in the Labour Party some fear of a possible royal intervention when it is in power. In this connection there is much to commend the view of Mr. Justice Evatt in his *King and the Dominion Governors* that the personal

prerogative should receive statutory formulation; and according to democratic principles.

While Professor Laski fears that the issue of socialism is likely to provoke extra-constitutional resistance against a Labour Government he agrees that normally at least our Cabinet system of government enables the will of the electorate to be carried out and is preferable to the American, French or former German democratic models. He quite rightly sees in party the great cohesive and directive factor in government, and is strongly opposed to proportional representation. "Once we grant the need for legislation on a body of coherent principle, the fragmentization of opinion may easily prove a major disaster." Moreover the Cabinet, being a party committee and, subject to the impact of public opinion, in control of the House of Commons "knows that it can get what it wants. The result is to make responsibility direct and policy coherent." Professor Laski does not regard a Member of Parliament's duties as merely automatic. He points, for example, to the ventilation of grievances and opinion and the extraction of information. However, he would enlarge their functions by setting up committees to advise Departments and to scrutinise delegated legislation and by extending the use of the Select Committee for inquiries and the examination of Private Members' Bills. "The real function of the House is to watch the process of administration as the safeguard of the private citizen." Professor Laski, however, vigorously denies the existence of a bureaucratic "despotism" in the Civil Service, although it is noticeable that he favours many safeguards which critics urge. His main complaint is in the alleged class consciousness of the upper grades of the Service and their inability to appreciate the working-class view.

Apart from the House of Lords, for which, of course, Professor Laski has little or no constitutional use, much of his sharpest criticism is directed against the judiciary, with its alleged "ignorance of, and hostility to, modern social reform." The need is for greater elasticity in statutory interpretation and for a "far profounder understanding by the judges that the historic philosophy of the Common Law is in considerable part unsuited by its inherent individualism to the necessary implications of a collectivist age." The author likens the High Court to the United States' Supreme

Court as a deliberate and reactionary brake upon social change. Such a charge and comparison is quite untenable. Unlike the Supreme Court, the English judiciary is bound strictly by precedent and is obliged to observe rules and decisions which may have ceased to be in touch with modern conditions, and also be disliked by the judges themselves. There is, for example, the notorious doctrine of common employment and it is noticeable that, where lack of precedent has permitted, its application has been restricted or abrogated as in the case of statutory duties. It is far better that settled rules of the Common Law should be amended, where necessary, by legislation than that the judiciary should exercise an arbitrary discretion governed by the individual views of its personnel. Professor Laski himself condemns the latter practice which exists to a certain degree in the Supreme Court of the United States.

A. G. DE M.

UNDERSTANDING MODERN JAPAN.*

Mr. Morgan Young is a distinguished member of Far Eastern circles, having been for ten years editor of one of Japan's best-known English newspapers, *The Japan Chronicle*. He has had peculiar opportunities to take a long view of all that has happened in that country during some very momentous years. Now that Japan is dominated by her military, however, criticism, or indeed the reporting of unwelcome news, rouses the wrath of her rulers, and Mr. Young has most arbitrarily been forbidden to reoccupy his editorial chair. This is the second record of Modern Japan which Mr. Young has given us. The first concerned Japan from 1912 to 1926. The present volume takes up the story from 1926 to 1938.

Books on Japan are very varied in type; so it is curious that, somehow, between them all, Western readers have failed to gain any balanced conception of Japan. Last century Lord Redesdale in his *Tales of Old Japan* showed us a feudal people, samurai loyal to the death, quick upon the sword. Yet, even while we read, as Mr. Morgan Young points out, we wondered what was the matter with us that, at heart, we could not wholly admire those "heroes," the Forty-Seven Ronins who so persistently hounded down their lord's slayer,

* *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938*. By A. Morgan Young. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

and then committed *bara-kiri*. Next came Lafcadio Hearn, who delighted us with Japan's nature-loving artistry and charm. Yet, even so, the Western sensed a curious ghoulishness, an uneasy fear of the unseen, which Christianity has long exorcised in us. Not so long ago most of us were reading Arthur Waley's admirable translation of *The Tales of Genji*, and were confounded to find ourselves in a Japan of the eleventh century as sophisticatedly amorous and cynical as English society in Charles II's day. Is the genius of Japan really too elusive for Western comprehension? Or can it be, alas, that we understand it only too well?—even though we know that behind the modern gunmen-descendants of the old vengeful Ronins must be an inarticulate kindly peasantry, and beneath the herded university students and teachers the yearning of unspoken thought. We tell ourselves that in this twentieth century Japan's growing and reputable list of scientists makes it impossible that her ideology should be founded on any Sun-Goddess myth. Yet we are forced to believe missionaries when they tell us how they have been held in court for hours on end, because they would not teach that the Emperor of Japan is the Highest Authority in the universe. Japan's rulers may give a theoretical assent to the Buddhist hypothesis of "the impermanence of all things"; but the outside world cannot help seeing that, within the last forty years, Japan has reft from her neighbour, China, the Liuchiu Islands, Formosa, the suzerainty of Korea, the three Manchurian provinces of China with their wealth of coal, iron, and the soya bean; that she is now engaged in absorbing—if she can—Jehol, Inner Mongolia, and all North China; admittedly has her eyes on the coal and iron of Shansi and Shantung provinces; and, at the moment, is pressing on Central and Southern China, to destroy—again, if she can—the one government that has raised China up from her chaos to hope and unity.

Mr. Morgan Young gives us the inside history of all this, and vivid lights on the personalities concerned. It is a most disturbing and pitiful picture, but it gives a point and a meaning to what we see of Japan abroad; for the fabric is of one piece. Japan's devastation of China is identical with her destruction of progressive and constructive thought at home. Nor is the sword clean. Corruption, jealousy, treachery are rife amongst these soldier-rulers; and stupidity almost

past belief. Hamaguchi's policy of conservation of the great funds which Japan accumulated during the European War has been thrown to the wind. The more intransigent military would like science omitted from university courses as leading to "dangerous thoughts." The mildest objector to military domination is at once dubbed a "Communist" and is thereafter totally deprived of justice. It is small wonder that no man of parts is willing to become Premier, since assassination on the score of indignant patriotism surely awaits him if military demands on the Budget are not met *instantly* and *in toto*.

Nobody can predict how it will all end. For Japan's sake as well as China's, one cannot help hoping that she may find herself bogged in China, and be forced to re-think. Meanwhile, Mr. Morgan Young's book should be read by any who are interested in world affairs: and which of us to-day can afford to be otherwise? He writes logically, interestingly and with personal knowledge—and with a restraint which cannot have been easy to maintain.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

SLUMP AND RECOVERY, 1929-37.*

This book based upon economic chapters contributed by Mr. Hodson to the annual *Survey of International Affairs* is an indispensable work of reference for students of international and national economy during a most critical period of shifting experimental industry, commerce and finance. It is inevitable that finance should assert its prominence, both as a measure of economic facts and forces and as a prime causal factor. For the chief features of this economic period, the struggle of many countries after economic isolation, the depression of 1931-3, the subsequent American crisis, the restriction of production in several industries and countries, the eccentric treatment of gold, the attempts at international policies, the armaments boom of 1936-7, find their most intelligible explanation in financial movements.

We have here a full and detailed account of these and other factors in both their national and international setting, with important incidental light upon the relations between economics and politics, internal and external.

* By H. V. Hodson. Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

The chief lesson that emerges is the chaotic state of economic thinking among the statesmen, economists and business men involved in the proceedings. The struggles after higher price levels, the oscillation of inflationary and deflationary "cures" for economic diseases, the costly public aids to depressed or excessively productive industries, the futile Conferences with their excellent assertions of principle and complete failure of policy—these revelations of unreason in the practical affairs of life are most disconcerting. It is not, however, Mr. Hodson's business to dwell upon the follies but to place them upon record for future analysts to study.

Protective duties are seen to play a most important part in the limitation and direction of international trade. It is natural that much space should be devoted to our own protective and restrictive policy, begun in war-time for purposes of national security and developed later for different ends. The growing sentiment of Imperialism contributed to damage our trade with many of our former customers, in particular Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Finland, Poland, Chile and Argentina. How far such disadvantages are offset by improved and enlarged trade with Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa is a question that still awaits an answer. The new position of the United States, suddenly converted from a debtor to a creditor nation by war and early post-war loans and investments, receives due attention in these chapters, for the American banking crisis reacted with mighty effect upon the trade and finance of the entire world.

Mr. Hodson, while admitting the influence of armaments expansion on trade revival in 1936-7, thinks there is a tendency to exaggerate its size. That it contributed to higher prices, not only of goods directly involved in armaments but of many other articles, is, of course, indisputable, but the effect differed widely in different countries, according to the measure in which they were debtors or creditors, producers of foods and raw materials or of manufactured goods for internal consumption or for export.

The writer distinguishes five phases in the period under study. The first was the depression which began in 1929 and was aggravated by the financial crisis of 1931. The next phase was one of "international defaults, of standstills, of exchange control," with various attempts to find solutions

along international lines which failed for lack of confidence. Then followed a phase of national efforts towards recovery which showed some measure of success in spite of the continuance of low prices. Fourthly came the phase of rising prices with promise of a boom when the collapse of the gold bloc coincided with commercial expansion and high governmental spending. Finally, we reach the pricking of the price boom early in 1937. "Associated with the curve of economics was a curve of political change, neither exactly parallel with it nor wholly representing cause or effect of the economic ups and downs, but linked to the economic curve by many important ties."

J. A. H.

THE RELIGIOUS STRUGGLE IN GERMANY.*

For breadth of vision, complete mastery of the subject, and moderation in tone the Dean of Chichester's book, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany*, stands unrivalled. With great skill Dr. Duncan-Jones traces the stages of a struggle which has compelled the attention of the Christian world for the last five years. That this struggle was inevitable, given the nature of the two antagonists, the Christian Church and the National Socialist State, is the main argument of the book. It is a struggle between two conceptions of life, each of which demands a complete surrender of the individual, the totalitarian claims of the State in Germany being by no means less emphatic or less comprehensive than those of Christianity itself. More than that, it is a struggle between two Churches. For the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* is not merely a philosophy of life, it actually forms a religion, with its own dogmas and symbols, and its own sacraments, centring round the personality of Adolf Hitler. In clear terms the author states the issue. "What is the dogma before which the clear-sighted Christians of Germany have refused to bow? It is the assertion that the rise of Adolf Hitler, his success in restoring German self-confidence, and his recovery of German military might, with its promise of reversing the defeat of 1918—that

* *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany*. By the Dean of Chichester. Victor Gollancz. 8s. 6d.

these things are a miracle of God, a Divine Act, more significant than the appearance on the earth of Jesus Christ."

At the outset, it is true, this issue was obscured. The successes of National Socialism in the political field were certainly appreciated by Christians of all confessions, and the promised moral regeneration of the German nation was eagerly welcomed. Only when it became apparent that National Socialism would not confine its activities to politics and morals, that it demanded man's soul as well as his body, and that the creed it endeavoured to force upon men was decidedly anti-Christian, did the Protestant Churches begin an organised resistance against the encroachments of the State.

The author gives a very clear and intelligible account of the details of the conflict without ever losing sight of the main issue. For the most part he lets the facts speak for themselves. He traces the development of the Confessional Movement from its very beginnings to the establishment of the Confessional Church with its great synods, and takes pains to show the different methods employed by the State to effect a co-ordination of the Church, and the various forms of pressure applied. It is a sad story of human suffering inflicted by human ignorance of man's deepest needs. At the same time it is a story of heroism and sacrifice which testifies to the reality of the Church.

In the four chapters devoted to the struggle of the Roman Catholic Church, Dr. Duncan-Jones shows that though the form of attack may vary—smuggling and immorality trials taking the place of financial and legal pressure—the National Socialist State is equally desirous of breaking the Roman Catholic Church, to which the Concordat of July 20th, 1933, affords as slight protection as the Church Constitution of July 14th, 1933, to the Protestant Churches. The growing danger to the Roman Church is reflected in the gradual change of outlook of the Pope, who has been persuaded that the German form of Fascism constitutes as great a menace to Christianity as Bolshevism.

The Dean of Chichester leaves no doubt that the struggle for religious freedom in Germany is still continuing and that it will continue in spite of perils and persecutions. "When the choice was offered—as it is clearly offered—Hitler or Christ, there can be but one answer."

GERTRUDE FARION.

THE GENIUS OF THE GERMAN LYRIC.*

What is the most criticised feature of the Nazi régime in Germany to-day? Probably the coercion of the individual, the fact that honesty of thought is being suffocated there. . . . It is, therefore, delightfully refreshing to come to Mr. Closs's book. From the inviolable retreat of Bristol University he is able to speak in perfect freedom. He extols nothing unduly and withholds nothing from us—he never, for instance, denies all knowledge of the name of Heine, nor does he appear to smile in inane ignorance at the mention of Thomas Mann or Stefan Zweig. Race is for him no all-determining factor of the lyricist's genius. Rather he sees the lyric as part of a great tradition, and traces out its long development, chequered and uneven as has been the development of the national life of the German people. And for this very reason, because amidst the unrest and upheavals of the past there has never existed a great literary society or literary *coterie*—as, for example in France in the seventeenth century—the lyric has become an essential characteristic of Germany's literature. It reflects the fleeting emotion of a moment—a moment caught and rescued for ever from the passing of time. In all ages the lyric has reached the highest form of German literary excellence, and from out the pages of this book some of those sweet old folk-songs seem to come floating over the air, to fill one with nostalgia for the German forests, and the German Rhine.

And so Mr. Closs opens little fairy doors, and shows us a dream-world: old court-yards the haunt of the Minnesingers and Meistersingers; the prim gardens of classicism; the "gushing fountains and whispering trees of the Romantic poets"; the "kaleidoscopic colouring," the verdant pastoral borders of the Impressionists. But the garden wall is, and remains, the end of the cosmos. Perhaps Mr. Closs is mistaken in not conjuring up a sufficient background of history. Poetry, even lyric poetry, is not severable from the time when it is written. The Muses walk hand in hand. History and literature are, must be, to a certain extent co-existent and interdependent. It is a pity, for instance, to discuss the Romantic movement with only a passing allusion to Revolutionary

* An Historic Survey of its Formal and Metaphysical Values. By A. Closs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 18s.

Europe, and to cite modern poetry without a reference to the demands of Nazi Germany. But Mr. Closs is so occupied in cultivating his garden that he fails to look over the garden walls!

Yet this book is and will remain an outstanding achievement because of the real intimate understanding and sympathy which it shows for the German character. Mr. Closs argues that the Germans love nothing better than to follow an enthusiasm. They evolve a slogan, and it becomes their self-imposed duty to carry out that slogan to the letter. Even in literature they develop the mentality of the poster-artist! But patiently the author bears with them through all their literary phases by turns—*Wanderlust*, *Waldeinsamkeit*, *Waldweben*, *Weltschmerz*, *Kultur*, *Weltanschauung*—up to the curiously mystical catch-phrase of the moderns: “*Mensch, werde wesentlich.*” These manifold voices echoing through Germany’s lyric poetry have always acted upon it as an immense stimulus. To-day in Germany there is no stimulus lacking, and Mr. Closs tells us that there is a literary movement afoot, worthy and deserving to enter into the very vast heritage to which it has become heir.

E. R. HODSOLL.

CHINESE WOMEN, YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY.*

This is a book of uncommon charm. It unites in a personal manner the most diverse qualities such as a light and readable style, profound knowledge of the subject and, what seem to a non-Chinese, excellent translations of Chinese poems with attractive drawings made either from rubbings or from original modern designs. One criticism which may be offered is that Mrs. Ayscough, like many strangers who adopt a sympathetic and understanding attitude towards a foreign country, paints her picture in altogether too rosy a light. By this she not only omits doing full justice to the complexities of a great culture, but hampers some of the effect of her book, as, artistically speaking, it lacks contrasts.

In the first part ancient and modern China are compared, and the social position of the Chinese women of old, which was defined by the Yin principle—the principle of earth, darkness and the moon—is explained. An interesting reference

* By Florence Ayscough. Cape. 12s. 6d.

is given to the eight terms of maternal relationship, such as legal mother and divorced mother. Yang and Yin are complementary, and so are men and women although their activities are distinct. To-day concubinage is no longer legally admitted, and modern women, now that they have entered professional life and may be self-supporting, are apt to be intolerant of double standards. Perhaps the most remarkable women of our age in China are the "3 sisters," the ladies of the Soong family, Mrs. H. H. Kung, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek. All three are Christians, a fact which seems of great importance to the understanding of modern womanhood in China.

In the second part, Mrs. Ayscough studies Chinese women, both of the present and the past, such as educationalists, artists and writers. A deeper sociological analysis is not attempted, and therefore it is difficult to realise what meaning the fact had for the general condition of Chinese women in the fourteenth century that a painter, like Lady Kuan, could hold high positions at court.

The third part gives a comprehensive summary of the Lieh Nü Chuan as summarised in the Kuei Fan in 1591. Particularly interesting, both sociologically and psychologically, is the story of a lady of the Shih clan. She passes a useless life in the harem of the Emperor T'ai Tsung (627-50) and writes a poem expressing her thoughts which she slips into the sleeve of a coat; there it is eventually found and the maiden is married to the foot-soldier who detected it. Ten widows are chosen by the Chinese author as worthy of immortal fame because they have, under trying conditions, protected their chastity. The "Ways" also illustrate the joint family system of old China, where the sons and their wives shared the paternal home and a common purse. In the short space available for this review it is impossible to do justice to all the aspects of cultural life evoked by Mrs. Ayscough's book. It is a valuable introduction to Chinese civilisation for the layman, and makes delightful reading for the student.

HELEN ROSENAU.

CROMWELL'S UNDERSTUDY.*

Dr. William Harbutt Dawson is best known for his valuable works on modern Germany, but he is also a specialist on the

* *Cromwell's Understudy: The Life and Times of General John Lambert.* By William Harbutt Dawson. Hodge & Co. 15s.

Cromwellian period. A full-length biography of Lambert was urgently required, and this substantial volume is the realisation of a plan conceived nearly sixty years ago. It is a dramatic story, sympathetically told, and based on a mass of fresh material. There is no suggestion of greatness about him, and he was not a very striking personality ; but he was a fine character, patriotic, honourably ambitious, cultured and averse to extremes. If there is nothing of the overpowering genius of Cromwell, there is also nothing of the ruthlessness of the greatest man of action in our history. Dr. Dawson admires the Protector a good deal less than Gardiner. He speaks of his mobile conscience, and he explains why Lambert did not get on very well with him.

They differed in that Cromwell, in his honest impatience to hasten the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth, was prepared to carry restriction and prohibition into every department of social life, where Lambert, with a stronger faith in humanity and a larger and more generous conception of personal liberty, distrusted the assumption that men and women should or could be made moral by legal compulsion. He consistently refused, in fact, to mix religion and politics.

Cromwell was first a Puritan, whereas Lambert was, above all, a liberal Parliamentarian.

After helping him both to win his victories and to rule the country, General Lambert withdrew from the Government in 1657, a year before Cromwell's death. He had approved and indeed proposed the Protectorate, but he declined to encourage the still higher ambitions of his chief. He regained influence on the death of the Protector, and the obvious incompetence of Richard Cromwell turned many eyes towards the man who was well liked by the army and had no violent enemies. But the royalist tide had begun to flow when the country was ruled by the Major-Generals, and when Oliver was gone it swelled into an irresistible flood. Clarendon and other Royalists used to discuss the question whether Lambert, whose moderation was generally recognised and who had no share in the execution of the King, might perhaps promote the restoration of the dynasty. The chance was seized by Monck, and Lambert's career closed at the early age of 41, when Charles II returned to Whitehall. He was condemned to death for his active part in what Royalists described as the great rebellion, but passed the remaining twenty-four years

of his life as a prisoner, first in the Channel Islands and then on an island in Plymouth Sound. "The more he is studied and understood," writes his biographer, "the more attractive as a man and the more important as a historical figure he will be found. He was called by Cromwell and the soldiers Honest John Lambert, and such a name is not bestowed without reason." Dr. Dawson makes out a very strong case for his favourable verdict.

G. P. G.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937,* by Maxwell Macartney and Paul Cremona, is the first full, authoritative and fairly impartial survey of the subject. The authors, who have spent many years in Rome as correspondents of leading English and American journals, detest dictatorships like the rest of us, but they keep their feelings under control. Introductory chapters on the war and the peace treaties are followed by studies of different aspects of Italian policy—Fiume, Albania, France, Germany, England, the Near East, the League of Nations, Disarmament, Abyssinia, etc. The authors find a good deal to criticise not only in Italian but in British policy. They remind us that the Corfu affair earned for Signor Mussolini "that name of a dangerous international firebrand which has clung to him ever since." They write with justifiable resentment of "the deliberately fomented anti-British campaign of lies and coarse insults which for months dishonoured the Italian Press." But they also censure the deplorable errors of the British Government at the opening of the Abyssinian war, when Sir Samuel Hoare blew a loud blast on the League trumpet at Geneva and then ran away as soon as Mussolini showed his teeth. "Great Britain raised among her partisans of the League hopes such as could not be realised, and her mistake was that of not having seen in advance the consequences of an action doomed to failure because of the manner in which it was conducted. Thus the failure of the League likewise became a British diplomatic defeat of the first order." The closing chapter on Italy's future aims is not cheerful reading. Writing before Mr. Chamberlain's Anglo-Italian treaty was concluded, our authors declare that the recognition of Abyssinia would not end the trouble. The real source of anxiety is the Mediterranean. Is there room for more than one Great Power there? The Fascists are convinced that there is not. "When Italians call the Mediterranean *mare nostro*, these are no empty words. . . Italy, re-born as a nation under Fascism, is seeking to wrest from Great Britain her undisputed sway over the Mediterranean which began with the capture of Gibraltar."

* Oxford University Press, 12s. 6d.

Education in Nazi Germany, by Two English Investigators (The Kulturkampf Association, 19 Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2), provides a carefully documented account of a very important subject. All autocracies try to capture the child, and the Nazis are as thorough as the Bolsheviks. "The mind of the German youth," writes Sir Norman Angell in a Foreword, "is now being so formed as to subserve the ends of evil, to undermine all hopes of peace and disarmament, and to menace the security of free communities like those of the British Commonwealth." In these seventy pages the reader will find a wealth of material, derived from many official sources, relating to the general aims of education, Hitler's theory of race, the textbooks, the universities, the teachers, and such outside influences as athletics and religion. The whole story is summarised in a quotation from Dr. Ley, head of the Labour Front: "The Party claims the totality of the soul of the German People. It cannot and will not suffer that another party or point of view should dominate in Germany." Such spiritual tyranny can be imposed for a time by terror and brute force, but some day it will be shaken off by a great and highly cultured people, perhaps at the cost of a world war. That the mind of the country which produced Lessing and Kant and Humboldt and Goethe is being dragooned by anti-semitic fanatics is enough to make the angels weep.

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*The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service** is a valuable and informative book by Mr. Charles J. Jeffries, who is an Assistant-Secretary to the Colonial Office. Since the Report of the Warren Fisher Committee in 1930 there has been great reorganisation in colonial administration towards unification and the creation of definite professional services, and in the Colonial Legal Service and the Colonial Medical Service. The author is careful to point out that this development is "complementary and not in opposition to the development of local services manned as far as may be possible from local resources." In this volume Mr. Jeffries is only concerned with the services recruited from Whitehall, and provides a lucid and straightforward description with an historical background. It is a book which should appeal particularly to the student of colonial administrative methods and to the potential recruit to any of the main branches of the Service.

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The Marchioness of Londonderry has published an interesting collection of *Letters from Benjamin Disraeli to Frances Anne Marchioness of Londonderry, 1837-1861*.† Extracts from some of the more important letters in this correspondence have already appeared in *Monypenny*

* Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

† Macmillan. 7s. 6d. net.

and Buckle's *Life*, and Lady Londonderry has now taken the opportunity of publishing these along with fifty further letters, all linked together by a short commentary and historical narrative. The letters are largely concerned with social gossip, but in some measure they also express Disraeli's outlook upon the passing political scene. Lady Londonderry has also something to say of the life and character of Frances Anne, whose patronage and friendship Disraeli so solicitously courted and received for more than twenty years and whom he once described as "half ruffian—half great lady."

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*A Tour in Northumbria** has been issued under the auspices of the North-Eastern Trading Estates Ltd., whose efforts, without any view to profit, in attracting to the Special Area in the North-East new industries are well known. The main purpose of this most attractive and informative book is to explain the charm and amenities of Northumberland and County Durham as a residential area for the industrialist and business man from the South. The author, Mr. Douglas Goldring, is himself a Londoner and in these vivid pages describes with enthusiasm his first impressions of the scenery, people and historic and romantic associations of this corner of England. It is too frequently forgotten, as he points out, that the coal mining and industrial areas in Northumberland amount in extent to only a tenth of the county and the remainder consists of sparsely populated agricultural land and "wild and deserted hills and moorlands, of an extraordinary beauty and grandeur." This short volume with its delightful illustrations forms an attractive introduction to this too little known countryside and coast, apart from its more special aim in showing the enjoyment of living in an area where the pleasures of town, sea and countryside are equally at your doorstep.

It is not inappropriate here to welcome a cheap edition of *Shadows on the Hills*.† Miss Nancy Price's reminiscences among the Cumberland Fells are written with a delicacy, depth of insight and a descriptive power which mark out the particular charm and merit of her book.

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A new addition to the English Scene series edited by Mr. Eric Parker is a delightful volume by Mr. Patrick Chalmers on *The Angler's England*.‡ It is more than an appreciation of the English countryside from the fisherman's angle. The author approaches angling from most varied viewpoints, including literary, artistic and social aspects, in a narrative lightly written and enlivened with anecdotes and the author's own deep knowledge and experiences of fishing.

* Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

‡ Seeley Service & Co. 8s. 6d. net.